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CVE-2026-116004 — Safe local proof of concept and technical analysis for CVE-2026-116004, an iframe sandbox bypass and stored XSS in Onyx preview, with source checks and browser reproduction. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/capivara-research/cve-2026-116004
Defensive ToolsVulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationWeb SecurityLearning & Education
GitHubcapivara-research/cve-2026-116004

CVE-2026-116004

Safe local proof of concept and technical analysis for CVE-2026-116004, an iframe sandbox bypass and stored XSS in Onyx preview, with source checks and browser reproduction.

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CVE-2026-116004 — Onyx same-origin iframe sandbox bypass / stored XSS

English | Português do Brasil

CVE NVD VulDB Submit

Safe, local proof of concept for the unsafe iframe sandbox configuration in Onyx Craft's preview panel. The issue was researched and reported by Fernando Viana (capivara-research).

At a glance

ItemDetail
ComponentCraft output preview
Fileweb/src/app/craft/components/output-panel/PreviewTab.tsx
WeaknessesCWE-79, CWE-94
Official affected rangeOnyx through 5.0.0
Official severityCVSS 4.0 5.1 / CVSS 3.1 3.5
Tested commit711a0479f1630dcce38f8f58212a63080702b753
InteractionA user views attacker-controlled preview content

Official CVE record

VulDB reserved the identifier on 2026-10-24 and published it on 2026-10-25. The canonical record credits fernando viana (VulDB User) as reporter. Exact record dates and vectors are preserved in evidence/official-record-summary.md.

The CVE record names version 5.0 as affected. The repository separately pins the exact audited commit so the source evidence remains reproducible even if the product's release labels or default branch change.

Root cause

How to think about the issue

An iframe sandbox starts as a locked room. Each sandbox token opens one capability. allow-scripts lets code run. allow-same-origin gives the document its real origin instead of an isolated opaque origin. When untrusted content shares the parent application's origin, these two permissions together can restore the exact capability the sandbox was expected to contain.

The relevant test is therefore behavioral: can script inside the framed preview read or modify the parent document?

The affected component renders the generated web application URL in this sandbox:

The dangerous condition is the combination of three facts:

attacker-controlled preview content
  + iframe can execute scripts
  + iframe keeps its real origin
  + preview and parent can share an origin
  -> framed JavaScript can access the parent DOM

An iframe sandbox is a list of restored capabilities. allow-scripts restores JavaScript. allow-same-origin prevents the framed document from receiving an opaque origin. If untrusted content shares the application's origin, the browser's same-origin policy permits DOM access to the parent.

Safe PoC

The harness serves two synthetic files from the same 127.0.0.1 origin. The parent uses the exact affected sandbox value. The child changes a harmless text marker in the parent DOM.

The validation has two independent layers:

  1. source-check.py verifies the affected iframe, URL source, and sandbox tokens in the pinned Onyx source.
  2. reproduce.py launches Chromium and proves that framed JavaScript can modify the synthetic parent DOM.

Local artifact review

The local research checkout at commit 711a0479f1630dcce38f8f58212a63080702b753 was found and used for validation. No separate disclosure-time payload, screenshot, or report file was found outside that vendor checkout. This repository therefore includes only newly generated synthetic artifacts and does not claim nonexistent historical evidence.

The checkout provenance and affected source excerpt are recorded in evidence/source-review.md.

python3 poc/source-check.py /path/to/onyx
python3 poc/reproduce.py

Dependencies on Debian/Ubuntu:

sudo apt install chromium chromium-driver python3-selenium

Expected vulnerable result:

"allow_scripts": true
"allow_same_origin": true
"parent_dom_accessed": true
[VULNERABLE] same-origin framed script modified the parent DOM

Exit codes:

CodeMeaning
1Vulnerable browser behavior reproduced
0Parent DOM access was not reproduced
otherBrowser or laboratory setup error

Docker

docker build -t cve-2026-116004 .
docker run --rm cve-2026-116004

Manual browser verification

Serve the controlled pages:

python3 -m http.server 8000 --bind 127.0.0.1 --directory poc

Open http://127.0.0.1:8000/parent.html. A vulnerable browser condition changes PARENT_NOT_MODIFIED to PARENT_DOM_ACCESSED_CVE_2026_116004.

Preconditions and limits

  • The framed content must execute attacker-controlled JavaScript.
  • The framed content and sensitive parent must be same-origin for direct parent DOM access.
  • Impact depends on how Onyx deploys and serves generated previews.
  • This PoC changes one synthetic text node. It does not steal sessions, credentials, or data.
  • It does not connect to an Onyx deployment or any external host.

Impact and defensive detection

The demonstrated security-boundary failure is same-origin parent-DOM access from untrusted preview code. Depending on the parent application's exposed DOM and browser-held authority, this can permit actions in the viewing user's context. The safe PoC deliberately stops after changing a fixed text marker.

Defenders should inventory preview iframe policies and flag any untrusted same-origin frame combining allow-scripts with allow-same-origin. Browser regression tests should assert that preview content cannot read or modify a sentinel in the parent document.

Remediation

  • Do not combine allow-scripts and allow-same-origin for untrusted same-origin content.
  • Serve generated previews from a dedicated origin with no shared cookies or application privileges.
  • Remove allow-same-origin when application requirements permit it.
  • Apply a restrictive Content Security Policy to preview content.
  • Validate that navigation and popup capabilities are necessary.
  • Add a browser regression test that asserts preview content cannot read or modify the parent DOM.

Repository map

.
├── README.md
├── README.pt-BR.md
├── Dockerfile
├── poc/
│   ├── parent.html
│   ├── payload.html
│   ├── reproduce.py
│   └── source-check.py
├── evidence/
│   ├── validated-results.md
│   ├── official-record-summary.md
│   └── source-review.md
├── SECURITY.md
└── LICENSE

References

  • Official CVE record
  • NIST National Vulnerability Database
  • VDB-426102
  • VulDB submission #992835
  • Affected PreviewTab.tsx
  • MDN: iframe sandbox

Timeline

DateEvent
2026-09-21VulDB submission #992835 recorded
2026-10-24CVE-2026-116004 reserved
2026-10-25CVE record published
2026-10-26Source and browser validation published in this repository

Legal notice

Use this material only for authorized security testing, defensive validation, and education.

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