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CVE-2026-130347 — PoC and differential lab for CVE-2026-130347: phpMyFAQ password-reset flow issues tokens for OIDC/LDAP accounts, enabling local password set and IdP/MFA bypass. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-130347
Password AttacksVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationSecurity VirtualizationPenetration TestingAuthenticationLabs & Practice
GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-130347

CVE-2026-130347

PoC and differential lab for CVE-2026-130347: phpMyFAQ password-reset flow issues tokens for OIDC/LDAP accounts, enabling local password set and IdP/MFA bypass.

2 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-130347 — phpMyFAQ: password-reset authentication bypass for OIDC/Keycloak/Entra ID/LDAP/SSO/WebAuthn accounts

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-130347 (GHSA-59x6-g992-q3fm)
ComponentphpMyFAQ — Controller/Frontend/UnauthorizedUserController.php::updatePassword() (4.1)
AffectedphpMyFAQ before 4.1.12; 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2
Fixed in4.1.12 (the genuine vendor fix — this lab's fixed side)
CWECWE-640 (Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password), CWE-287 (Improper Authentication)
ImpactAnyone who can trigger a password reset for an externally-provisioned account — and read the reset mail (mailbox access, catch-all, DNS/mail redirection) — sets a NEW LOCAL PASSWORD on that account and logs in with username/password, skipping the IdP entirely and defeating its MFA, conditional access and deprovisioning
VectorNetwork, unauthenticated — PUT /api/user/password/update + POST /api/user/password/reset (both public routes)
Triggerone reset request naming the victim's login + on-file e-mail, then consume the signed link from the delivered mail

When phpMyFAQ auto-provisions an account from an external identity provider (OIDC, Keycloak, Entra ID, LDAP, SSO, WebAuthn), it stores auth_source='oidc' (etc.) — and creates a random local bcrypt hash in faquserlogin (a provisioning artifact: User::createUser($login, '') replaces the empty password with createPassword()). The public reset flow never inspects auth_source:

// UnauthorizedUserController::updatePassword() (4.1.x, ~L96)
$passHash = $this->getUserPasswordHash($user->getLogin());
if ($passHash === null) {
    return $genericSuccess;
}
$expires = time() + self::RESET_TOKEN_TTL;
$signature = $this->signResetToken($user->getUserId(), $expires, $passHash);
// … the signed link is emailed to the on-file address

The token is HMAC-SHA256 over userId|expires|passHash keyed with main.phpMyFAQToken; possession of the mailed link is the only gate. On 4.1.12 the vendor added an isLocalAccount() gate (auth_source empty or database) and refuses to issue a token for external accounts. This laboratory runs the real phpMyFAQ 4.1.11 vs 4.1.12 with Mailpit catching the reset mail and seeds alice exactly as IdP provisioning leaves an account behind.


1. Root cause

updatePassword() answers a reset request with a generic success in every negative branch — which is correct anti-enumeration — but its positive branch has no auth_source check. Because provisioning leaves a random local hash behind, getUserPasswordHash() returns a real bcrypt hash for OIDC/LDAP/WebAuthn accounts and the flow proceeds end to end: request → signed mail → resetPassword() sets a new local password → the account now authenticates locally with Auth against faquserlogin.pass. The IdP — and every control attached to it — is out of the picture.

The fixed 4.1.12 controller adds:

// 4.1.12, UnauthorizedUserController (~L207 comment + isLocalAccount())
// "Letting the public reset flow overwrite it would hand out a local
//  password that skips the provider's MFA, conditional access and
//  deprovisioning (CWE-640)."
if (!$this->isLocalAccount($user)) {
    return $genericSuccess;
}

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
pmf347-vulncve-2026-130347:vulnphpMyFAQ 4.1.11 (upstream tag) + MariaDB
pmf347-fixedcve-2026-130347:fixedphpMyFAQ 4.1.12 — the vendor fix
pmf347-db-vuln / pmf347-db-fixedmariadb:10.11per-side databases
mailpit347-vuln / mailpit347-fixedaxllent/mailpitper-side SMTP sink (the attacker's mailbox view)
poccve-2026-130347-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

Both app sides get the identical lab additions: alice provisioned as auth_source='oidc' with an on-file e-mail and a random local hash (what IdP auto-provisioning leaves), SMTP pointed at the side's Mailpit, and a lab-only check-user.php status endpoint. Install is driven through the product's own setup controller. The PoC reads the delivered mail from the Mailpit HTTP API (GET /api/v1/message/latest) — modelling the attacker-with-mailbox-access premise deterministically.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # composer install at tags 4.1.11 / 4.1.12
./run-lab.sh up        # cve130347lab network: two app+db+mailpit stacks
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only):

  • check — request a reset for alice, read Mailpit for the signed link, consume it with a chosen password, then prove local login (POST /index.php like the login form; authenticated iff the rendered page carries the logout route). Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — the same chain, narrated.
  • probe — sibling paths: tampered signature (400), weak password (400), unknown user (no mail), wrong e-mail (generic, no oracle).
  • mitigation — the vendor fix is 4.1.12 (the fixed side).

5. Expected results

runpmf347-vuln (4.1.11)pmf347-fixed (4.1.12)
checkreset mail delivered → token consumed → local login SUCCESSno mail issued for the OIDC account
exploitfull chain to an authenticated sessionchain stops at step 1
probeOIDC chain completes; tampered sig 400; weak password 400no mail; no link to tamper
mitigationvulnerablefixed

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; every container bounded on the isolated cve130347lab network (--cpus 2 --memory 4g or less).
  • Outbound HTTPS at image build (GitHub: phpMyFAQ tags; packagist).
  • Mailpit image pull (docker.io/axllent/mailpit).

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The sibling-path matrix is the surface sweep (evidence/0day-sweep.txt): 4.1.12 refuses to issue a token for external accounts, unknown users get no mail, wrong-e-mail stays generic (no enumeration oracle), and the signature HMAC plus the password policy hold. On 4.1.11 the only broken invariant is the missing auth_source check. No second bypass form was found. Deployment note: faquserlogin.pass on external accounts is a silent local-credential artifact — rotating it or nulling it at provisioning removes the reset attack surface entirely even on unpatched releases (the reset flow returns the generic no-mail branch when the hash is absent).

8. Repository layout

README.md             this write-up
run-lab.sh            environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile              convenience targets
poc/poc.py            the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile        runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile    multi-stage build (phpMyFAQ 4.1.11 / 4.1.12)
lab/entrypoint.sh     db wait -> setup-controller install -> seed -> smtp -> apache
lab/seed-victim.php   provisions the OIDC victim exactly as IdP auto-provisioning
lab/mail-config.php   points the mailer at the side's Mailpit
lab/lab-config.php    base lab configuration applied identically to both sides
lab/check-user.php    lab-only status verification endpoint
evidence/             captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md           excluded (working record)

9. References

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