Read-only verification harness for CVE-2026-43621, an SMF profile authorization bypass. Tests parameter variants to detect cross-account access to profile settings without exploiting it.
A read-only verification harness for CVE-2026-43621, an authorization flaw in Simple Machines Forum that lets a low-privilege member reach another member's profile account settings area.
The tool proves or disproves the missing authorization check. It does not contain an exploit chain, a password write, or an account-takeover step.
Run this only against a forum you own, or one you have written permission to
test. The harness refuses any non-loopback host unless you pass
--i-own-this-target, and it only sends GET requests plus an optional
credential-free POST.
| CVE | CVE-2026-43621 |
| Product | Simple Machines Forum (SMF) |
| Affected | SMF 3.0 — see Validation status |
| Fixed in | commit 6f0dc61958aa (Sources/Actions/Profile/*) |
| Class | Authorization bypass through a user-controlled key |
| Impact | Cross-account access to profile settings, including the password-change form |
The profile controller selects the member whose account form to render from a
request parameter (u). The 3.0 refactor (Sources/Actions/Profile/*, with
Profile::load()) does not bind that id to the authenticated session before
the account-settings form is built. A member who is allowed to edit their own
account can therefore ask for someone else's.
Because the returned form includes the new-password fields, reaching it is equivalent to account takeover — the target's password can be replaced through the normal save action. That write is intentionally not implemented here.
SMF 2.1.x uses a different profile implementation (
Sources/Profile.php, noProfile::load). It is not affected by this code path. See Validation status.
u=<you>) and confirms it
returns your own password form. If this fails, the run is inconclusive —
the detector is wrong for the install, not the target safe.;/& separators,
null bytes, numeric coercion (01, 1.0, 1e0), and trailing whitespace.Every request is paced (--delay) and retried on 429/5xx.
requestspip install -r requirements.txt
python smf_profile_authz.py \
--base http://127.0.0.1:8080/forums \
--cookie-file .cookie \
--my-id 42 \
--target-id 1
--cookie-file holds the Name=Value pair copied from a logged-in browser
session, for example:
SMFCookie240327=%7B%220%22%3A42%2C...
You can also pass --cookie "SMFCookie240327=..." directly, or set
SMF_PHPSESSID if the install requires a separate PHP session cookie.
| Flag | Meaning |
|---|---|
--base | Forum base URL (required) |
--cookie / --cookie-file | Session cookie for the low-privilege account |
--cookie-name | Cookie name (default SMFCookie240327) |
--my-id | Your member id (required) |
--target-id | Member id to reach (required, must differ from --my-id) |
--include-post | Also try the id in a POST body (no save, no credential fields) |
--delay | Seconds between requests (default 0.5) |
--retries | Retries on 429/5xx (default 2) |
--json | Emit a machine-readable report |
--i-own-this-target | Required for any host that is not loopback |
--insecure | Skip TLS verification |
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 | Not vulnerable |
1 | Vulnerable |
2 | Inconclusive, or usage/connection error |
### control: own account area (u=2) ###
[--] own account (control) 200 len=674 own-account
### matrix: target account area (u=1) ###
[!!] canonical 200 len=680 target-account
[!!] array u[] 200 len=680 target-account
[--] null byte 200 len=148 denied errors=['You are not allowed to access this section.']
...
### result ###
[!!] canonical: action=profile;area=account;u=1
[!!] array u[]: action=profile;area=account;u[]=1
VULNERABLE: 2 request(s) returned the account form for u=1 while authenticated as u=2.
This proves the authorization check is missing; it is not an account takeover.
own-account on a target variant means the server ignored the parameter and
rendered your own form — not a finding. Only target-account counts.
A clean matrix is not proof of a patch. Confirm the control hit, then diff the install against the fixed release.
| Environment | Result |
|---|---|
| Local mock, vulnerable routing | VULNERABLE (exit 1) |
| Local mock, patched routing | NOT VULNERABLE (exit 0) |
| Live SMF 2.1.4 install | NOT VULNERABLE — expected: 2.1.x has no Profile::load / Sources/Actions/Profile |
| Live SMF 3.0 build (vulnerable) | not tested |
The detector itself is exercised end to end against both mock modes, so the control/matrix/verdict logic is sound. It has not been run against a live vulnerable 3.0 install. Treat it as a detector whose positive result needs manual confirmation, not as a validated exploit.
POST-only variant of the bug is not covered unless you pass
--include-post.arg_separator.input settings are covered only for ; and &.The step that turns a missing check into a takeover is a single POST with
two password fields. Shipping that publicly would convert a vulnerability
advisory into a one-command account-takeover tool for every unpatched 3.0
forum. The authorization gap is fully demonstrated by returning the form; the
write adds no diagnostic value to this repo.
If you need to prove full impact — for a vendor report or your own lab — do the save manually against an instance you control, and document it in your write-up rather than in a public tool.
6f0dc61958aa.action=profile requests to
admins when the u parameter differs from the session member id, at the
reverse proxy or WAF. This is a stopgap, not a fix; the matrix above shows
how many spellings of the parameter have to be denied.MIT — see LICENSE.