
Proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-129492, a stored XSS in bolo-solo's commentOriginalCommentName field, with check, exploit, and probe modes against vulnerable and fixed builds.
commentOriginalCommentName| CVE | CVE-2026-129492 (VDB-437423) |
| Component | bolo-blog/bolo-solo — CommentMgmtService.addArticleComment stores the request's commentOriginalCommentName verbatim; every skin renders it unescaped (skins/*/common-comment.ftl) |
| Affected | 1.7 – 2.6.4 (unfixed upstream; the advisory's commit is the affected release) |
| Fixed in | no upstream fix at publication time; the fixed side is a hash-checked synthetic remediation (documented as such) |
| CWE | CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting, Stored) |
| Impact | Session theft from every visitor of the commented article: the stored name executes as markup/script in the comment list, and bolo's sid session cookie is not HttpOnly — `` in the name reads document.cookie and admin sessions fall |
| Vector | Network, unauthenticated — one POST to /article/comments |
| Trigger | a guest comment whose commentOriginalCommentName carries the payload (the reply-resolution path only overwrites the field when the original id resolves) |
addArticleComment copies the request's commentOriginalCommentName
into the stored comment verbatim:
comment.put(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_ID,
requestJSONObject.optString(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_ID));
comment.put(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_NAME,
requestJSONObject.optString(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_NAME));
The author name (boloUser) IS run through the product's own
AntiXSS.getSafeStringXSS, but this field is not; and every skin
renders it unescaped:
<span class="post-name">${comment.commentOriginalCommentName}</span>
So one anonymous POST stores a payload that every visitor's browser executes. This laboratory runs the real bolo-solo v2.6.4_stable (upstream Maven build, embedded H2) and proves it end to end.
Two facts compose:
${comment.commentOriginalCommentName} directly into HTML.bolo's sid session cookie is not marked HttpOnly in this release, so
an onerror handler in the stored name can exfiltrate the session to
an attacker endpoint — the advisory's impact (admin takeover via
stolen session) follows. The comment-notification e-mail fails after
the insert on this build (sc=false, "添加失败"), which upstream
treats as a failure — but the row is persisted and rendered.
| service | image | role |
|---|---|---|
boloxss-vuln | cve-2026-129492:vuln | bolo-solo v2.6.4_stable as released |
boloxss-fixed | cve-2026-129492:fixed | same tree + lab/patch-fixed.py (hash-checked): the field passes through the product's own AntiXSS before storage |
poc | cve-2026-129492-poc:local | stdlib-only Python driver |
The instance bootstraps through the product's own first-run flow and the
comment is posted through the public /article/comments endpoint with
no authentication.
./run-lab.sh build # upstream bolo build at v2.6.4_stable (both trees)
./run-lab.sh up # cve129492lab network, boloxss-vuln, boloxss-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down
poc/poc.py (stdlib only):
| run | boloxss-vuln (v2.6.4) | boloxss-fixed (synthetic) |
|---|---|---|
check | RAW — xss- in the page | ABSENT (sanitized at storage) |
exploit rendered context | >xss-</a> | payload absent |
probe img onerror / svg onload | RAW / RAW | ABSENT / ABSENT |
Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt,
evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt,
evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.
cve129492lab network.The payload-variant matrix is the surface sweep
(evidence/0day-sweep.txt): on the remediated build every variant is
neutralized by the storage-time AntiXSS pass; on the shipped build the
active variants render raw. The sibling view-password disclosure in the
same product is CVE-2026-129493, reproduced in
CVE-2026-129493.
README.md this write-up
run-lab.sh environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile convenience targets
poc/poc.py the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile multi-stage build (bolo v2.6.4_stable, both trees)
lab/patch-fixed.py the hash-checked synthetic remediation
lab/entrypoint.sh standalone Starter
evidence/ captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md excluded (working record)