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CVE-2026-49881 — Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-49881, an Android 17 Telecom privilege escalation letting any app execute code as system_server (UID 1000) with only MANAGE_OWN_CALLS. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/cyb3r-w0lf/cve-2026-49881
Android SecurityPrivilege EscalationExploitationMobile App PentestingMobile SecurityPayload Development
GitHubcyb3r-w0lf/cve-2026-49881

CVE-2026-49881

Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-49881, an Android 17 Telecom privilege escalation letting any app execute code as system_server (UID 1000) with only MANAGE_OWN_CALLS.

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22 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-49881 — Telecom LoadedApk Privilege Escalation (TLPE)

A proof-of-concept demonstrating CVE-2026-49881, a privilege escalation vulnerability in Android 17 that allows any installed app to execute arbitrary code as system_server (UID 1000) with only the auto-granted MANAGE_OWN_CALLS permission.

PoC Video

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cf0e91a5-68f5-40aa-9cb7-503925e1f23b

Vulnerability Summary

Root Cause: InCallController.serviceClassExists() calls createPackageContextAsUser() with CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE | CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY, then getClassLoader(), which triggers the attacker's AppComponentFactory.instantiateClassLoader() inside system_server.

Trigger: TelecomManager.addCall() — requires only MANAGE_OWN_CALLS (auto-granted at install, no user prompt).

Impact: Full system_server code execution — silent permission grants, system settings modification, IMEI exfiltration, silent camera streaming, and more.

Repository Structure

├── torch-demo/        # Demo app disguised as a flashlight ("Torch")
├── viewer/            # MJPEG camera stream viewer for presenter laptop
└── demo.sh            # Demo automation script

Torch Demo App

A flashlight app that, upon tapping the torch button, silently:

  1. Changes Bluetooth device name to "CVE-2026-49881" (requires WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS)
  2. Enables ADB over WiFi via Settings.Global
  3. Reads the IMEI without READ_PHONE_STATE
  4. Silently grants CAMERA permission via PackageManager.grantRuntimePermission()
  5. Streams camera feed off-screen over MJPEG HTTP (port 8888)

Long-press the torch button to revert all changes.

Quick Start

Prerequisites

  • Android 17 emulator or device (pre-patch)
  • Android SDK with ADB
  • Java 21+

Build & Run

cd torch-demo
./gradlew assembleDebug
adb install app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk

Demo Script

# Show available commands
./demo.sh

# Full demo sequence
./demo.sh full

# Individual commands
./demo.sh install      # Build and install
./demo.sh exploit      # Trigger exploit + show logs
./demo.sh bt           # Show Bluetooth name change
./demo.sh camera       # Open camera stream viewer
./demo.sh revert       # Revert all changes + uninstall
./demo.sh verify       # Verify clean state

Remote Emulator (SSH)

# On local machine — port forward
ssh <host> -L 5555:127.0.0.1:5555 -L 8888:localhost:8888 -L 9999:localhost:9999

# On VM — after each emulator reboot
adb forward tcp:8888 tcp:8888 && adb forward tcp:9999 tcp:9999

Capability Test App

Standalone app (com.research.captest) that tests 9 UID 1000 capabilities individually, each with automatic revert:

  1. Silent permission grants (10 permissions)
  2. Location read
  3. Hide app from launcher
  4. Write system settings (Global + Secure)
  5. Read contacts
  6. Read SMS
  7. Silent APK install session
  8. Start service in other app
  9. Persistence check

Key Technical Details

  • SELinux blocks direct camera/shell access from system_server — workaround uses Java reflection and Context.startForegroundService()
  • foregroundServiceType="dataSync" avoids validateForegroundServiceType crash
  • Camera runs in app process (not system_server) with silently granted permission
  • Classloader is cached after first exploit — reboot needed between reinstalls
  • Silently granted permissions persist across reboot

Mitigation

Google's fix: removed CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY flag from serviceClassExists(). Update to the latest Android security patch.

Disclaimer

This proof-of-concept is for educational and authorized security research purposes only. Do not use against devices without explicit permission.

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