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CVE-2026-32606-POC — Proof-of-concept demonstrating bypass of TPM-bound LUKS disk encryption on Linux systems, extracting volume keys via custom root filesystem attack. | Kitploit
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GitHubgibmat/cve-2026-32606-poc

CVE-2026-32606-POC

Proof-of-concept demonstrating bypass of TPM-bound LUKS disk encryption on Linux systems, extracting volume keys via custom root filesystem attack.

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508 months agoNot yet reviewed
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Proof-of-Concept for CVE-2026-32606

This repo has simple proof-of-concept code exploiting a common weakness initially described over a year ago at https://oddlama.org/blog/bypassing-disk-encryption-with-tpm2-unlock/. While it specifically targets IncusOS, the attack is pretty generic against most modern Linux systems.

TL;DR

If you're binding your LUKS encryption to a TPM, make sure you also set a PIN for the TPM.

DISCLAIMER

This is a quick-n-dirty PoC. It's not fully polished, and there are some rough edges. There's no support, and I don't plan on any further development.

Oops, TPM disk encryption can be bypassed on most systems

I, like most people, assumed that setting up LUKS disk encryption bound to my laptop's TPM chip would be secure and prevent an attacker from being able to extract the LUKS volume key (aka, master key). Turns out, it's almost depressingly easy to do and leave no trace of the attack.

But I'm using Secure Boot and have a measured UKI!

Yup, the problem is an attacker can provide a custom root file system, and after your system boots the TPM will be in a known "good" state where it will happily unlock your LUKS volume. The attacker can then do whatever they want, and easily cover any evidence of the attack.

Luckily, this requires physical access

But a prepared attacker literally only needs to have your computer in their possession for a couple of minutes and you're pwned. Leave your laptop in the hotel room while going out to dinner? What about a security checkpoint where you're pulled aside for questioning? Yup, this isn't good.

Running the attack

The script ./prepare.sh runs the steps necessary to compromise the target VM. The same steps can easily be run against a real hard drive that's been temporarily removed from its normal housing.

The actual "exploit" will extract the original LUKS volume key, which can be seen by looking at the journal log for attack.service. Many variations on this attack are possible.

Covering your tracks

Run ./restore.sh to wipe away all evidence of your deeds while you walk away with the LUKS volume key of your victim.

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