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B63-POC-CVE-2026-115560 — PoC and verification material for CVE-2026-115560 (PHP session serializer confusion via session.upload_progress -> object injection -> RCE) | Kitploit
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B63-POC-CVE-2026-115560

PoC and verification material for CVE-2026-115560 (PHP session serializer confusion via session.upload_progress -> object injection -> RCE)

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1328 days agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-115560 — PHP session serializer confusion via session.upload_progress → unauthenticated object injection → RCE

PoC and verification material for CVE-2026-115560: PHP writes attacker-influenced upload-progress data into the session file under the configured serializer; an application that switches session.serialize_handler to php at runtime before session_start() then decodes those bytes with the php parser, whose record separator is the | character — handing the deserializer to attacker bytes. This repository demonstrates the resulting chain to unauthenticated remote command execution against a locally recreated lab built on PHP 8.5.12.

Status note (read first). The PHP project published an informational advisory for this CVE on 2026-10-23 and states the full advisory will ship with the next regular bugfix release. No CVSS score, CWE, affected-version range or GHSA has been published for this CVE at the time of this repository's release, and this repository asserts none. A CVSS 9.2 figure circulating in coverage of the October 21 PHP releases belongs to CVE-2026-109619 (a different bug); this material deliberately does not quote it. If the full vendor advisory changes the technical picture, this repository will be corrected in place.

Overview

PHP's advisory names the vulnerable combination:

An application must set session.serialize_handler to php_binary or php_serialize in its configuration and then switch it to php at runtime with ini_set() before calling session_start(). Session upload progress must also still be enabled.

Mechanism (observed against PHP 8.5.12 and consistent with the advisory text; courtesy of reading ext/session/session.c and main/rfc1867.c in the pinned 8.5.12 tree):

  1. A multipart upload with a PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS field makes the upload hook write an upload-progress record into the session file before the session module initializes the request — under the configured serializer (php_binary or php_serialize).
  2. Attacker-controlled strings (the uploaded filename, the progress field name) are carried inside that record.
  3. When the application then calls ini_set('session.serialize_handler','php') and session_start(), PHP decodes the file with the php decoder, which splits records on the first |. The attacker's | moves the parse start into attacker-chosen bytes.
  4. php_var_unserialize() runs on those bytes with class autoloading and destructors enabled → arbitrary object injection.
  5. Instantiating a class whose __destruct() persists a property to a path (this repository's lab ships a framework-style cache-writer class as the gadget surface) drops a webshell → command execution as the web user.

Two negative controls each individually break the chain — one of them is PHP's recommended mitigation (session.upload_progress.enabled=0), the other is the guard the advisory's preconditions imply the application owns (never switching the handler at runtime) — and both are verified as causal negative controls in this repository.

Vendor facts (quoted)

  • Vendor advisory: php.net news archive, 23 Oct 2026 — "Informational advisory: Session upload progress"; the preconditions quoted above are a condensation of that notice's wording (the notice URL is in References).
  • Mitigation, verbatim from the advisory: set session.upload_progress.enabled=0 until the next regular bugfix release. The same setting was already listed on 21 Oct 2026 as a mitigation for CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp).
  • Not fixed by any PHP release at the time of writing: 8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35 (the 21 Oct emergency releases covering CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) do not cover this CVE. The fix ships with the next regular bugfix release, and a patched-build negative therefore cannot be produced yet — this is stated, and it is why the negatives here are configuration negatives.

Verification tiers

Everything in the captured tier has the transcript that proves it, in evidence/, produced verbatim by tooling that records command, working directory, UTC timestamp and exit code. Everything in the second tier is documented, not reproduced here, with the reason.

#ClaimTierEvidence
1Lab fingerprint: PHP 8.5.12, serialize_handler=php_binary, upload progress on, mpm_prefork + mod_phpcapturedevidence/01-lab-fingerprint.txt
2The upload hook writes the php_binary record containing the attacker's | (byte dump); the handler-switching app then fails to decode the same session filecapturedevidence/02-poison-bytes-decode-mismatch.txt
3RCE, non-default cleanup=0 profile: poisoned record → confused decode → gadget __destruct writes a PHP shell → nonce-verified id//etc/passwd as uid=33(www-data)capturedevidence/03-direct-rce-cleanup0.txt
4RCE on the DEFAULT cleanup=1 profile: direct path fails (record erased at upload completion), concurrent request racing the streaming window lands the decodecapturedevidence/04-race-rce-default-cleanup.txt
5RCE with session.serialize_handler=php_serialize (the other serializer PHP names in the advisory)capturedevidence/07-rce-php-serialize-profile.txt
6Causality receipt for the no-switch negative: the identical poisoned request is rejected by the vulnerable app but accepted (progress key listed) by the consistent-handler appcapturedevidence/05-consistent-twin-decode-receipt.txt
7Both configuration negatives (upload progress off; no runtime switch), direct and race modes: exit 1, no nonce, no shell written — 4/4 exploit invocations across isolated docroots, each seed also byte-verified cleancapturedevidence/06-negatives-isolated-docroots.txt
8Reliability: 5/5 direct (cleanup=0) + 10/10 race (default profile) on the shipped implementationcapturedevidence/08-reliability-15-of-15.txt
9php_binary key-length ceiling measured with corrected numbers (55-byte key → 381-byte record; 172-byte key → 0-byte file, encoder skips over-long keys)capturedevidence/09-key-length-ceiling.txt
10Exit-code contract of both drivers (0 executed+nonce / 1 completed-no-execution / 2 usage / 3 transport), incl. malformed port → 2capturedevidence/10-exit-code-matrix.txt
AVulnerable PHP versions beyond 8.5.12 (e.g. the "> = 5.4" range implied by the code history)documented, not reproduced hereonly 8.5.12 was executed; the statement is source-derived from the pinned tree, labelled as such
BA stock Composer-library gadget chain (e.g. monolog)documented, not reproduced herethe shipped lab uses a lab-provided model class App\Cache\FileCache (framework-style cache writer); "RCE given any class with a file-writing destructor" is what the transcripts show — "RCE against framework X out of the box" is not claimed
CRace timing on a real (non-loopback) networkdocumented, not reproduced here10/10 was measured in-container on loopback with a 1.5 s settle; a real network adds jitter and no timing sweep was done
DA patched-build negativedocumented, not reproduced hereimpossible: no fixed PHP release exists yet

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