
Advisory and proof-of-concept for CVE-2026-115926: free5gc BSF exposes 13 unauthenticated SBI endpoints, enabling PCF binding manipulation and 5G control-plane hijack.
📢 Published Security Advisory
- GHSA: GHSA-5wxg-mj2c-p9p2
- CVE: CVE-2026-115926
- Reporter: aymen benlamari (@aymencdm) (accepted · credited)
- Vendor: free5gc · Package
github.com/free5gc/bsf· Published by Alonza0314
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Package | github.com/free5gc/bsf (Go) |
| Affected versions | <= 1754bde (BSF submodule) |
| Patched versions | None |
| Severity | Critical (9.1/10) |
| CVSS v3.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
| CWE | CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality | High |
| Integrity | High |
| Availability | None |
BSF — the Binding Support Function — is the only free5gc SBI-based NF with zero authentication on its HTTP API. It exposes 13 endpoints at /nbsf-management/v1 protected by no middleware at all. Any entity with network access to the BSF SBI port can create, read, modify, and delete PCF bindings for any subscriber — enabling control-plane redirection attacks against the entire 5G core.
Every other NF (AMF, SMF, UDM, UDR, AUSF, PCF, NSSF, CHF, NEF, NRF) wraps its routes with the RouterAuthorizationCheck middleware. BSF registers its routes directly in AddService() with no .Use() call.
| Doc | File | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Weakness Analysis | 01_weakness.md | CWE-306, root cause, code diff, BSF vs AMF |
| Prerequisites | 02_prerequisites.md | What an attacker needs |
| Attack Scenarios | 03_attack_scenarios.md | Control-plane hijack, exfiltration, DoS |
| PoC | poc-run-all.sh | Full 6-step no-auth chain |
| Commands | 04_commands.md | Full command log |
| Remediation | 05_remediation.md | Add RouterAuthorizationCheck middleware |
▶ Run the demo:
./poc-run-all.shrequires the project running on port 8089 , or edit the script