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CVE-2026-130335 — Differential lab and PoC for CVE-2026-130335: OS command injection in Info-ZIP zip -T via crafted archive names, with vulnerable and patched builds. | Kitploit
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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-130335

CVE-2026-130335

Differential lab and PoC for CVE-2026-130335: OS command injection in Info-ZIP zip -T via crafted archive names, with vulnerable and patched builds.

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CVE-2026-130335 — Info-ZIP zip -T: OS command injection through a crafted archive name

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-130335 (Debian DSA, bugs.debian.org/1143866)
ComponentInfo-ZIP Zip 3.0 (and 3.1 beta – 3.1c) — check_zipfile() in zip.c
AffectedZip 3.0, 3.1b–3.1c; fixed in Debian zip/3.0-16 (fix-command-injection.patch)
Fixed inthe genuine Debian/Info-ZIP fix — quote_arg() proper quoting (this lab's fixed side)
CWECWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
ImpactArbitrary command execution with the privileges of whoever runs zip -T on an attacker-influenced archive name — CI pipelines, packaging services, upload-verify flows
VectorLocal/queued: the attacker controls the archive name; the victim (or pipeline) runs zip -T <name>; the CVE notes no common scenario ships untrusted names to zip -T — the lab models the precondition honestly
Triggeran archive name containing a single quote, e.g. a.zip';id>pwned;#

zip -T verifies a freshly written archive by building a shell command and calling system():

/* zip 3.0 check_zipfile() — the UNIX branch wraps the name in SINGLE quotes */
strcat(cmd, "'");
strcat(cmd, zipname);
strcat(cmd, "'");
...
result = system(cmd);

A name containing a single quote breaks out of that quoting and runs attacker commands. Debian's fix (3.0-16) introduces quote_arg() — double-quote wrapping with per-character escaping of ", !, $, backtick and backslash. This laboratory builds both sides from the upstream 3.0 source with the Debian patch series, differing only by the one fix patch.


1. Root cause

Single quotes are not a quoting mechanism that survives attacker input containing single quotes. check_zipfile() builds (on UNIX):

sh -c "unzip -tqq 'a.zip';id>pwned;#'"

The first ' after a.zip closes the quoted span; the rest is shell. The fix quotes with double quotes and escapes the five dangerous characters, so the name reaches unzip as one literal argument.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
zip-vulncve-2026-130335:vulnZip 3.0 + Debian patches without fix-command-injection.patch (= 3.0-15)
zip-fixedcve-2026-130335:fixedsame + the fix patch (= 3.0-16) — genuine vendor/distro fix
poccve-2026-130335-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

The packaging service models the documented precondition: the caller chooses the archive name, a real zip is created under that name, and zip -T verifies it — exactly what upload/CI pipelines do. The filename is passed to zip as a single argv element (no shell at the service layer), so any breakout happens inside Zip's own system() call. unzip is installed because zip -T shells out to unzip -tqq.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # builds zip 3.0 twice (with/without the fix patch)
./run-lab.sh up        # cve130335lab network, zip-vuln, zip-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

4. The PoC

A standalone full-chain exploit script ships at exploit/exploit.py (python3 exploit/exploit.py --host=<target>; exit 1 on confirmed exploitation, 0 on a safe target).

  • check — benign name, then the single-quote breakout; classified by the marker file the injected command writes. Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — baseline + breakout; prints the injected command's output (uid=0(root) ... in the lab).
  • probe — name-shape matrix: single-quote breakout, dollar expansion, backtick expansion.
  • mitigation — the vendor/Debian fix is the fixed side.

5. Expected results

runzip-vuln (3.0-15)zip-fixed (3.0-16)
check benignzip exit 0, no markerexit 0, no marker
check breakoutmarker created — injected id ransafely quoted, no marker
exploituid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)(no injection)
probe dollar formexecutes (/root in marker)safe
probe backtick formexit 8 (intercepted by the quoting context)safe

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; every container bounded on the isolated cve130335lab network.
  • Outbound HTTPS at image build (Debian pool: the upstream 3.0 source).

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The name-shape matrix is the surface sweep (evidence/0day-sweep.txt): the fix neutralizes every breakout form; on the vulnerable build the single-quote and dollar forms execute arbitrary commands. No second injection sink was found beyond check_zipfile's system() call.

8. Repository layout

README.md             this write-up
run-lab.sh            environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile              convenience targets
exploit/exploit.py    standalone full-chain exploit
poc/poc.py            the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile        runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile    multi-stage build (zip 3.0 with/without the fix)
lab/patches/          the Debian patch series (series file included)
lab/service.py        the packaging service (the documented precondition)
evidence/             captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md           excluded (working record)

9. References

  • CVE record — https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-130335
  • Debian bug — https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1143866
  • Info-ZIP — https://infozip.sourceforge.net/Zip.html
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