Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
CVE-2026-5053_NoMachine_LPE — Writeup and proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-5053, an arbitrary file deletion flaw in NoMachine's SUID-root nxexec binary that enables local privilege escalation. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/do4choo/cve-2026-5053_nomachine_lpe
Privilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationPapers & Research
GitHubdo4choo/cve-2026-5053_nomachine_lpe

CVE-2026-5053_NoMachine_LPE

Writeup and proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-5053, an arbitrary file deletion flaw in NoMachine's SUID-root nxexec binary that enables local privilege escalation.

View Repository
Share
223 days agoNot yet reviewed

CVE-2026-5053: NoMachine Arbitrary File Deletion (ZDI-26-247)

CVE ID: CVE-2026-5053
ZDI Advisory: ZDI-26-247
CVSS Score: 7.1 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H)
Affected Products: NoMachine (Free) and NoMachine Workstation Pack (Tested on 9.2.18 Linux/Ubuntu)
Patched Version: 9.4.14 (Tracked as TR02X11710)


Overview

NoMachine installs a SUID-root binary (nxexec) that contains a logic flaw allowing arbitrary file deletion when invoked with specific command-line arguments. Because the binary does not properly validate user-supplied environment variables before using them in file operations, a local attacker can exploit this to remove any file on the system, regardless of ownership.

Note: This vulnerability is fully patched in NoMachine 9.4.14.


Proof of Concept (PoC)

To trigger the arbitrary file deletion, an attacker simply needs to manipulate the NX_KRB5_TICKET_CACHE environment variable and execute the SUID binary.

Basic Syntax:

NX_KRB5_TICKET_CACHE=<target file> /usr/NX/bin/nxexec --user root --gssremove

Example (Deleting /etc/passwd):

NX_KRB5_TICKET_CACHE=/etc/passwd /usr/NX/bin/nxexec --user root --gssremove


Technical Details & Root Cause Analysis

The vulnerability stems from how the nxexec binary handles the Kerberos ticket cache path.

  1. Injection Point: The environment variable NX_KRB5_TICKET_CACHE is read directly by the application.
  2. Missing Validation: There is absolutely no length, path traversal, or sanitization validation performed on this buffer.
  3. Execution Flow: * NXGssapiRemoveTicket() reads the environment variable: env = getenv("NX_KRB5_TICKET_CACHE").
  • It passes this unvalidated path to DestroyKerberosCache().
  • The execution falls through to the MIT Kerberos implementation via DestroyKerberosCacheMit().
  • The program calls krb5_cc_resolve(env, …) followed by krb5_cc_destroy().
  • krb5_cc_destroy() performs an unlink() operation on the resolved file, running in the context of the SUID-root binary.

Vulnerable Code Path Snippet:

int NXGssapiRemoveTicket(char *specified_user){
    ...
    env = getenv("NX_KRB5_TICKET_CACHE");
    ...
    iVar1 = DestroyKerberosCache(specified_user,env);

    -----
    if (ret == 0) {
        if (kerberos_implementation_type == 0) {
            ret = DestroyKerberosCacheMit(specified_user, value_env_NX_KRB5_TICKET_CACHE);
            return ret;
        }
    -----
    iVar1 = (*krb5_cc_destroy)(krb5_context, local_a0); // unlinks the file
}


Impact: Denial of Service & Privilege Escalation

While an arbitrary file delete is natively a Denial of Service (DoS) vector (e.g., deleting critical system files to crash the host), it can easily be weaponized for Privilege Escalation (PrivEsc).

Escalation Scenarios:

  • Cron Replacements: An attacker could delete a root-owned cron script and replace it with a malicious payload that spawns a root shell upon execution.
  • Sticky Bit Exploitation: In directories with the sticky bit set (like /tmp or /var/tmp), an attacker can delete a file owned by root that the system expects to read/execute later, and recreate it with arbitrary malicious content.

Disclosure Timeline

  • 2026-02-06: Vulnerability discovered and reported to vendor via Zero Day Initiative (ZDI).
  • 2026-03-26: NoMachine releases patch in version 9.4.14.
  • 2026-03-30: Coordinated public release of advisory.
Download Tool

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    927
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    555
  • 3

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    360
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    357
  • 5

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    324
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    289

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →