
Proof-of-concept lab and Python driver for CVE-2026-129493: leaks bolo-solo articleViewPwd from the public GET /articles endpoint and unlocks protected articles via /console/article-pwd.
/articles endpoint discloses article view passwords| CVE | CVE-2026-129493 (VDB-437424) |
| Component | bolo-blog/bolo-solo — ArticleProcessor.getArticlesByPage (public GET /articles) |
| Affected | 1.7 – 2.6.4 (the release at the advisory's commit is the affected one; unfixed upstream) |
| Fixed in | no upstream fix at publication time; the fixed side is a hash-checked synthetic remediation (documented as such) |
| CWE | CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) |
| Impact | The plaintext articleViewPwd of every password-protected article ships to any anonymous visitor of /articles; submitting it to /console/article-pwd renders the protected content readable — the view-password confidentiality boundary is void |
| Vector | Network, unauthenticated — one GET |
| Trigger | any password-protected article in the paged listing |
ArticleQueryService has a dedicated scrubber,
removeUnusedProperties(JSONObject), that strips ARTICLE_VIEW_PWD
(among other internals) before articles are handed to renderers. The
paginated query path used by the public endpoint never runs it:
// ArticleQueryService.getArticles(requestJSONObject) — no removeUnusedProperties call
// ArticleProcessor.getArticlesByPage (the public GET /articles):
final JSONObject result = articleQueryService.getArticles(requestJSONObject);
final List<JSONObject> articles = CollectionUtils.jsonArrayToList(result.getJSONArray(Article.ARTICLES));
dataModelService.setArticlesExProperties(context, articles, preference);
jsonObject.put(Keys.RESULTS, result);
so the raw rows — articleViewPwd included — go into the anonymous JSON
response. This laboratory runs the real bolo-solo v2.6.4_stable (the
upstream Maven build, embedded H2) and proves the full chain: create a
protected article → leak its password from /articles → unlock it via
/console/article-pwd → read the protected content.
Two facts compose:
getArticlesByPage is the public, unauthenticated listing endpoint;getArticles(JSONObject) path does not pass its rows
through removeUnusedProperties, unlike the single-article and
random/relevant paths which do.The password-verification flow (POST /console/article-pwd with
articleId + pwdTyped) accepts any caller's password guess and stores
the unlock in that caller's session — so the leaked password converts
directly into read access. Protected content, comments, and any future
"password-gated" features share the same boundary.
| service | image | role |
|---|---|---|
bolo-vuln | cve-2026-129493:vuln | bolo-solo v2.6.4_stable as released (upstream build recipe) |
bolo-fixed | cve-2026-129493:fixed | same tree + lab/patch-fixed.py (hash-checked): the paged response strips articleViewPwd |
poc | cve-2026-129493-poc:local | stdlib-only Python driver |
The instance bootstraps through the product's own first-run flow
(POST /oauth/bolo/login creates the admin; the second login sets the
session cookie — upstream behaviour), uses the embedded H2 database via
the docker profile, and the admin article API creates the protected
article exactly as the admin console does.
./run-lab.sh build # upstream bolo build at v2.6.4_stable (both trees)
./run-lab.sh up # cve129493lab network, bolo-vuln, bolo-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down
poc/poc.py (stdlib only):
GET /articles; classification by password presence. Exit 1
vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.POST /console/article-pwd and read the protected article at its
permalink./articles, /articles/1, tag pages.| run | bolo-vuln (v2.6.4) | bolo-fixed (synthetic) |
|---|---|---|
check | HTTP 200, articleViewPwd":"s3cret-view-pass" present | password absent |
exploit | password leaked → article unlocked → protected content read | no leak |
probe /articles, /articles/1, tags | /articles leaks; others 404 | no leak anywhere |
mitigation | leaks | safe |
Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt,
evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt,
evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.
cve129493lab network.The endpoint matrix is the surface sweep (evidence/0day-sweep.txt): on
the remediated build no public endpoint exposes the view password; on
the shipped build exactly one form (GET /articles) does — no second
disclosure path was found. The sibling stored-XSS flaw in the same
product is CVE-2026-129492, reproduced in
CVE-2026-129492.
README.md this write-up
run-lab.sh environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile convenience targets
poc/poc.py the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile multi-stage build (bolo v2.6.4_stable, both trees)
lab/patch-fixed.py the hash-checked synthetic remediation
lab/entrypoint.sh standalone Starter
evidence/ captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md excluded (working record)