Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
CVE-2026-82286-gpt-crawler-Arbitrary-File-Write — CVE-2026-82286 — gpt-crawler <=1.5.1 unauthenticated arbitrary file write via outputFileName (POST /crawl). PoC + self-contained Docker lab. CVSS 8.6, CWE-22. | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/biitts/cve-2026-82286-gpt-crawler-arbitrary-file-write
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration TestingLearning & EducationLabs & Practice
GitHubbiitts/cve-2026-82286-gpt-crawler-arbitrary-file-write

CVE-2026-82286-gpt-crawler-Arbitrary-File-Write

CVE-2026-82286 — gpt-crawler <=1.5.1 unauthenticated arbitrary file write via outputFileName (POST /crawl). PoC + self-contained Docker lab. CVSS 8.6, CWE-22.

View Repository
262 months agoNot yet reviewed

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    1.1k
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    600
  • 3

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    391
  • 4

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    321
  • 5

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    292
  • 6

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    257

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →
Share

CVE-2026-82286 — gpt-crawler Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write

Proof-of-concept for an unauthenticated arbitrary file write in BuilderIO/gpt-crawler (≈22k ★) via the outputFileName parameter of the POST /crawl API endpoint.

CVECVE-2026-82286
Productgpt-crawler (BuilderIO)
Affected<= 1.5.1 (latest release; default branch HEAD also affected)
ClassPath Traversal / Arbitrary File Write (CWE-22, CWE-73)
CVSS 3.18.6 — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L (HIGH)
AuthNone (unauthenticated)
PreconditionAPI server mode running (npm run start:server)
StatusCONFIRMED end-to-end (unpatched as of 2026-08-29)

Root cause

The API server (src/server.ts) exposes POST /crawl with no authentication. The JSON body is parsed directly into the crawler Config; outputFileName is validated only as z.string() — there is no path constraint:

// src/config.ts
outputFileName: z.string(),

In src/core.ts, write() builds the output path straight from that attacker-controlled string and calls fs.writeFile() on it:

// src/core.ts  (write)
const nextFileName = (): string =>
  `${config.outputFileName.replace(/\.json$/, "")}-${fileCounter}.json`;
...
await writeFile(nextFileNameString, JSON.stringify(currentResults, null, 2));

A remote, unauthenticated attacker therefore controls the full path of a file written outside the intended storage/ output area — via an absolute path (/tmp/x, /home/<user>/x) or ../ traversal. The file content is the crawl result [{title,url,html}], whose fields come from a page the attacker points the crawler at (set url to a server you control), so content is attacker-influenced.

The only constraint is the forced -<N>.json suffix (name always ends .json) and the JSON-array content wrapper — which is why this is scored as arbitrary file write (I:H), not a clean RCE.

Exploit

python3 exploit.py \
  -t http://TARGET:3000 \
  -u http://ATTACKER:8081/index.html \   # page whose content lands in the written file
  -o /home/myuser/PWNED                    # -> writes /home/myuser/PWNED-1.json

The endpoint reflects the written file's content in the HTTP response. Empirical proof is the file appearing at the attacker-chosen path on the target filesystem (see EVIDENCE.txt).

Reproduce

cd lab && ./run.sh
python3 ../exploit.py -t http://127.0.0.1:3000 -u http://127.0.0.1:8081/index.html -o /tmp/PWNED
docker exec gptc-vuln cat /tmp/PWNED-1.json     # <- written outside storage/, unauthenticated

Teardown: docker rm -f gptc-vuln; pkill -f 'http.server 8081'.

Impact

An unauthenticated network attacker can create or overwrite files at arbitrary paths (subject to the process user's permissions and the -<N>.json suffix) with partially attacker-controlled content. Depending on deployment this enables tampering with configuration/data files, clobbering application state (integrity/availability), and, on targets that later consume a written *.json file, can be chained further.

Affected surface note

The sink is reachable only in the API server mode (src/server.ts, started via npm run start:server / the containerapp deployment), not the default CLI mode. The server binds API_HOST (default localhost); real deployments that expose the API set it to 0.0.0.0 (as the containerapp image does), making the endpoint remotely reachable.

Remediation

  • Resolve outputFileName against a fixed base directory and reject the result if it escapes it (path.resolve(base, name) + prefix check); strip .. and absolute paths.
  • Add authentication/authorization to POST /crawl.
  • Treat the crawl output filename as server-controlled, not client-supplied.

Detection

Look for POST /crawl bodies whose outputFileName contains /, \, or .., and for *-1.json files appearing outside the crawler's storage/ directory.

Credits

Research & PoC: Caio Fabrício (BiiTts).

Download Tool