Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
CVE-2026-126273 — Differential PoC lab for CVE-2026-126273: exploits NocoDB's skipped admin bootstrap so the first unauthenticated signup gains Super Admin, and verifies the fail-closed fix. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-126273
Authentication & AuthorizationPrivilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationSecurity VirtualizationWeb SecurityMisconfigurationLabs & Practice
GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-126273

CVE-2026-126273

Differential PoC lab for CVE-2026-126273: exploits NocoDB's skipped admin bootstrap so the first unauthenticated signup gains Super Admin, and verifies the fail-closed fix.

5 days agoNot yet reviewed
Share
View Repository

CVE-2026-126273 — NocoDB Incomplete Admin Bootstrap: First Unauthenticated Signup Claims Super Admin

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-126273 (GHSA-mjxv-r6j7-m8gv, Critical 9.2 CVSS v4)
ComponentNocoDB — packages/nocodb/src/helpers/initAdminFromEnv.ts / UsersService.signup()
Affected< 2026.09.0
Fixed in2026.09.0 (fail-closed bootstrap)
CWECWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management)
ImpactOn an instance deployed with NC_ADMIN_EMAIL set and NC_ADMIN_PASSWORD empty, the first unauthenticated caller of the public signup endpoint receives org-level Creator and Super Admin roles — full administrative control
VectorUnauthenticated POST /api/v1/auth/user/signup, first-comer
TriggerEmpty NC_ADMIN_PASSWORD (falsy) silently skips the entire bootstrap
CreditReported by @sec-reex; advisory published by mertmit (NocoDB)

An operator who sets the admin email but leaves the password blank intends the deployment to be admin-bootstrapped and closed to strangers. NocoDB before 2026.09.0 instead silently skips the bootstrap: no admin row, no error, no warning. The HTTP surface then comes up with zero user rows, and UsersService.signup() grants the first user of a non-cloud instance the org Creator and Super Admin roles — a branch that normally never fires because the bootstrap has already created the first user before the server accepts connections. Whoever calls the public signup endpoint first owns the deployment. The decoded JWT says it plainly: the vulnerable instance returns roles = {"org-level-creator": true, "super": true} to the attacker; a correctly bootstrapped instance returns {"org-level-viewer": true} for the same call. The fix fails closed and loudly — the same misconfiguration now aborts the boot with a "Missing admin password" banner instead of shipping an open instance.

1. Root cause

packages/nocodb/src/helpers/initAdminFromEnv.ts gates the whole bootstrap on a single truthiness test:

export default async function initAdminFromEnv(_ncMeta = Noco.ncMeta) {
  if (process.env.NC_ADMIN_EMAIL && process.env.NC_ADMIN_PASSWORD) {
    ...
    // insert the admin user, create the default workspace, ...
  }
  // neither branch: no admin row, no error, no log
}

An empty string is falsy, so [email protected] with NC_ADMIN_PASSWORD= skips the entire function body. Downstream, UsersService.signup() contains the first-user branch:

// UsersService.signup(): first user of a non-cloud instance
// -> org-level creator + super admin

which exists for the initial-setup flow and is normally unreachable — bootstrap has created the first user row before the HTTP listener starts. With bootstrap skipped, that branch hands the deployment to the first caller. The race window is not a race at all: it stays open for the whole life of the instance until someone signs up.

The fix in 2026.09.0 fails closed when operator intent is clear from the email alone:

 ╔═══════════════════════════ Missing admin password ═══════════════════════════╗
 ║ NC_ADMIN_EMAIL is set but NC_ADMIN_PASSWORD is empty, so the admin           ║
 ║ account cannot be created.                                                   ║
 ║                                                                              ║
 ║ Set NC_ADMIN_PASSWORD, or unset NC_ADMIN_EMAIL to intentionally use          ║
 ║ first-signup setup.                                                          ║
 ╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

and the process exits 1 instead of starting the HTTP surface.

2. Reproduction environment

The vulnerability condition is a configuration, not a build flag, so the lab runs the same official images under both configurations:

serviceimageNC_ADMIN_EMAILNC_ADMIN_PASSWORDexpected
nocodb-vuln2026.08.2setemptyboots silently, first signup → super
nocodb-vuln-safe2026.08.2setsetbootstrap completes, signup → viewer
nocodb-fixed2026.10.1setemptyrefuses to boot (exit 1, banner)
nocodb-fixed-safe2026.10.1setsetboots, bootstrap completes
nocodb-advisory2026.09.0setemptyrefuses to boot (the advisory's patched version, verified empirically)

Each container is fresh (no volume): the SQLite user table starts empty, so the first-comer semantics are reproducible. All containers are CPU/memory bounded on the isolated cve126273lab network.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # PoC runner image
./run-lab.sh sweep     # boot-state matrix + exploit (fresh vuln) + probe + mitigation
./run-lab.sh down

run-lab.sh sweep restarts nocodb-vuln before the exploit — the escalation is first-comer only, so the run must begin with zero user rows.

Single modes:

podman run --rm --network=cve126273lab cve-2026-126273-poc:local exploit

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py — stdlib-only, four modes:

modepurpose
checkclassify one instance by a canary signup and decode the JWT roles claim. The signup is the only observable of the condition; on a fresh instance it is the exploit itself (documented side effect).
exploitfull differential: first-comer signup on the misconfigured vulnerable instance must claim super; the fixed build on the same configuration must refuse to boot.
probecompanion primitives: a bootstrapped instance yields viewer-only signups (the escalation needs the misconfiguration), a second signup on the vulnerable instance is viewer-only (first-comer only), and the advisory's stated fixed version 2026.09.0 is empirically fail-closed.
mitigationthe published workaround on the SAME vulnerable binary: complete the bootstrap (NC_ADMIN_PASSWORD set) — the super-granting branch closes.

Exit codes: 0 safe / workaround validated, 1 vulnerable, 2 target unreachable (for the fixed side this is the fail-closed behavior), 3 primitive confirmed but inconclusive, 4 internal error.

5. Expected results

reproduction pathvulnerable 2026.08.2 (email set, password empty)fixed 2026.10.1 / 2026.09.0 (same configuration)evidence
boot staterunning, no warningexited, exit 1, "Missing admin password" bannerevidence/boot-states.txt
first unauthenticated signuproles = {org-level-creator: true, super: true}HTTP surface never starts (fail closed)evidence/poc-exploit.txt
second signup{org-level-viewer: true} — first-comer only—evidence/poc-probe.txt
bootstrapped instance, same binary{org-level-viewer: true}boots normallyevidence/poc-probe.txt
workaround (password set)viewer-only signup — validated—evidence/poc-mitigation.txt
check on an exhausted instancerejected (slot consumed by the exploit run)unreachableevidence/poc-check-*.txt

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman with podman compose; --cpus 2 --memory 4g per container; isolated cve126273lab network.
  • Outbound network once, to pull the three official nocodb/nocodb images.
  • The vulnerable instance must be fresh for the exploit (the escalation is first-comer only); run-lab.sh sweep handles the restart.
  • Containers hold state only in their own filesystem — podman compose down fully resets the lab.

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep)

Download Tool

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    936
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    555
  • 3

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    353
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    348
  • 5

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    336
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    288

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →