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CVE-2026-129492 — Proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-129492, a stored XSS in bolo-solo's commentOriginalCommentName field, with check, exploit, and probe modes against vulnerable and fixed builds. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-129492
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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-129492

CVE-2026-129492

Proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-129492, a stored XSS in bolo-solo's commentOriginalCommentName field, with check, exploit, and probe modes against vulnerable and fixed builds.

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CVE-2026-129492 — Bolo (bolo-solo): stored XSS via the unsanitized commentOriginalCommentName

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-129492 (VDB-437423)
Componentbolo-blog/bolo-solo — CommentMgmtService.addArticleComment stores the request's commentOriginalCommentName verbatim; every skin renders it unescaped (skins/*/common-comment.ftl)
Affected1.7 – 2.6.4 (unfixed upstream; the advisory's commit is the affected release)
Fixed inno upstream fix at publication time; the fixed side is a hash-checked synthetic remediation (documented as such)
CWECWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting, Stored)
ImpactSession theft from every visitor of the commented article: the stored name executes as markup/script in the comment list, and bolo's sid session cookie is not HttpOnly — `` in the name reads document.cookie and admin sessions fall
VectorNetwork, unauthenticated — one POST to /article/comments
Triggera guest comment whose commentOriginalCommentName carries the payload (the reply-resolution path only overwrites the field when the original id resolves)

addArticleComment copies the request's commentOriginalCommentName into the stored comment verbatim:

comment.put(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_ID,
        requestJSONObject.optString(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_ID));
comment.put(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_NAME,
        requestJSONObject.optString(Comment.COMMENT_ORIGINAL_COMMENT_NAME));

The author name (boloUser) IS run through the product's own AntiXSS.getSafeStringXSS, but this field is not; and every skin renders it unescaped:

<span class="post-name">${comment.commentOriginalCommentName}</span>

So one anonymous POST stores a payload that every visitor's browser executes. This laboratory runs the real bolo-solo v2.6.4_stable (upstream Maven build, embedded H2) and proves it end to end.


1. Root cause

Two facts compose:

  1. verbatim storage — the request field is persisted without sanitization (the later reply block only overwrites it when the referenced original comment exists);
  2. unescaped rendering — the skins' FreeMarker templates interpolate ${comment.commentOriginalCommentName} directly into HTML.

bolo's sid session cookie is not marked HttpOnly in this release, so an onerror handler in the stored name can exfiltrate the session to an attacker endpoint — the advisory's impact (admin takeover via stolen session) follows. The comment-notification e-mail fails after the insert on this build (sc=false, "添加失败"), which upstream treats as a failure — but the row is persisted and rendered.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
boloxss-vulncve-2026-129492:vulnbolo-solo v2.6.4_stable as released
boloxss-fixedcve-2026-129492:fixedsame tree + lab/patch-fixed.py (hash-checked): the field passes through the product's own AntiXSS before storage
poccve-2026-129492-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

The instance bootstraps through the product's own first-run flow and the comment is posted through the public /article/comments endpoint with no authentication.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # upstream bolo build at v2.6.4_stable (both trees)
./run-lab.sh up        # cve129492lab network, boloxss-vuln, boloxss-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only):

  • check — one anonymous payload comment + one fetch of the article page; classification by RAW/ESCAPED/ABSENT. Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — posts the payload (the notification failure is tolerated and explained), fetches the page as a visitor, prints the rendered context around the payload and states the sid-cookie impact.
  • probe — payload variants (img onerror / svg onload / plain markup) × rendered-as matrix; posts are spaced to respect the comment rate limit.
  • mitigation — no upstream fix; the fixed container is the form a fix takes (sanitize at storage with the product's own AntiXSS).

5. Expected results

runboloxss-vuln (v2.6.4)boloxss-fixed (synthetic)
checkRAW — xss- in the pageABSENT (sanitized at storage)
exploit rendered context>xss-</a>payload absent
probe img onerror / svg onloadRAW / RAWABSENT / ABSENT

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; every container bounded on the isolated cve129492lab network.
  • Outbound HTTPS at image build (GitHub: bolo-solo v2.6.4_stable; Maven Central). The Maven build takes several minutes.

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The payload-variant matrix is the surface sweep (evidence/0day-sweep.txt): on the remediated build every variant is neutralized by the storage-time AntiXSS pass; on the shipped build the active variants render raw. The sibling view-password disclosure in the same product is CVE-2026-129493, reproduced in CVE-2026-129493.

8. Repository layout

README.md             this write-up
run-lab.sh            environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile              convenience targets
poc/poc.py            the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile        runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile    multi-stage build (bolo v2.6.4_stable, both trees)
lab/patch-fixed.py    the hash-checked synthetic remediation
lab/entrypoint.sh     standalone Starter
evidence/             captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md           excluded (working record)

9. References

  • CVE record — https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129492
  • VulDB entry — https://vuldb.com/?q=CVE-2026-129492
  • Advisory — https://vul.yulun.ac.cn/20261115/bolo-solo/
  • bolo-solo — https://github.com/bolo-blog/bolo-solo (issue #331)
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