
Differential PoC lab for CVE-2026-126274, a stored XSS in NocoDB's table-deletion dialog, verifying the innerHTML sink in served bundles against vulnerable and fixed images.
| CVE | CVE-2026-126274 (GHSA-638g-xw92-xq9x, High, CWE-79) |
| Component | NocoDB nc-gui — components/dlg/Table/Delete.vue |
| Affected | < 2026.08.0 (sink verified present through the 2026.08.0 source and bundle) |
| Fixed in | 2026.08.1 (verified: the 2026.08.1 bundle ships the plain-content builder; 2026.08.0's still ships the sink) |
| CWE | CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting) |
| Impact | A Creator embeds markup in a table or column title; when another user attempts to delete a table whose deletion is blocked by link columns, the dependency message interpolates those titles into an innerHTML binding and the markup executes in the victim's browser — able to steal the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"] |
| Vector | Stored title (Creator+) → victim confirms a table deletion → same-origin script execution |
| Trigger | innerHTML: binding interpolating ${column.title} / ${relatedTable.title} |
| Credit | Reported upstream (NVD CVE-2026-126274); advisory GHSA-638g-xw92-xq9x |
Delete.vue built the deletion-blocked dependency message by interpolating the blocking column's title and the related table's title into a template string and rendering it as a VNode created with h('div', { innerHTML }). Vue does not escape innerHTML bindings, so markup authored inside a title — stored verbatim by the meta API — becomes live HTML in the confirm dialog. The lab proves both halves of the stored-XSS equation against the official images: the vulnerable build stores markup titles verbatim and ships the exact innerHTML sink (extracted from the bundle the server itself hands to browsers, interpolation intact); the fixed build stores the identical titles but ships a plain-content renderer in which the same titles produce zero HTML elements. Feeding the attacker titles through the exact vulnerable interpolation yields an `` element — the execution condition — while the fixed rendering path yields plain text.
packages/nc-gui/components/dlg/Table/Delete.vue (2026.07.0 source, and the identical compiled sink in the 2026.08.0/2026.07.0 bundles):
message.info(
h('div', {
innerHTML: `<div style="padding:10px 4px">Unable to delete tables because of the following.
<br><br>${refColMsgs.join('<br>')}<br><br>
Delete them & try again</div>`,
}),
)
with each dependency line built as
return `${i + 1}. ${c.title} is a LinkToAnotherRecord of ${(refMeta && refMeta.title) || c.title}`
c.title and the related table's title are user-controlled (Creator-authored table/column titles). The message renders only after the user confirms deleting a table whose deletion is blocked by link columns. Vue escapes interpolations in templates but not innerHTML bindings, so the joined string is parsed as HTML.
The compiled sink, extracted verbatim from the bundle the vulnerable image serves to browsers (_nuxt/BGeeiuXx.js):
ht.info(Se("div",{innerHTML:`<div style="padding:10px 4px">Unable to delete tables
because of the following. <br><br>${F.join("<br>")}<br><br> Delete them & try again</div>`}))
The fix (2026.08.1) replaces the binding with escaped child VNodes:
rRn = t => xe("div", {style:{padding:"10px 4px"}},
["Unable to delete tables because of the following.", xe("br"), xe("br"),
...t.flatMap(e => [e, xe("br")]), xe("br"), "Delete them & try again"])
— titles become text children that Vue escapes, so no HTML parsing of user input occurs.
| service | image | role |
|---|---|---|
nocodb-vuln | 2026.07.0 | vulnerable side — bundle ships the innerHTML sink |
nocodb-fixed | 2026.08.1 | fixed side — bundle ships the plain-content builder |
poc | — | stdlib Python driver |
All containers are CPU/memory bounded on the isolated cve126274lab network. No browser is required: the two halves of the stored-XSS equation are proven from the server side and from the exact shipped code.
./run-lab.sh build # PoC runner image
./run-lab.sh sweep # exploit / probe / mitigation / check
./run-lab.sh down
Single mode:
podman run --rm --network=cve126274lab cve-2026-126274-poc:local exploit
poc/poc.py — stdlib-only, four modes:
| mode | purpose |
|---|---|
check | store a markup title via the meta API, verify it is served verbatim, scan the bundles the target serves for the innerHTML sink, and classify |
exploit | full differential: markup stored verbatim + sink shipped on the vulnerable build; identical storage + plain-content builder on the fixed build; plus the DOM execution condition of the exact vulnerable interpolation |
probe | companion primitives: the table meta API returns the payload verbatim, the title is stored raw, and the sink inventory across all served chunks |
mitigation | the fixed bundle ships no sink chunk and the fixed rendering yields zero handler attributes — upgrade is the fix; no client-side compensating control exists on the vulnerable build |
Exit codes: 0 safe / mapped, 1 vulnerable, 2 target unreachable, 3 inconclusive, 4 internal error.
The DOM execution condition feeds the attacker titles through the exact vulnerable interpolation (same template, same join) and parses the result as HTML: the vulnerable output contains an `` element — what a browser executes inside an innerHTML binding — while the fixed path's escaped content contains none.
| reproduction path | vulnerable 2026.07.0 | fixed 2026.08.1 | evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| markup title stored via meta API | served verbatim to the UI | served verbatim (storage is not the defect) | evidence/poc-exploit.txt |
| bundle the server ships to browsers | sink chunk BGeeiuXx.js — innerHTML: with ${F.join("<br>")} interpolation | plain-builder chunk B5CMIqqa.js — escaped child VNodes, no innerHTML near the message | evidence/poc-exploit.txt |
| DOM execution condition of the exact sink template | 4 handler attributes incl. ('img','onerror','alert(document.domain)') | 0 | evidence/poc-exploit.txt |
| sink inventory across served chunks | 153 scanned, sink present | 166 scanned, no sink | evidence/poc-probe.txt |
check canary | stored + sink → exit 1 | — | evidence/poc-check.txt |
podman compose; --cpus 2 --memory 4g per container; isolated cve126274lab network.nocodb/nocodb images./_nuxt/*.js chunk the entry page preloads (~150–170 assets per side); the sink discriminator is local to the dependency-message context, because the shared chunk contains unrelated innerHTML uses.