
Proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-49881, an Android 17 Telecom privilege escalation letting any app execute code as system_server (UID 1000) with only MANAGE_OWN_CALLS.
A proof-of-concept demonstrating CVE-2026-49881, a privilege escalation vulnerability in Android 17 that allows any installed app to execute arbitrary code as system_server (UID 1000) with only the auto-granted MANAGE_OWN_CALLS permission.
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cf0e91a5-68f5-40aa-9cb7-503925e1f23b
Root Cause: InCallController.serviceClassExists() calls createPackageContextAsUser() with CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE | CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY, then getClassLoader(), which triggers the attacker's AppComponentFactory.instantiateClassLoader() inside system_server.
Trigger: TelecomManager.addCall() — requires only MANAGE_OWN_CALLS (auto-granted at install, no user prompt).
Impact: Full system_server code execution — silent permission grants, system settings modification, IMEI exfiltration, silent camera streaming, and more.
├── torch-demo/ # Demo app disguised as a flashlight ("Torch")
├── viewer/ # MJPEG camera stream viewer for presenter laptop
└── demo.sh # Demo automation script
A flashlight app that, upon tapping the torch button, silently:
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS)Settings.GlobalREAD_PHONE_STATEPackageManager.grantRuntimePermission()Long-press the torch button to revert all changes.
cd torch-demo
./gradlew assembleDebug
adb install app/build/outputs/apk/debug/app-debug.apk
# Show available commands
./demo.sh
# Full demo sequence
./demo.sh full
# Individual commands
./demo.sh install # Build and install
./demo.sh exploit # Trigger exploit + show logs
./demo.sh bt # Show Bluetooth name change
./demo.sh camera # Open camera stream viewer
./demo.sh revert # Revert all changes + uninstall
./demo.sh verify # Verify clean state
# On local machine — port forward
ssh <host> -L 5555:127.0.0.1:5555 -L 8888:localhost:8888 -L 9999:localhost:9999
# On VM — after each emulator reboot
adb forward tcp:8888 tcp:8888 && adb forward tcp:9999 tcp:9999
Standalone app (com.research.captest) that tests 9 UID 1000 capabilities individually, each with automatic revert:
system_server — workaround uses Java reflection and Context.startForegroundService()foregroundServiceType="dataSync" avoids validateForegroundServiceType crashGoogle's fix: removed CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY flag from serviceClassExists(). Update to the latest Android security patch.
This proof-of-concept is for educational and authorized security research purposes only. Do not use against devices without explicit permission.