Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
Tools/GitHubGitHub/federiconbaez/cortex9-pingora-http10-te-smuggling-model
Static AnalysisVulnerability AnalysisCode AnalysisWeb SecurityPapers & ResearchLearning & EducationLabs & Practice
GitHubfedericonbaez/cortex9-pingora-http10-te-smuggling-model

cortex9-pingora-http10-te-smuggling-model

Offline educational model of CVE-2026-2835 (Pingora HTTP/1.0 TE smuggling)

View Repository
9 days agoNot yet reviewed

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    795
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    520
  • 3

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    439
  • 4

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    346
  • 5

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    267
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    264

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →
Share

cortex9-pingora-http10-te-smuggling-model

Offline model of CVE-2026-2835 (GHSA-hj7x-879w-vrp7, RUSTSEC-2026-0034, CWE-444): before 0.8.0, Pingora's HTTP/1 server read an HTTP/1.0 request without Content-Length as close-delimited, accepted Transfer-Encoding on HTTP/1.0, and decided "chunked" from the first Transfer-Encoding value by exact match. A front-end and a back-end could then disagree about where a request ends. The GHSA names three fix commits, all in 0.8.0 and not in 0.7.0: 7f7166d, 40c3c1e and 87e2e2f. Educational, deterministic, C11 checked with ASan/UBSan. Pingora is not built or run, no socket is opened. The model frames a request head given as header values.

Spanish: README.es.md. Exercises: PRACTICE.md.

What is modelled (tied to the code)

pingora-core/src/protocols/http/v1/, pre = 9ac75d0 (parent of 7f7166d), post = 87e2e2f (after the three commits):

Steppre (9ac75d0)post (87e2e2f)
TE and CL both presentserver.rs 253-263: CL removed258-271 same, 283-285 keepalive off (7f7166d)
HTTP/1.0 + TEacceptedserver.rs 338-343: rejected (7f7166d)
Which TE countscommon.rs 144-149: first value, exact chunkedcommon.rs 145-176: last header, last token, trimmed (7f7166d)
Final coding not chunkedtreated as not chunkedserver.rs 346-347: rejected (87e2e2f)
Invalid CLcommon.rs 182-209: Noneserver.rs 351, common.rs 209-242: rejected (fc904c0, see LIMITATIONS)
No TE, no CLserver.rs 832-841: HTTP/1.1 length 0, HTTP/1.0 until closeserver.rs 883-889: length 0 (40c3c1e)
Duplicate CL linescommon.rs 252-270: rejected unless TEsame (285-303)
Keepaliveserver.rs 661-678710-727 (same)

Every result is compared with rfc, an independent reading of RFC 9112 §6.1 and §6.3 for requests (not code from Pingora): AGREE, STRICTER (Pingora rejects, RFC accepts), KEEPALIVE (same framing, but the connection stays reusable where the RFC says close) or DESYNC (accepted with a different framing, or accepted where the RFC rejects).

Differential evidence (results/)

results/sweep.csv: 2 versions × 12 TE configurations × 8 CL configurations × 3 Connection values = 576 request heads.

AGREESTRICTERKEEPALIVEDESYNCuntil close
pre45642483177
post528360120

All 12 remaining post desyncs are Content-Length: +5 or -0: Rust's str::parse::<i64>() accepts a sign (checked with rustc 1.99.1 here), RFC 9112 says 1*DIGIT. That is a model observation, not a finding. tests/test_model.c checks on 40,000 random heads that post never reads until close, never keeps a TE+CL connection alive, rejects every HTTP/1.0 request with TE, and only differs from the RFC on a signed length.

Build and check

sh scripts/build.sh test
python3 scripts/derive_expected.py | diff - fixtures/expected.tsv
sh scripts/build.sh results /tmp/r && diff -r results /tmp/r
./build/pgframe case 10 chunked - -
./build/pgframe case 11 'chunked|identity' - -

Sources: SOURCES.md. Limits: LIMITATIONS.md. License: Apache-2.0.

Download Tool