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CVE-2026-46242 — Aarch64 proof-of-concept checker for CVE-2026-46242 'Bad Epoll', triggering the Linux kernel epoll close-vs-close use-after-free race to validate local privilege escalation. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/binarymasc/cve-2026-46242
Privilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationBinary Exploitation
GitHubbinarymasc/cve-2026-46242

CVE-2026-46242

Aarch64 proof-of-concept checker for CVE-2026-46242 'Bad Epoll', triggering the Linux kernel epoll close-vs-close use-after-free race to validate local privilege escalation.

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453 months agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-46242 — "Bad Epoll"

This repo is a bad Epoll validator for aarch64 kernels based on exploit already exists for x86.

Linux Kernel Local Privilege Escalation via epoll Use-After-Free Race Condition

FieldDetail
CVECVE-2026-46242
NicknameBad Epoll
TypeUse-After-Free (UAF) via race condition
CVSS7.8 (High)
ImpactLocal Privilege Escalation → root
Affected kernels5.10 – 6.11 (LTS & COS)
Subsystemfs/eventpoll.c (ep_remove() / close path)

Vulnerability Summary

A race condition exists in the Linux kernel's epoll subsystem during concurrent close() operations on monitored and monitoring file descriptors. When two close paths execute simultaneously:

  1. One path frees an eventpoll object via ep_remove().
  2. The other path's pending hlist_del_rcu() write lands on the already-freed memory.

This produces a Use-After-Free that corrupts the refs list of the reclaimed eventpoll, leaving a dangling epi->ffd.file pointer in the surviving epoll waiter — the foundation for the full exploit chain.


Exploitation Flow

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. KASLR Leak       (prefetch side-channel via libxdk)  │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2. Race Trigger      (close-vs-close UAF on eventpoll)  │
│    ├─ Adaptive timer: stat/exec phases calibrate ahead  │
│    ├─ False-sharing:  dup()+close() widens race window  │
│    └─ Oracle:         EPOLL_CTL_ADD depth-3 → ELOOP?    │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 3. Reclaim           (freed eventpoll → ep_uaf_target)  │
│    └─ Dangling epi->ffd.file in ep_uaf_waiter           │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 4. Cross-Cache       (filp slab → buddy → pipe_buffer)  │
│    ├─ Drain per-CPU partial list                        │
│    ├─ Free enclosing objects → slab page freed          │
│    └─ Reclaim as pipe pages (256 × 4 KiB)              │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 5. Constrained AAR   (fdinfo ino:/sdev: as read oracle) │
│    ├─ Fake file spray tiles forged struct file in pipe  │
│    ├─ 8B read: ino: ← i_ino at controlled offset       │
│    ├─ 4B read: sdev: ← sigaltstack(sas_ss_sp) cursor   │
│    └─ Walk: init_task → find exploit task → resolve     │
│       files → fdt → fd[] → pipe_buffer → struct page   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 6. RIP Control       (f_op→poll hijack → JOP → ROP)    │
│    ├─ Forge f_op = virt, f_count = virt - 1             │
│    ├─ JOP pivot chain lands rsp on controlled page      │
│    └─ libxdk ROP: commit_creds(init_cred) + ns switch  │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 7. Ret2Usr           execve("/bin/bash") as root        │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Build

# aarch64 (cross-compile or native)
aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc -O2 -Wall -pthread -march=armv8-a \
    race_check_aarch64.c -o race_check

Usage

./race_check [timeout_seconds]   # default: 300s (5 min)
./race_check 120                 # 2-minute timeout

Exit Codes

CodeMeaning
0Race won — kernel is vulnerable
1Timeout — race not detected (possible false negative, does not prove the kernel is patched)

References

  • Original PoC (J-jaeyoung)
  • NVD — CVE-2026-46242

⚠️ Disclaimer: This repository is provided for educational and authorized security research purposes only. Unauthorized use of this exploit against systems you do not own or have explicit permission to test is illegal.

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