
Detection-only local triage scanner for CVE-2026-119977 (CISA KEV 2026-11-03) in WordPress Core: grades versions 4.7-7.1.3 against per-branch fixes (7.1.4 and backports) and flags wp-content/upgrade exposure. No payloads, no remote probing.
wordpress-core-scannerLocal triage for CVE-2026-119977, the unauthenticated upgrade-window race in WordPress Core. Give it a WordPress version you own, or a version.php file you own, and it tells you whether that install is still open. It never touches the network, never probes a server, never starts an update, never tries to win the race.
The flawDuring a full-package core update, WordPress unpacked the new files into a predictable, web-accessible staging directory under wp-content/upgrade/. The staged copy includes the installer. An unauthenticated attacker who reached that staged installer in the seconds-long window between unpacking and cleanup could execute code on the server. That is CWE-367, a time-of-check to time-of-use race: a check observes a state, the state changes, and a later operation uses the changed state.
WordPress 7.1.4, released 28 October 2026, fixes it by randomizing the staging directory name, adding an index guard, and stopping staged configuration data from being promoted unsafely. The fix is backported to every branch back to 4.7. Wordfence, the CNA that assigned the CVE, scores it CVSS 3.1 8.1 High (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). Wordfence blocked tens of thousands of attempts in the first days, and CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 3 November 2026, with a federal fix deadline of 6 November 2026. No confirmed site takeover has been reported. Attempts are not compromises, and this tool grades exposure, not compromise.
What it checksA version you supply (--version 7.1.3): graded against the fixed release for its branchA version file you supply (--version-file wp-includes/version.php): $wp_version parsed out of a file you ownAn install root you supply (--wp-root /var/www/html): wp-includes/version.php graded, plus a note if wp-content/upgrade/ still exists on disk under that installAn offline inventory (--inventory-json sites.json): a JSON list of {site, version, upgrade_exposed, auto_updates} entries, for a fleet of sitesThe full table (--list): every branch and its fixed releaseThe trap: the update to 7.1.4 opens the window once moreSignal | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
WordPress 4.7.0 through 7.1.3 | below its branch fix | 7.1.4, or its branch backport |
WordPress 4.6 and earlier | no security updates at all | no fix, upgrade to a supported release |
WordPress newer than 7.1 (for example 7.2) | post-fix line | graded PATCHED |
Two things to not get wrong. First, do not grade every install against 7.1.4 alone. A site on 6.8.12 is patched even though it is not on 7.1.4, and a site on 7.0.7 is vulnerable even though 7.0.8 is a much smaller number than 7.1.4. The grade is per branch, and the table covers all 25 branches from 4.7 to 7.1.
Second, block wp-content/upgrade/ at the web server before you update. The update to 7.1.4 itself is unpacked by the old, unpatched code, so that last update opens the window once more. WordPress only needs filesystem access to that folder, so a server-level deny costs nothing. Do not put the rule in a file inside the upgrade folder itself: pre-7.1.4 code deletes everything in that folder before each unpack. A PHP-level firewall alone is not enough either, because the malicious request goes straight to a PHP file without loading WordPress first.
Usage# vulnerable install
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --version 7.1.3
# fixed install
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --version 7.1.4
# a branch backport counts as fixed
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --version 6.8.12
# from a version file you own
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --version-file wp-includes/version.php
# on the host itself
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --wp-root /var/www/html
# say the upgrade folder is web-accessible, or that auto-updates are off
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --version 7.0.7 --upgrade-exposed --auto-updates-off
# machine-readable output for fleets
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --version 7.1.3 --json
# the full fixed-version table
python3 wordpress_core_scanner.py --list
Exit codes: 0 = nothing vulnerable found, 2 = vulnerable or no-fix finding, 1 = scan error. UNKNOWN does not change the exit code, but it is not clean. An unparseable version, or a branch with no published fixed release, has not been cleared. It has simply not been graded.
Where sources disagree, and what is still unverifiedFirst, the severity. WordPress rates the race Low in its own advisory GHSA-4w3m-c66w-69mg. Wordfence, the CNA, scores the same flaw 8.1 High. Both describe the same facts: the impact is code execution if the race is won, and winning it is hard because the window lasts seconds and needs a full-package update in progress. This tool follows the Wordfence score for the headline and the WordPress rating for the caveat, and it says so plainly. Do not quote one rating without the other.
Second, the KEV timeline. Reporting on 31 October correctly said the flaw was not yet in CISA KEV. That changed on 3 November 2026, when CISA added it on evidence of active exploitation, with a 6 November federal deadline. The trend trigger for this build is that 3 November addition, inside the last 72 hours, not the 28 October release itself.
Third, exploitation. Wordfence reports attempts: more than 18,500 requests aimed at staged installer paths in the first 21 hours, and later tallies near 63,000 in 24 hours. Neither Wordfence nor any other source cited here reports a confirmed site takeover. This tool grades whether a version is exposed. It does not claim any site was compromised, and a VULNERABLE grade on its own is not evidence of compromise. If a site was unpatched during a core update, check its logs for requests to PHP files under wp-content/upgrade/, plus unexpected admin accounts, plugins, or PHP files you did not place there.
Fourth, no widely available local triage scanner for this flaw was found when this build was checked. What exists is firewall rules (Wordfence paid from 28 October, free from 27 November 2026), version checks in scanners like WPScan, and log detection for staged installer requests. Those watch traffic or report a version. This tool is the other side of that: an offline, per-branch grade for a single install or a whole fleet, including the upgrade-folder exposure flag and the auto-updates flag that decide whether a site will actually pick up the fix. If a standalone scanner already covers this well, open an issue and say so.
Mitigation if you cannot patch todayBlock wp-content/upgrade/ at the web server, now, before any update. Then update to 7.1.4 or your branch backport, and confirm the update landed instead of assuming it did (Dashboard > Updates, or wp core version plus wp core verify-checksums). Sites with automatic background updates off will not pick up 7.1.4 on their own, so update those by hand. Sites on 4.6 or earlier have no fix to wait for: move them to a supported release.
Testspython3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
26 tests: current-line and per-branch boundaries for all 25 branches, unsupported versions as NO-FIX, post-fix lines and pre-release suffixes, unparseable versions as UNKNOWN, version.php parsing, wp-root grading and stale upgrade-directory reporting, inventory counts and notes, CLI exit codes, JSON output, and the full table.
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