Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-130354
ExploitationWeb Application ExploitationSecurity VirtualizationWeb SecurityAuthenticationLabs & Practice
GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-130354

CVE-2026-130354

phpMyFAQ 4.1.0-4.1.11: POST /api/webauthn/prepare creates accounts ACTIVE — bypassing spam.manualActivation and the registration domain whitelist. Anonymous visitors get ready registered accounts. Real 4.1.11 vs vendor-fixed 4.1.12 with identical policy.

View Repository
2 days agoNot yet reviewed
Website
Share

CVE-2026-130354 — phpMyFAQ: the WebAuthn sign-up endpoint creates ACTIVE accounts, bypassing manual activation and the registration domain whitelist

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-130354 (GHSA-8mmg-4qpv-p7x5)
ComponentphpMyFAQ — Controller/Frontend/WebAuthnController.php::prepare() (4.1)
Affected4.1.0 – 4.1.11
Fixed in4.1.12 (the genuine vendor fix — this lab's fixed side)
CWECWE-284 (Improper Access Control), CWE-287 (Improper Authentication)
ImpactUnauthenticated visitors obtain ready-to-use registered accounts on sites whose policy is "manual approval + e-mail domain whitelist" — everything a registered user can see or do (restricted FAQs/categories, auto-join groups, posting) is open without any approval
VectorNetwork, unauthenticated — POST /api/webauthn/prepare
Triggerone request with an arbitrary e-mail as username and the anonymously-issued webauthn CSRF token; the account is stored active with auth_source=webauthn

The regular registration path (/api/register) creates accounts blocked, enforces spam.manualActivation, and applies security.domainWhiteListForRegistrations. The WebAuthn sign-up path does none of that:

// Controller/Frontend/WebAuthnController.php (4.1.x, ~L106)
if (!$userExists) {
    $this->user->createUser($username);
    $this->user->setStatus(status: 'active');          // ← the flaw
    $this->user->setAuthSource(AuthenticationSourceType::AUTH_WEB_AUTH_N->value);
    $this->user->setUserData(['display_name' => $username, 'email' => $username]);
}

This is the incomplete-fix remnant of GHSA-w22q-m2fm-x9f4 (CVE-2026-27836): the 4.0 fix switched the status to blocked; the 4.1 port added the config/CSRF/captcha gates but kept active. This laboratory runs the real phpMyFAQ 4.1.11 vs 4.1.12 (genuine vendor differential) with WebAuthn enabled and the whitelist set on both sides.


1. Root cause

prepare() is a public API route whose only registration gate is security.enableRegistration. For a new username it creates the account with status active, sets the e-mail to the caller's chosen username (ownership never checked), and skips RegistrationHelper::isDomainAllowed() and spam.manualActivation entirely. The passkey ceremony that follows is normal WebAuthn; the policy breach has already happened at account creation.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
pmf-vulncve-2026-130354:vulnphpMyFAQ 4.1.11 (upstream tag) + MariaDB
pmf-fixedcve-2026-130354:fixedphpMyFAQ 4.1.12 — the vendor fix
pmf-db-vuln / pmf-db-fixedmariadb:10.11per-side databases
poccve-2026-130354-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

Both sides get the identical policy: WebAuthn enabled, registration enabled, manualActivation on, whitelist corp.example, captcha disabled for determinism (an independent gate — the advisory notes the attacker simply adds the field). Install is driven through the product's own setup controller. A lab-only check-user.php reports the stored account_status/auth_source for verification.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # composer install at tags 4.1.11 / 4.1.12
./run-lab.sh up        # cve130354lab network: two app+db stacks
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only):

  • check — fetch the register page (anonymous webauthn CSRF token) → POST /api/webauthn/prepare with an evil.example username → read the stored status. Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — the same, then the contrast with the regular /api/register for the identical address.
  • probe — endpoint × e-mail matrix (webauthn vs register; outsider vs insider).
  • mitigation — the vendor fix is 4.1.12.

5. Expected results

runpmf-vuln (4.1.11)pmf-fixed (4.1.12)
checkaccount active, auth webauthnrejected — no account
exploit contrastwebauthn: active · regular: blocked/not-foundboth refused
probe webauthn outsider/insideractive / activerefused
probe regular outsider/insiderheld / heldrefused

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; every container bounded on the isolated cve130354lab network.
  • Outbound HTTPS at image build (GitHub: phpMyFAQ tags; packagist).

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The endpoint × e-mail matrix is the surface sweep (evidence/0day-sweep.txt): 4.1.12 refuses every form of the bypass while enforcing the same policy through both paths. No second bypass form was found.

8. Repository layout

README.md             this write-up
run-lab.sh            environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile              convenience targets
poc/poc.py            the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile        runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile    multi-stage build (phpMyFAQ 4.1.11 / 4.1.12)
lab/entrypoint.sh     db wait -> setup-controller install -> config -> apache
lab/lab-config.php    the identical policy on both sides
lab/check-user.php    lab-only status verification endpoint
evidence/             captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md           excluded (working record)

9. References

  • CVE record — https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-130354
  • GitHub advisory — https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8mmg-4qpv-p7x5
  • phpMyFAQ — https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    936
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    555
  • 3

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    353
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    348
  • 5

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    336
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    288

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →
Download Tool