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CVE-2026-123007_nginx2root — Research kit for CVE-2026-123007 - NGINX HTTP/2 flow-control accounting bug leading to unauthenticated RCE | Kitploit
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GitHubaduli198/cve-2026-123007_nginx2root

CVE-2026-123007_nginx2root

Research kit for CVE-2026-123007 - NGINX HTTP/2 flow-control accounting bug leading to unauthenticated RCE

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11 day agoNot yet reviewed

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CVE-2026-123007 — HTTP/2 flow-control under-credit to RCE

An independent research kit for the unauthenticated NGINX HTTP/2 vulnerability described by Rapid7 as critical HTTP/2 integer underflow leading to RCE.

This repository is a rewrite, not a mirror. The wire behaviour and the calibrated target data are preserved where the target requires them; the implementation, tool layout, trigger, tests, and analysis are new. See NOTICE.md for provenance.

Scope. Everything here is for authorized testing of systems you own or operate, and for defensive research. The RCE client is calibrated for two specific NGINX builds; it is not a general-purpose exploit.

What the bug is, in one paragraph

NGINX tracks a connection-level send window and a per-stream window for every HTTP/2 response. When response DATA is queued, its length is charged against the connection window. When a stream is closed while such DATA is still untransmitted, HTTP/2 output cleanup refunds that length. A SETTINGS change that makes a stream window illegal closes the stream on a path that does not restore the "window ≤ 2³¹−1" invariant first. The refund therefore pushes the connection window above HTTP/2's maximum. The WINDOW_UPDATE guard computes MAX - current in unsigned arithmetic; once current > MAX that subtraction underflows and every subsequent maximum increment is accepted. Roughly 2³² of them walk a 64-bit window through its signed midpoint, turning it into a negative output length. NGINX inverts an output buffer around that length, the TLS coalescer passes the negative distance to memcpy as a huge size_t, and glibc's CPU-selected copy routine wraps at the address-space boundary — which both discloses memory and overwrites an adjacent request pool.

Details, with the exact state transitions and arithmetic:

  • docs/01-flow-control.md — the accounting failure
  • docs/02-window-to-memory.md — signed wrap and the copy
  • docs/03-heap-to-execution.md — leak, reclaim, callback
  • docs/04-lab-reproduction.md — run it
  • docs/05-detection-mitigation.md — find and stop it
  • docs/06-profile-reference.md — calibration fields

Layout

poc/
  trigger.py            portable accounting oracle + crash amplifier
  exploit.py            calibrated RCE client entry point
  profile_tool.py       validate, summarize, or remotely fingerprint a profile
  h2kit/                HTTP/2 frames, HPACK subset, TLS 1.3 record engine
  nginxh2/              prime → wrap → layout → leak → reclaim → execute
  profiles/             validated target calibrations (JSON)
  native/h2blast.c      constant-memory multi-gigabyte record sender
  tests/                offline component suite (41 tests)
lab/
  nginx.conf            minimal HTTP/2-over-TLS listener
  reproduce.sh          build, start, verify, run, clean up

Two clients, two purposes

poc/trigger.py — proving the root cause

The trigger is deliberately portable. Unlike earlier reproductions it does not read CPython's private SSLSocket layout through ctypes; it performs the handshake with ssl while a key log is enabled, then writes its own TLS 1.3 records from the logged traffic secret. That works on any CPython 3.8+ with OpenSSL 3.

python poc/trigger.py https://127.0.0.1:19443/ --skip-amplifier
python poc/trigger.py https://127.0.0.1:19443/

The first command stops after the accounting oracle: it prints

cleanup over-credit confirmed: connection window exceeded MAX and later frames are still accepted

and exits zero. That statement is independently checkable: the target reset both over-credited streams with FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR, released exactly the public bytes, and then answered a PING on the same connection.

The second command adds the amplifier. Success means the connection closed while the client was still uploading; confirm the worker death from NGINX's own log (worker process N exited on signal 11). A disconnect alone is not proof.

poc/exploit.py — command execution

poc/native/h2blast --version
python poc/exploit.py --target https://127.0.0.1:19443/ \
  --profile nginx-1.31.8-debian13-amd64 \
  --cmd 'touch /tmp/cve-2026-123007-proof'

The only valid success oracle is external: check that the marker exists inside the target's filesystem, owned by the worker's UID. The client's exit status and log line are not sufficient.

Build

python3 -m venv poc/.venv
poc/.venv/bin/pip install -r poc/requirements.txt
cc -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror poc/native/h2blast.c -lcrypto -o poc/native/h2blast
python -m unittest discover -s poc/tests -t poc -v

The native helper and the RCE client require a POSIX host. The trigger requires only Python and cryptography; the lab target requires Linux, Docker, and a CPU with avx512f + avx512vl.

Validation status

  • The offline suite passes locally: 41 tests, including byte-for-byte TLS record checks for all three TLS 1.3 suites, a captured HPACK response block, the profile validator, the leak locators, the forged-object layout, and the stage orchestrator.
  • The calibrated profile data is inherited from the published Rapid7 reproduction, where it was validated end-to-end against the pinned image.
  • The rewritten client has not been re-run end-to-end in this repository. Treat a live result as the only acceptance test, and expect allocator and scheduling sensitivity — see docs/04-lab-reproduction.md.

Requirements and failure modes

The RCE path assumes: direct TCP/TLS reachability (no TLS terminator or buffering proxy), one backend for all sockets, auxiliary connections that land on the same worker, a fresh worker heap, avx512f/avx512vl, glibc's selected memcpy, and a session that finishes inside the configured keepalive, send, and header timeouts. Failures are expected after substantial prior traffic, across load balancers, or on paths too slow to complete a ~1 GiB owner interval within 60 seconds.

Credits

Original vulnerability research, disclosure, and first public reproduction: Rapid7. This repository re-implements the clients and analysis and reuses the published calibration data for the two NGINX builds it names.

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