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B63-POC-CVE-2026-33186 — CVE-2026-33186 (grpc-go): authorization bypass via a slash-less HTTP/2 :path -- b63 showcase, lab-verified with patched and config-leg negatives | Kitploit
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basesixtythree/b63-poc-cve-2026-33186

B63-POC-CVE-2026-33186

CVE-2026-33186 (grpc-go): authorization bypass via a slash-less HTTP/2 :path -- b63 showcase, lab-verified with patched and config-leg negatives

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17 days agoNot yet reviewed

CVE-2026-33186 -- grpc-go :path authorization bypass

A denied, privileged gRPC method executes for an unauthenticated caller when the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header omits its mandatory leading slash.

Lab-verified PoC, a two-twin Docker lab (grpc-go v1.79.2 vulnerable / v1.79.3 patched), and the evidence transcripts for every claim below.

Overview

grpc-go's server strips the leading / from :path only when it is present, then splits on the last /. A path like admin.v1.Admin/DeleteUser therefore still routes to the right service and method -- but path-based authorization sees the raw, non-canonical string. A policy that denies a canonical path and allows everything else by default never matches the deny rule, so the denied RPC runs.

In this lab the denied method is admin.v1.Admin/DeleteUser on a policy of the exact shape the advisory describes (one deny rule on /admin.v1.Admin/DeleteUser plus an allow-all fallback). The attacker deletes the root-admin administrator account without ever authenticating.

Advisory facts

CVECVE-2026-33186
GHSAGHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3 (grpc/grpc-go)
ClassCWE-285 improper authorization; Red Hat also files CWE-551 (authorization before parsing/canonicalization)
CVSS 3.19.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (as published)
Affectedgoogle.golang.org/grpc < 1.79.3
Fixedv1.79.3 -- commit 72186f163e, PR #8981

Preconditions (both required, per the advisory): authorization is path-based (grpc/authz, or a custom interceptor reading grpc.Method(ctx) / a stream interceptor's FullMethod), and the policy denies specific canonical paths while allowing the rest by default.

One nuance worth stating because it is easy to get wrong: on protoc-generated unary handlers, UnaryServerInfo.FullMethod is a compile-time constant, so a unary interceptor that reads only that field sees the canonical path and is not bypassed. The vulnerable readers are grpc.Method(ctx), the grpc/authz package, and stream interceptors. The lab mirrors generated-stub semantics and logs both values side by side (evidence 01, 04).

Verification

Everything below was captured in this lab. "Captured" means the transcript is shipped; nothing here is claimed from reading the advisory alone. The evidence/ set was re-captured from a fresh clone of this repository at its current tip (after review found the first set was anchored to the private authoring tree), so every Command: line is a command a reader can run from the repo root; MANIFEST.txt is the sha256 inventory of the release tree.

claimlevelevidence
Two builds of one source tree: grpc-go v1.79.2 (vulnerable) and v1.79.3 (patched), pinned by tag commit, identity baked in and read back from the running containerscapturedevidence/01-lab-identity.txt
A stock grpc-go client (cc.Invoke with a slash-less method string) reproduces the bypass: canonical method -> PermissionDenied, slash-less -> the denied account deletioncapturedevidence/02-impact-go-stock-client.txt
Raw HTTP/2 driver (poc/exploit_opt.py, one TCP connection): control leg denied, bypass deletes root-admin, nonce-matched receipt + post-statecapturedevidence/03-impact-opt-driver.txt
Same via the annotated driver (poc/exploit_readable.py)capturedevidence/04-impact-readable-driver.txt
Patched v1.79.3 refuses with grpc-status 12 Unimplemented before interceptors; grpc-core logs its own rejection; store unchangedcapturedevidence/05-negative-patched.txt
Config leg: the byte-identical v1.79.3 binary with GRPC_GO_EXPERIMENTAL_DISABLE_STRICT_PATH_CHECKING=true restores the bypasscapturedevidence/06-config-escape-hatch.txt
Four-leg matrix, both drivers (vuln / patched / config / closed port)capturedevidence/07-matrix-four-legs.txt
Reliability, vulnerable twin: 10/10 hits (opt) and 5/5 (readable), fresh lab per runcapturedevidence/08-reliability-vulnerable.txt
Reliability, patched twin: 0/10 and 0/5 -- no false positivescapturedevidence/09-reliability-patched.txt
Non-vacuous control: on a vulnerable binary whose policy has no deny rule, both drivers refuse to claim a hit; exit codes 0/1/2/3 exercised livecapturedevidence/10-control-nonvacuity-exit-codes.txt
A lying target (status 0 with a plausible but unverifiable receipt) makes both drivers exit 1capturedevidence/11-receipt-validation-lying-target.txt

