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CMF-Watch-Pro-2-BLE-Protocol — Reverse-engineered BLE protocol for the CMF Watch Pro 2, documenting GATT layout, AES-128-CBC encrypted command frames, authentication handshake, and health data sync for alternative companion app development. | Kitploit
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GitHubjoshuapassos/cmf-watch-pro-2-ble-protocol

CMF-Watch-Pro-2-BLE-Protocol

Reverse-engineered BLE protocol for the CMF Watch Pro 2, documenting GATT layout, AES-128-CBC encrypted command frames, authentication handshake, and health data sync for alternative companion app development.

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31643 months agoNot yet reviewed

CMF Watch Pro 2 — BLE Protocol (reverse-engineered)

Unofficial. This document describes the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol of the CMF Watch Pro 2 (CMF by Nothing), reconstructed by reverse engineering for an alternative companion app. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by Nothing/CMF. Use at your own risk.

All multi-byte integers in the frame header and opcodes are big-endian. Integers inside command payloads are little-endian unless stated otherwise (this mirrors the device firmware) — watch out for the exceptions (GOALS_SET, GPS_PUSH, bulk-transfer offset/length are big-endian).

Confidence markers

Every non-obvious claim below is tagged with how it was established:

  • ✅ validated on-device — observed in a decrypted live capture or exercised against a real watch.
  • 🔎 from firmware / APK RE — extracted by decompiling the firmware (1.0.0.73) or the official APK (3.5.7); consistent with the code but not runtime-tested.
  • 🟡 partially proven — structurally established (offline, corpus-wide, or by RE) but the remaining step needs the watch and hasn't been run.
  • ⚠️ [uncertain] — inferred, not confirmed; may be wrong.

Where a later section corrects an earlier one, the earlier text is kept with a pointer rather than deleted — knowing which readings were tried and refuted saves the next person the same detour.

Test device for all captures: CMF Watch Pro 2-5485, fw 1.0.0.73, serial CI04102520008192, MCU Actions ATS3089C (Cortex-M4), screen 466×360.


1. GATT layout

The phone is the GATT client; the watch is the peripheral, advertising as CMF Watch Pro 2-XXXX (4 hex chars).

PurposeServiceCharacteristicProperties
Command write0000fff0-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb0000fff2-…Write
Command notify0000fff0-…0000fff1-…Notify
Shell write (AT)—77d4ff01-2fe2-2334-0d35-9ccd078f529cWrite
Shell notify (AT)—77d4ff02-…Notify
Bulk data write—02f00000-0000-0000-0000-00000000ffe1Write
Bulk data notify—02f00000-…ffe2Notify

Enable notifications by writing 01 00 to each CCCD (00002902-…). The command channel (fff1/fff2) carries the framed protocol below. The shell channel (77d4…) carries plain AT-style text (e.g. AT GETSECRET; see §14). The data channel (02f0…) carries large binary blobs (watchface, firmware, AGPS), coordinated by control opcodes on the command channel.

Service UUIDs — the watch advertises ~10 primary services. Enumerated on a real unit: 0xfff0 (command), 0x180f (battery), 0x180a (device info), 0xefe7, 0xffd0, 02f00000-…ffe0 and 02f00000-…fe00 (data), 77d4e67c-2fe2-2334-0d35-9ccd078f529c (shell / pairing), e49a3001-f69a-11e8-8eb2-f2801f1b9fd1, f48a23c0-f69a-11e8-8eb2-f2801f1b9fd1.

⚠️ The shell service UUID is 77d4e67c-…, not 77d4ff00-…. Earlier revisions of this document assumed the service shared the ff00 prefix of its characteristics (77d4ff01/77d4ff02, §14) — it does not, at least on the unit this was checked on (finding from freethinkel/fmc, see §Sources). The characteristic UUIDs are unchanged. Not verified whether 77d4e67c is stable across units — enumerate rather than hardcode.

