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CVE-2026-129355 — dufs <=0.46.0 WebDAV COPY: overwrites existing destinations without the delete permission and ignores Overwrite: F (CWE-863). Both sides compiled from upstream (v0.46.0 vs fix commit fba13df): vuln 204+content replaced on every form; fixed 403/412 intact. | Kitploit
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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-129355

CVE-2026-129355

dufs <=0.46.0 WebDAV COPY: overwrites existing destinations without the delete permission and ignores Overwrite: F (CWE-863). Both sides compiled from upstream (v0.46.0 vs fix commit fba13df): vuln 204+content replaced on every form; fixed 403/412 intact.

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CVE-2026-129355 — dufs WebDAV COPY overwrites existing files without the delete permission and ignores Overwrite: F

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-129355 (VDB-437418)
Componentsigoden/dufs ≤ 0.46.0 — WebDAV COPY handler, src/server.rs
Affecteddufs 0.1.0 – 0.46.0
Fixed inthe fix commit fba13dffb9c65b5e5e26419f64de709200277a04 ("fix: prevent COPY from overwriting existing files without delete permission"), released in 0.47.0
CWECWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization), CWE-285 (Improper Authorization)
ImpactA client of a deployment that grants upload but not delete can overwrite — i.e. destroy the content of — any existing file reachable by the served tree; no deployment can rely on RFC 4918 Overwrite: F preconditions
VectorNetwork — one authenticated/ACL-scoped WebDAV COPY request with a Destination naming an existing file
TriggerCOPY /attacker.txt with Destination: …/secret.html — 0.46.0 answers 204 and replaces the content; the fixed tree answers 403 (no delete permission) or 412 (Overwrite: F)
CVSSper VulDB (High band); data integrity destruction of the served tree

dufs is a single-binary file server with WebDAV support. Its COPY handler copied source to destination unconditionally — the upstream fix adds exactly the two missing guards:

ensure_path_parent(&dest).await?;

let overwrite = req.headers().get("overwrite")
    .map(|v| v.as_bytes() != b"F").unwrap_or(true);
if fs::symlink_metadata(&dest).await.is_ok() {     // destination exists
    if !overwrite { *res.status_mut() = StatusCode::PRECONDITION_FAILED; return Ok(()); }
    if !self.args.allow_delete { status_forbid(res); return Ok(()); }   // ← the missing check
}
fs::copy(path, &dest).await?;

This laboratory compiles both sides from the upstream repository — the vulnerable tag v0.46.0 and the tree at the fix commit — and drives them with the exact scenarios of the upstream regression tests (tests/webdav.rs), plus a wider destination/Overwrite/traversal matrix.


1. Root cause

src/server.rs, WebDAV COPY operation (dufs ≤ 0.46.0):

ensure_path_parent(&dest).await?;
fs::copy(path, &dest).await?;          // no existence check, no permission check, no Overwrite semantics
status_no_content(res);

Three guarantees are missing at once:

  1. delete permission — overwriting an existing file destroys its content, which dufs models as the delete permission; the handler never consulted allow_delete;
  2. RFC 4918 Overwrite — the header was ignored entirely, so Overwrite: F (do not overwrite an existing destination) silently overwrote anyway;
  3. consequently a restricted instance (--allow-upload without --allow-delete, or an ACL user with upload-only rights) lets any client replace every existing file's content with attacker-chosen bytes.

The upstream regression tests added with the fix specify the expected behaviour this lab reproduces verbatim: 403 for a copy onto an existing destination without delete permission, 412 for Overwrite: F, and the destination's original content intact in both cases.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
dufs-vulncve-2026-129355:lab, LAB_DUFUS_VARIANT=vulndufs v0.46.0 built from the upstream tag
dufs-fixedcve-2026-129355:lab, LAB_DUFUS_VARIANT=fixeddufs at the upstream fix commit fba13df (both compiled at image build; the fix commit does not bump Cargo.toml, so both binaries self-report "0.46.0" — see evidence/versions.txt)
poccve-2026-129355-poc:localstdlib-only Python driver

Each container runs two instances over the same seeded tree, mirroring the upstream tests' fixtures (test.txt, test.html, an integrity marker secret.html, subdir/note.md):

  • :8080 — --allow-upload (upload granted, delete not granted — the restricted deployment of the advisory);
  • :8081 — --allow-all (full permissions — the Overwrite: F semantics case).

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # compiles dufs v0.46.0 and the fba13df tree
./run-lab.sh up        # cve129355lab network, dufs-vuln, dufs-fixed
./run-lab.sh sweep     # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides
./run-lab.sh down

Single mode against one side:

podman run --rm --network cve129355lab cve-2026-129355-poc:local \
    exploit --host=dufs-vuln

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py (stdlib only):

  • check — one COPY over the integrity marker on the restricted instance: 204 + replaced content (vulnerable) vs 403 + intact (fixed). Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker, 2 unreachable.
  • exploit — stage 1 destroys the marker's content with attacker-supplied bytes as the restricted client; stage 2 shows Overwrite: F being ignored on the permissive instance (204 + replaced) versus the fixed 412 with the content intact.
  • probe — destination matrix: existing destination under no-delete and all-permissions profiles, Overwrite: F/T/absent, new-name baseline, subdirectory destination, and a traversal-shaped Destination (rejected 400 on both sides — no additional exposure).
  • mitigation — there is no runtime flag of 0.46.0 that repairs the handler (granting delete would widen, not narrow, the exposure); the remediation is the upstream fix, which is exactly the fixed side.

5. Expected results

rundufs-vuln (v0.46.0)dufs-fixed (fba13df)
check (COPY over existing, no-delete)204, marker replaced403, marker intact
exploit stage 1 (content destruction)attacker bytes in place403, intact
exploit stage 2 (Overwrite: F, all-perms)204, replaced412, intact
probe Overwrite: T/absent, no-delete204, replaced403, intact
probe new-name / subdir baseline204 (legitimate copy)204 (legitimate copy)
probe all-perms overwrite204, replaced (delete granted — correct)204, replaced (correct)
probe traversal Destination (../..)400400

Captured runs: evidence/check-*-run.txt, evidence/exploit-*-run.txt, evidence/probe-*-run.txt, evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt, evidence/versions.txt, evidence/0day-sweep.txt.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; every container is bounded to --cpus 2 --memory 4g on the isolated cve129355lab network.
  • Outbound HTTPS at image build (clones github.com/sigoden/dufs and fetches the fix commit).

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The probe matrix doubles as the surface sweep over the fixed tree — every destination shape (existing, new, subdirectory, traversal) and Overwrite value under both permission profiles. On the fixed side every overwrite form is refused (403) or preconditioned (412), legitimate new-file copies are unaffected, and the traversal-shaped Destination is rejected on both sides. No additional unprotected path was found (evidence/0day-sweep.txt).

8. Repository layout

README.md            this write-up
run-lab.sh           environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)
Makefile             convenience targets
poc/poc.py           the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)
poc/Dockerfile       runner image (python:3.12-alpine)
lab/lab.Dockerfile   multi-stage image (compiles both upstream trees)
lab/entrypoint.sh    starts the two dufs instances of the variant
evidence/            captured runs of every mode on both sides
TRACKING.md          excluded (working record)

9. References

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