Not claimed: code execution (gRPC offers no shell primitive for this class), versions other than the two pins above, and any real deployment's authentication layer.

Files

poc/
  go_stock_client/       # primary driver: a stock grpc-go client (Go)
  exploit_opt.py         # raw HTTP/2 driver, compact (python-h2)
  exploit_readable.py    # raw HTTP/2 driver, staged and annotated (python-h2)
  tests/                 # fake gRPC target + post-condition test runner
lab/
  build.sh               # clones grpc-go v1.79.2 / v1.79.3, builds both twins
  compose.yml            # vulnerable / patched / config-escape-hatch / control
  runtime.Dockerfile
  server-src/main.go     # the twin server (grpc/authz policy + 2 services)
  server-assets/         # policies, seed roster, entrypoint
harness/
  matrix.sh              # four-leg matrix
  reliability.sh         # N-run loop, fresh lab per run
  verify-exitcodes.sh    # control non-vacuity + exit-code table
evidence/                # captured transcripts (path-scrubbed, see below)

Usage -- lab targets only

Every command below targets 127.0.0.1 containers built from this repo. Do not point any of this at a system you do not own or have written authorization to test.

Prerequisites

python3 -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install h2   # for the python drivers
cd lab && ./build.sh                                 # clones the two grpc-go tags
docker compose build
docker compose up -d --force-recreate

Four loopback-only services:

portrolebuild
19130vulnerablegrpc-go v1.79.2
19131patchedgrpc-go v1.79.3
19132config escape hatchv1.79.3 + GRPC_GO_EXPERIMENTAL_DISABLE_STRICT_PATH_CHECKING=true
19133controlv1.79.2 with an allow-all policy (no deny rule)

Primary: stock grpc-go client

No raw frames, no HTTP/2 library -- a normal grpc.NewClient + cc.Invoke, with the method string missing its leading slash:

(cd poc/go_stock_client && go build -o stockclient .)

# canonical method -> the deny rule fires
poc/go_stock_client/stockclient 127.0.0.1:19130 /admin.v1.Admin/DeleteUser b11-victim-1
#   INVOKE_ERROR: rpc error: code = PermissionDenied desc = unauthorized RPC request rejected

# slash-less method -> the denied RPC executes
poc/go_stock_client/stockclient 127.0.0.1:19130 admin.v1.Admin/DeleteUser b11-victim-2
#   INVOKE_OK: {"by_method":"admin.v1.Admin/DeleteUser","deleted_user":"b11-victim-2",...}

# against the patched twin the same call is refused before authorization runs
poc/go_stock_client/stockclient 127.0.0.1:19131 admin.v1.Admin/DeleteUser b11-victim-2
# the Unimplemented behavior below is DERIVED from the captured server-side
# transcripts (evidence 05 and 07 show grpc-status 12 + the core reject line
# for the same call shape); the transcript ships the server's rejection, not
# this wrapper's wording:
#   INVOKE_ERROR: rpc error: code = Unimplemented desc = malformed method name: ...

Byte-level reference: raw HTTP/2 drivers

The python drivers build the HEADERS frame themselves, which is how the malformed :path can be inspected and how the control leg (canonical path denied) is exercised in the same run:

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