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CVE-2026-129360 — Proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-129360: Magma orc8r obsidian REST operator impersonation via the spoofable X-Magma-Client-Cert-Serial header, with vuln/fixed containers and a Python PoC. | Kitploit
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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-129360

CVE-2026-129360

Proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-129360: Magma orc8r obsidian REST operator impersonation via the spoofable X-Magma-Client-Cert-Serial header, with vuln/fixed containers and a Python PoC.

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CVE-2026-129360 — Magma orc8r Obsidian REST: the operator identity follows the spoofable X-Magma-Client-Cert-Serial header

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-129360
ComponentLinux Foundation Magma orc8r — orc8r/cloud/go/services/obsidian/access/operator.go (getOperator) behind CertificateMiddleware (rest_middleware.go)
AffectedMagma ≤ 1.9.0 (logic unchanged in master at lab time)
Fixed innothing upstream at the time of this laboratory; the fixed side is a hash-checked synthetic remediation (documented as such)
CWECWE-290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing)
ImpactOperator impersonation on the NMS/obsidian REST tier: a caller who knows (or guesses) a registered operator certificate serial authenticates as that operator with nothing but a header — certificate serials are not secret, and no certificate possession is checked
VectorNetwork — an HTTP request carrying X-Magma-Client-Cert-Serial: <registered operator serial>
Triggerthe header value alone; unknown serials are rejected through the real certifier lookup

The obsidian REST tier resolves the caller's identity from a header:

// orc8r/cloud/go/services/obsidian/access/operator.go
csn := req.Header.Get(CLIENT_CERT_SN_KEY)            // attacker-controlled header
certInfo, err := certifier.GetCertificateIdentity(req.Context(), csn)
...
return certInfo.Id, nil                               // operator identity

The design assumes a trusted TLS-terminating proxy injects that header from the verified client certificate. When the header is reachable by the client (direct service exposure, a proxy that forwards client-supplied headers, or any topology where the assumption breaks), knowing a registered operator serial — which is not a secret — is the whole authentication. This laboratory runs the real CertificateMiddleware behind the real certifier client against a certifier gRPC server implementing the real protobuf service with one registered operator certificate, and proves the spoof: the registered serial authenticates with no certificate at all, while unknown serials are rejected through the real lookup path.


1. Root cause

getOperator treats the header as ground truth about certificate possession. Three facts compose into the spoof:

  1. the serial arrives from an HTTP header with no binding to the TLS session — req.TLS and req.TLS.PeerCertificates are never consulted;
  2. the certifier lookup itself is correct — it returns the identity bound to the serial — but the caller only needs to know the serial, not to hold the certificate;
  3. certificate serials are not secret: they surface in logs, proxies, and administrative interfaces, and (per the sibling CVE-2026-129359) one cloud-wide serial is even hardcoded in the public source.

The middleware chain (CertificateMiddleware) calls getOperator before anything else; on success the operator identity flows into the ACL check. The lab mounts the middleware on a static-READ path (GET under /swagger), which skips the entity-ACL stage — isolating exactly the authentication stage under test.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
obs-vulncve-2026-129360:vulnMagma v1.9.0 as released: the real middleware + real certifier client + a real-proto certifier server with one registered operator certificate
obs-fixedcve-2026-129360:fixedthe same tree with lab/patch-fixed.py (hash-checked): the serial header is only trusted when a TLS client certificate was actually presented
poccve-2026-129360-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

The harness (lab/harness/main.go) links the real obsidian/access package (echo v4, the framework magma itself uses) and the real certifier.GetCertificateIdentity client. The certifier backend implements the real CertifierServer protobuf interface and holds one registered operator certificate (serial LABOPERATORSN0001, operator lab-operator) — a minimal faithful model of a production certifier. The HTTP endpoint never requests a TLS client certificate, exactly like the header-trusting topology of the advisory.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # fetches magma v1.9.0, builds vuln + fixed harnesses
./run-lab.sh up        # cve129360lab network, obs-vuln, obs-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

Single mode against one side:

podman run --rm --network cve129360lab cve-2026-129360-poc:local \
    exploit --host=obs-vuln

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only):

  • check — the registered serial without any certificate vs an unknown serial vs no header. Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — authenticates as the operator with the header alone, then the control matrix (unknown, empty, absent serials).
  • probe — serial-shape and verb matrix (GET/HEAD/POST, lowercased, 200-byte serials).
  • mitigation — no upstream fix; the fixed container is the form a fix takes; the deployment mitigation is header hygiene at the TLS-terminating proxy.

5. Expected results

runobs-vuln (v1.9.0)obs-fixed (synthetic)
check registered SN, no certificateHTTP 200, authenticated: true, operator resolvedHTTP 401 (client certificate required)
check unknown SNHTTP 401 (unknown certificate SN — real lookup)HTTP 401
check no headerHTTP 401 (missing client certificate)HTTP 401
exploit controls (unknown/empty/absent)all 401all 401
probe GET/HEAD/POST with registered SN200 on every verb401 on every verb
probe lowercased / 200-byte serials401 through the real lookup401

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; containers bounded on the isolated cve129360lab network.
  • Outbound HTTPS at image build (GitHub: magma tag v1.9.0; Go module proxy; npm is not required — the harness is Go-only).

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The serial-shape and verb matrix is the surface sweep (evidence/0day-sweep.txt): only the exact registered serial authenticates on the shipped build (every mutation goes through the real lookup and is rejected), and on the remediated build every form is rejected. No second bypass form was found. The gRPC-tier hardcoded constant is CVE-2026-129359, reproduced in CVE-2026-129359.

8. Repository layout

README.md               this write-up
run-lab.sh              environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile                convenience targets
poc/poc.py              the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile          runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile      multi-stage build (magma v1.9.0 + harness)
lab/patch-fixed.py      the hash-checked synthetic remediation
lab/harness/main.go     real-middleware + real-certifier-client harness
lab/harness/go.mod      upstream consumer-module replace pattern
evidence/               captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md             excluded (working record)

9. References

  • CVE record — https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-129360
  • VulDB entry — https://vuldb.com/?q=CVE-2026-129360
  • Magma — https://github.com/magma/magma (orc8r/cloud/go/services/obsidian/access/)
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