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B63-POC-CVE-2026-96652 — PoC and verification material for CVE-2026-96652 (Plex Media Server timeline SSRF, owner-token disclosure chain) | Kitploit
Tools/GitHubGitHub/basesixtythree/b63-poc-cve-2026-96652
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationInformation GatheringWeb SecurityPenetration Testing
GitHubbasesixtythree/b63-poc-cve-2026-96652

B63-POC-CVE-2026-96652

PoC and verification material for CVE-2026-96652 (Plex Media Server timeline SSRF, owner-token disclosure chain)

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328 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-96652 — Plex Media Server timeline SSRF

PoC and verification material for CVE-2026-96652 (GHSA-5p7w-r379-3c2m, "Plex Media Server allows SSRF via '/player/timeline'", CVSS v3.1 4.3 Medium, CWE-918) — fixed in Plex Media Server 1.43.3.10861.

Overview — the /player/timeline subscription endpoint validates the X-Plex-Token header's presence, not its value, and copies the attacker protocol string into a URL the server itself fetches. An unauthenticated attacker therefore makes the Plex Media Server issue HTTP requests of their choosing (server-origin SSRF). Inside the Plex 1.43.3.10828 lab this was chained one step further: the SSRF pivots into loopback-only /system/agents/* endpoints and ends with the server handing out its own owner-level admin token (byte-identical to .LocalAdminToken) to a callback the attacker controls.

Verification status (tier-separated)

TierStatusEvidence
SSRF primitive in isolation: server issues a POST to an attacker-selected URL, any X-Plex-Token value accepted, invalid token includedcapturedevidence/01-ssrf-primitive.txt
Full chain: loopback pivot into /system/agents/z/searchOne (CVE-2026-96654 agent-function access, CVE-2026-96655 owner-token disclosure) → owner admin token exfiltrated → owner-tier endpoints answer 200capturedevidence/02-impact-owner-token.txt
Patched build negative (1.43.3.10861): subscription returns HTTP 400, no server-originated request observedcapturedevidence/03-negative-patched.txt
Reliability: 5/5 per exploit variant on the vulnerable build, 0/5 on the patched build (10 attempts per verdict class total)capturedevidence/04-reliability-5x.txt

Evidence transcripts are kept as captured; the leading Command:/CWD: headers had the operator home path masked as ~ (visible mask, nothing else touched). Some Command: headers reference the foundry's internal workspace layout and internal driver filenames; the shipped poc/ drivers reproduce the same chain, and lab/ reproduces the captured environment. The owner token visible in the transcripts is the lab container's own .LocalAdminToken (a lab-local value, regenerated per container); no real-world token appears anywhere in this bundle.

Files

poc/exploit_opt.py          compact driver (ssrf / full modes)
poc/exploit_readable.py     same wire sequence, staged and commented
lab/compose.yml             vulnerable 1.43.3.10828 (127.0.0.1:32400) vs patched 1.43.3.10861 (32401)
evidence/                   captured lab transcripts (paths scrubbed, see above)

Usage (lab targets only)

Both PoCs speak to local lab instances; the same flows work against any server you are explicitly authorized to test. Python 3.8+, stdlib only.

# full chain: SSRF -> loopback pivot -> owner token theft
python3 poc/exploit_readable.py --target 127.0.0.1:32400 --attacker-ip <bridge-gateway>

# SSRF primitive only (proves CVE-2026-96652 in isolation)
python3 poc/exploit_opt.py --target 127.0.0.1:32400 --attacker-ip <bridge-gateway> --mode ssrf

--attacker-ip must be the attacking host's address as seen from inside the Plex container — on a default Docker bridge that is the bridge gateway: docker network inspect bridge --format '{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{.Gateway}}{{end}}'. Knobs: --bind (listener address), --listen-port (default 8952), --wait (seconds to wait for callbacks, default 30; the readable driver uses at least half of it per refire attempt, the opt driver the same formula — both cap each attempt at roughly half the knob by default).

Expected on the vulnerable build: the server issues POST /ssrf-proof?stage=1 to the attacker listener, then the pivoted /system/agents/z/searchOne response is triggered, then GET /leak arrives carrying X-Plex-Token=local-... — the owner admin token, which then authenticates /:/prefs and /accounts with HTTP 200. On the patched build: subscription returns HTTP 400, no callback, no token.

Exit codes: 0 success, 2 no SSRF callback / no token / token rejected.

Notes an analyst will care about

  • X-Plex-Token is sent with a deliberately invalid value; the flaw is that the server checks header presence, not validity.
  • The token-exfiltration step uses sslip.io DNS: the hostname literally starts with 127.0.0.1 (passing the server's string-prefix check that is supposed to guard the owner token) but resolves to the attacker address. Without external DNS the pivot stage fails while --mode ssrf still works — the SSRF itself needs no DNS.
  • Scope note: this exploit stops at token theft (verified owner-tier access). The demonstrated chain runs through the loopback agent-function access (CVE-2026-96654) and the owner-token disclosure (CVE-2026-96655 — the tier this repository demonstrates); the final code-execution step (CVE-2026-96656, arbitrary file write via transcoder preferences) is out of scope here. The exfiltrated owner token is itself the demonstrated impact — it grants owner-tier API access over the (HTTP, unbound-preflight) server.
  • The lab binds 127.0.0.1:32400 / :32401 only; the containers declare ALLOWED_NETWORKS=127.0.0.1/32, so nothing is exposed to the internet.

Mitigation

  1. Upgrade to Plex Media Server 1.43.3.10861 or later.
  2. Where upgrading is not immediately possible: do not expose port 32400 to untrusted networks (both the SSRF source and the token prefix-check bypass are reachable via that port).
  3. Monitor for server-originated requests to non-Plex destinations and any unexpected outbound POSTs containing /player/timeline-shaped parameters.

Detection

  • The outbound POST is server-origin (no client connection to it) and contains stage=-prefixed query parameters shaped like :<protocol>/:<dest>/:/timeline.
  • A X-Plex-Token=local-... header leaving the server toward an external host is owner-token compromise — treat the instance as compromised and rotate the token.
  • Between the two callbacks a loopback request to /system/agents/z/searchOne appears in localhost traffic along with the forged GetResultFromNetwork plugin call.

Responsible use

This repository is security research material. The PoCs are written and verified against locally reconstructed lab instances only; do not run them against systems you do not own or have no explicit authorization to test. Verification tiers above separate what was demonstrated in that lab from what was not.

References

  • Plex Media Server advisory GHSA-5p7w-r379-3c2m (CVE-2026-96652)

About

Produced with the b63 // Agentic Exploit Foundry tooling; all exploitation ran in local containers (pinned images, loopback-only ports, no third-party targets). The material passed a fresh-context review pass before publication (identity scrub, claim-to-evidence mapping, lab reproducibility, tier honesty).

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

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