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CVE-2026-123039 — Containerised differential lab and 4-mode PoC for CVE-2026-123039, a Check Point Gaia OS Dynamic CLI world-writable socket flaw enabling local privilege escalation to root. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/googlesky/cve-2026-123039
Privilege EscalationContainer SecurityExploitationFuzzingLabs & Practice
GitHubgooglesky/cve-2026-123039

CVE-2026-123039

Containerised differential lab and 4-mode PoC for CVE-2026-123039, a Check Point Gaia OS Dynamic CLI world-writable socket flaw enabling local privilege escalation to root.

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411 day agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-123039 — Check Point Gaia OS Dynamic CLI world-writable control socket allows a local user to execute commands as root

CVECVE-2026-123039
ComponentCheck Point Gaia OS — Dynamic / Extended CLI daemon, /usr/bin/dynamic_server
AffectedGaia OS R81, R81.10, R81.20, R82, R82.10, R82.20 — Quantum Security Gateways and Force firewalls, Security Management and Log Servers, Multi-Domain Security Management and Log Servers, Maestro / Scalable Platforms. Check Point Spark firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud are not affected.
Fixed inThe security hotfix for advisory sk1000362, delivered through the monthly Jumbo Hotfix Accumulator of the affected branches
CWECWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) and CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)
ImpactLocal privilege escalation to root: an arbitrary command string written into the control socket is executed with the privileges of the daemon
CVSS7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
VectorThe local AF_UNIX control socket /tmp/dynamic_socket, published by the root daemon dynamic_server
TriggerThe command string an unprivileged local process writes into the socket, framed as #<length># <command>
AdvisoryCheck Point sk1000362
Mitigationdbset process:dynamic_server off followed by dbset :save in Expert mode
Indicators/var/log/dynamicCli.log — the daemon records every request it accepts

The Gaia OS Dynamic CLI (sk144112) maps expert-mode diagnostic commands into the restricted clish shell. The mapping is served by dynamic_server, a daemon that runs as root and owns the local control socket /tmp/dynamic_socket. On affected builds the socket is created world writable and the daemon neither authenticates nor authorizes the process that connects to it, so any authenticated local account — a service account, a portal worker, an interactive shell user — writes a command string into the socket and the daemon executes it as root. The attack is local by design and does not need any credential beyond the ability to run a process on the appliance, which is why it is consistently used as the second stage of the published campaigns that begin with a web portal compromise.

This repository contains a containerised laboratory that reproduces the escalation on the affected behaviour, contrasts it with the patched behaviour, tests the published mitigation and the operator-side hardening, and reports the result of a 0-day sweep over the patched line. Every claim is backed by a capture in evidence/.

What this repository delivers

element of the objectivedelivered byverified by
Containerised differential laboratory, vulnerable and fixed buildslab/ — one image, four authorization variants selected by GAIA_VARIANTmake check, evidence/check-vulnerable-run.txt, evidence/check-fixed-run.txt
Deterministic differential PoC in the modes check / exploit / probe / mitigationpoc/poc.py, poc/Containerfilemake check, make exploit, make probe, make mitigation
The local privilege escalation reproduced on the vulnerable buildthe PoC run as uid 1000 against the world-writable socketevidence/exploit-vulnerable-run.txt, evidence/results/exploit-vuln.json
The same PoC blocked on the fixed buildthe patched daemon modelevidence/exploit-fixed-run.txt, evidence/results/exploit-fixed.json
The published mitigation testeddbset process:dynamic_server off + dbset :saveevidence/mitigation-dbsetserver-off-run.txt
Adjacent 0-days hunted on the fixed linelab/src/sweep.sh, lab/src/fuzz_frame.cevidence/0day-sweep.txt, evidence/0day-sweep-vulnerable.txt
Public GitHub repositoryhttps://github.com/googlesky/CVE-2026-123039gh repo view googlesky/CVE-2026-123039

The machine readable result of every run of the differential is in evidence/results/, and evidence/differential-table.txt is generated from them.


1. Scope and fidelity of this laboratory

Gaia OS is proprietary, licence-gated and not redistributable, the Dynamic CLI daemon ships as an opaque binary inside the cprx/cphaprep packages, and the upstream fix is a binary hotfix with no public source commit. Nothing of the vendor product is redistributed here. What is reproducible in this laboratory is:

  • the vendor's own statement of the defect — CWE-732 and CWE-862, the Dynamic CLI daemon, the world-writable /tmp/dynamic_socket, the absence of caller authentication, the local privilege escalation to root, CVSS 7.8, and the affected/fixed version matrix — taken from advisory sk1000362 and the CVE record;
  • the attack surface of the component — a root daemon, an AF_UNIX control socket in the shared /tmp namespace, the length-framed request format #<length># <command>, the command string executed with the credentials of the daemon, and the request log at /var/log/dynamicCli.log;
  • the security-relevant behaviour of the service — a socket whose mode and peer validation decide whether an unprivileged local process can reach the command execution path;
  • the mitigation surface — the dbset process:dynamic_server off configuration switch and its effect on the published socket.

Everything the laboratory asserts about the vendor product is sourced from the advisory and the CVE record; everything it asserts about the model is labelled as such. The model runs in the laboratory, and the vulnerable and the patched sides differ in the authorization behaviour of the control socket alone — same base image, same configuration, same service, same entrypoint, the variant selected by an environment variable.

The lab image also carries the two partial fixes separately, so the two halves of the defect can be told apart:

buildsocket modepeer validationmeaning
dynamic_server.vuln0777nonethe affected behaviour (CVE-2026-123039)
dynamic_server.fixed0600SO_PEERCRED, uid 0 onlythe patched behaviour
dynamic_server.perm0600noneaccess control only
dynamic_server.peer0777SO_PEERCRED, uid 0 onlyvalidation only

2. Root cause

2.1 The defect

The daemon creates its control socket and then decides who may use it. The affected behaviour creates the socket world writable and never asks the kernel who the caller is. lab/src/dynamic_server.c:

359:    unlink(sock_path);
360:
361:    if (bind(srv, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {
362:        log_line("dynamic_server: bind(%s) failed: %s", sock_path, strerror(errno));
363:        close(srv);
364:        return 2;
365:    }
366:
367:    switch (variant) {
368:    case GAIA_VARIANT_FIXED:
369:    case GAIA_VARIANT_PERM_ONLY:
370:        mode = 0600; /* root only */
371:        break;
372:    default:
373:        mode = 0777; /* world writable */
374:        break;
375:    }
376:    if (chmod(sock_path, mode) != 0)
377:        log_line("dynamic_server: chmod(%s, %o) failed: %s", sock_path,
378:                 (unsigned)mode, strerror(errno));

0777 on a socket grants connect() to every account on the appliance. The daemon then reads a request, and the request is a command string:

281:    pr = dyn_frame_parse(req, got, &frame);
282:    if (pr != DYN_PARSE_OK) {
...
288:    out = run_command(frame.cmd, &out_len);

and the command runs with the credentials of the daemon, which are root:

133:        execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", cmd, (char *)NULL);
134:        _exit(127);

The request handler of the affected build contains no authorization decision at all. The patched build makes the decision before a single byte of the request is interpreted, and it takes it from the kernel rather than from the request:

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