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CVE-2026-129494 — PoC lab for CVE-2026-129494: unauthenticated CloudPaste /api/proxy/link leaks WebDAV Basic auth headers, enabling full storage read/write/delete via a single anonymous request. | Kitploit
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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-129494

CVE-2026-129494

PoC lab for CVE-2026-129494: unauthenticated CloudPaste /api/proxy/link leaks WebDAV Basic auth headers, enabling full storage read/write/delete via a single anonymous request.

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CVE-2026-129494 — CloudPaste: the unauthenticated /api/proxy/link endpoint returns WebDAV storage credentials

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-129494
Componentling-drag0n/CloudPaste — backend/src/routes/proxyLinkRoutes.js (POST /api/proxy/link), share branch via LinkService.getShareUpstreamLink → WebDavStorageDriver.generateUpstreamRequest
Affected1.1.0 – 1.9.1 (the vendor's 1.9.2 image still leaks — see §7)
Fixed inno genuine vendor fix verified at publication time; this laboratory's fixed side is v1.9.1 source + a hash-checked synthetic remediation (documented as such)
CWECWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials)
ImpactFull WebDAV storage compromise from one anonymous request: the share branch of /api/proxy/link returns the upstream URL and the Basic Authorization header built from the WebDAV account — so anyone who knows a public share slug can read, modify, and delete every file on the backing WebDAV service, including files never shared through CloudPaste
VectorNetwork, unauthenticated — POST /api/proxy/link with {"type":"share","slug":"<public slug>"}
Triggera share whose storage is WebDAV with use_proxy=0; the driver hands its Authorization: Basic … header to the endpoint, which returns it unchanged
Creditadvisory at vul.yulun.ac.cn/20261115/cloudpaste/

POST /api/proxy/link exists so a reverse proxy can resolve upstream addresses. It has no authentication middleware; for a WebDAV-backed share it returns the upstream URL and the Basic Authorization header the WebDAV driver builds from the storage configuration — handing the storage account to any anonymous caller:

{"code":200,"data":{"url":"http://…/dav/private.txt",
  "header":{"Authorization":["Basic ZGF2dXNlcjpkYXZwYXNzLVNFQ1JFVA=="]}}}

echo ZGF2dXNlcjpkYXZwYXNzLVNFQ1JFVA== | base64 -d → davuser:davpass-SECRET. This laboratory runs the vendor's published container image for the vulnerable side, a stdlib WebDAV stub with one shared and one never-shared file, and proves the full chain: one anonymous request → credentials → read the unshared file.


1. Root cause

proxyLinkRoutes.js (v1.9.1):

proxyLinkRoutes.post("/api/proxy/link", async (c) => {
  // no authentication middleware — anonymous callers reach every branch
  ...
  case "share": {
    const storageLink = await linkService.getShareUpstreamLink(file, ...);
    return c.json(buildLinkResponse({
      url: storageLink.url,
      header: normalizeHeaders(storageLink.headers || {}),   // ← credentials
    }), ApiStatus.OK);
  }

getShareUpstreamLink → driver.generateUpstreamRequest (WebDAV driver) encodes the configured account into the header:

const auth = this._basicAuthHeader();
if (auth) headers["Authorization"] = [auth];
return { url, headers };

The endpoint was designed for a trusted reverse proxy; nothing enforces that trust. Preconditions (a public WebDAV-backed share) are the default sharing flow of the product.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
cp-vulndragon730/cloudpaste-backend:1.9.1 (vendor image, digest-pinned at pull)the affected release
cp-fixedcve-2026-129494:fixed — v1.9.1 source + lab/patch-fixed.py (hash-checked): the endpoint is internal-secret gatedthe remediation shape
cp-davcve-2026-129494-davstub:localstdlib WebDAV stub (Basic auth): private.txt (shared) + admin-notes.txt (never shared)
poccve-2026-129494-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

The vendor image keeps its state in a /data volume (SQLite); administrative setup (login, storage config, mount, share) is driven through the product's own HTTP API exactly as in the advisory.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # pulls the pinned vendor image, builds stub + PoC
./run-lab.sh up        # cve129494lab network: cp-vuln, cp-fixed, cp-dav
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only; mirrors the advisory's chain):

  • check — admin setup once (storage/mount/share) then one anonymous POST /api/proxy/link. Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — setup → anonymous leak → decode the Basic header → read the never-shared admin-notes.txt from the WebDAV stub with the leaked account → full compromise statement.
  • probe — endpoint matrix: anonymous share link, bad slug, empty slug, wrong type, empty body.
  • mitigation — no verified vendor fix (1.9.2 image still leaks); the fixed container is the form a fix takes; deployment mitigation is ACLing /api/proxy/link to the reverse proxy at the edge.

5. Expected results

runcp-vuln (1.9.1)cp-fixed (synthetic)
check anonymous share linkHTTP 200 + Authorization: Basic … → davuser:davpass-SECRETHTTP 403 proxy link endpoint is internal-only
exploit unshared-file readHTTP 200 WEBDAV-UNSHARED-DATA(no credentials)
probe bad slug / empty slug / bad type / empty body404 / 400 / 400 / 400 (upstream validation intact)403 on every form

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; every container bounded on the isolated cve129494lab network.
  • Outbound network at build (Docker Hub: the vendor image; GitHub + npm for the source-built fixed side).

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The endpoint matrix is the surface sweep (evidence/0day-sweep.txt). The remediated build refuses every anonymous form with 403; the shipped build validates slugs/types identically but leaks on the one reachable form. The vendor's 1.9.2 image leaks identically to 1.9.1 (verified against dragon730/cloudpaste-backend:1.9.2, digest b17f43129cfe8…, 2026-11-16): the commit the advisory names as the patch (282ea1c) does not remediate the endpoint in the published image — this laboratory treats that as an unremediated-upstream finding and uses a documented synthetic remediation for the differential.

8. Repository layout

README.md             this write-up
run-lab.sh            environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile              convenience targets
poc/poc.py            the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile        runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/fixed.Dockerfile  source build of the remediated backend
lab/patch-fixed.py    the hash-checked synthetic remediation
lab/davstub.py        stdlib WebDAV stub (shared + unshared files)
lab/davstub.Dockerfile
evidence/             captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md           excluded (working record)

9. References

  • CVE record — https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129494
  • Advisory — https://vul.yulun.ac.cn/20261115/cloudpaste/
  • CloudPaste — https://github.com/ling-drag0n/CloudPaste (issue #223)
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