🌐 Web Bluetooth callout. Chromium only ever discovers services that the page listed in optionalServices, even for an unfiltered getPrimaryServices() call — a page listing 3 services sees 3, while chrome://bluetooth-internals (Chrome's own C++ layer, unscoped) shows all 10. If you write a browser client, list every UUID above up front or pairing will fail with services that plainly exist. No Web Bluetooth in Firefox/Safari; needs a user gesture + HTTPS/localhost.

✅ A whole real session ran on the single command channel — during a 160 s heavy-use capture there was no traffic on the data/firmware or shell channels except during an explicit OTA/watchface transfer.


2. Frame format (0xF5)

Every command-channel message is wrapped in one or more 11-byte-header frames:

+------+-----------+--------+-------------+-------------+--------+-------------------+
| 0xF5 | chunkLen  | cmd1   | chunkCount  | chunkIndex  | cmd2   | chunk bytes …     |
| 1 B  | 2 B (BE)  | 2 B BE | 2 B BE      | 2 B BE      | 2 B BE | chunkLen bytes    |
+------+-----------+--------+-------------+-------------+--------+-------------------+
        \__________________________ 11-byte header ____________________________/
  • cmd1/cmd2 together form the opcode (see §6). 🔎 confirmed against the official app's frame builder (C6117b.m30831g).
  • chunkCount = total chunks for this command; chunkIndex is 1-based.
  • chunkLen = number of bytes of chunk in this frame.
  • A single BLE write may be fragmented by the link MTU; the receiver buffers raw bytes and re-extracts complete frames. Large payloads are split into multiple chunks (same cmd1/cmd2, increasing chunkIndex) and reassembled in order.

Opcode convention (✅ confirmed on the wire)

  • cmd1 = 0xFFFF: cmd2 in 0x80xx/0x90xx = phone→watch (request/set); 0x00xx/0xa0xx = watch→phone (reply). Pairs match by the low byte (0x9055↔0xa055, 0x8051↔0x0051).
  • feature-specific cmd1: cmd2 suffix = 0x0001 SET, 0x0002 GET, 0x0003 ACK.

Chunk body

For each chunk, the body is payloadPiece ‖ CRC32_LE(payloadPiece) (4-byte CRC, little-endian, zlib/IEEE). If the command is encrypted (see §3), the whole payloadPiece ‖ CRC is then AES-128-CBC/PKCS7 encrypted and that ciphertext becomes the frame chunk.

Plaintext quirk: for plaintext opcodes the watch counts the 4-byte CRC in chunkLen but does not transmit it. So when decoding a plaintext frame, the actual data length is chunkLen − 4. (Encrypted frames carry the CRC inside the ciphertext as normal.)

Chunk sizing (so encrypted chunks land on AES block boundaries), with maxWrite = mtu − 3:

  • encrypted: floor((maxWrite − 11) / 16) * 16 − 4 − 1
  • plaintext: maxWrite − 11 − 4 − 2

✅ All observed encrypted frame chunkLen values were multiples of 16 (block alignment holds).


3. Cryptographic primitives

  • AES-128-CBC with PKCS7 padding and a fixed IV (from firmware CmfCharacteristic.AES_IV): 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 5A.
  • CRC32 (zlib/IEEE), emitted as 4 little-endian bytes.
  • SHA-256 over the concatenation of parts.

Key derivation:

authkey      = SHA256( rnd1 ‖ rnd2 ‖ secret )[0..16]      // persisted across sessions
sessionKey   = SHA256( nonce ‖ authkey )[0..16]           // per connection
  • secret = 16-byte device secret (obtainable from the watch via the shell command AT GETSECRET → GETSECRET:<32-hex>,OK).
  • rnd1 = 16 random bytes chosen by the phone; rnd2 = 16 random bytes from the watch.
  • nonce = bytes from the watch's nonce reply.

After the key is set, all command-channel frames are AES-encrypted except the plaintext opcodes listed in §5.

✅ Both derivations validated: authkey recovered from a rooted phone's ntwatch.db matched the value derived from a captured rnd1/rnd2/secret; sessionKey reproduced from a captured nonce decrypts live frames.


4. Authentication / pairing handshake

Two entry paths share the same nonce/confirm tail.

4.1 First-time pairing (have the device secret)

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