
Advisory and proof-of-concept documentation for CVE-2026-115925, a hard-coded free5gc Root CA private key (CWE-321) enabling NF certificate forgery and mTLS impersonation.
📢 Published Security Advisory
- GHSA: GHSA-grjj-c27p-3mgc
- CVE: CVE-2026-115925
- Reporter: aymen benlamari (@aymencdm) (accepted · credited)
- Vendor: free5gc · Published by Alonza0314
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Package | free5gc (Go) |
| Affected versions | v1.0.0 – v4.2.3+ |
| Patched versions | None |
| Severity | High (9.1/10) |
| CVSS v3.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N |
| CWE | CWE-321 — Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | High (requires HTTPS-Enabled SBI deployment) |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | Changed (PKI for all NFs) |
| Confidentiality | High |
| Integrity | High |
| Availability | None |
The free5gc repository ships an unencrypted Root Certificate Authority (CA) private key at cert/root.key (and a duplicate at NFs/bsf/cert/root.key). This key is the trust anchor that signs every network function certificate. It is identical across all deployments that haven't manually regenerated it.
The trap: default configs ship scheme: http, so the key sits dormant. But the only documented path to harden SBI (switching http → https) makes root.key the live trust anchor for NF-to-NF mTLS — meaning every operator who follows the security hardening guide unknowingly deploys with a publicly-known root of trust.
| Doc | File | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Weakness Analysis | 01_weakness.md | CWE-321 deep dive, PKI chain, code locations |
| Prerequisites | 02_prerequisites.md | What an attacker needs |
| Attack Scenarios | 03_attack_scenarios.md | MITM, impersonation, supply chain |
| Commands | 04_commands.md | Full step-by-step command log (manual reproduction) |
| Remediation | 05_remediation.md | Remove key, gitignore, per-deployment CA |
▶ Reproduction: No script ships for this folder — the exploit is a short OpenSSL sequence; run it step-by-step from
04_commands.md(extractcert/root.key→ forge an NF cert → verify withopenssl verify).