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CVE-2026-26399-Disclosure — Disclosure of a stack-based use-after-return vulnerability in Arduino_Core_STM32, detailing technical root cause, affected versions, and fix, with security impact analysis. | Kitploit
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GitHubacen28/cve-2026-26399-disclosure

CVE-2026-26399-Disclosure

Disclosure of a stack-based use-after-return vulnerability in Arduino_Core_STM32, detailing technical root cause, affected versions, and fix, with security impact analysis.

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1277 months agoNot yet reviewed

CVE-2026-26399: Stack-based Use-After-Return in Arduino_Core_STM32 (Legacy Versions)

Summary

A stack-based use-after-return vulnerability exists in legacy versions of Arduino_Core_STM32 prior to version 1.7.0.

The issue is located in the pwm_start() implementation, where a TIM_HandleTypeDef object is allocated on the stack and its address is passed into HAL initialization logic. That pointer may later be retained in a global timer handle registry and dereferenced asynchronously by interrupt service routines after the original stack frame has already returned.

This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2026-26399 by MITRE.

Affected Product

  • Product: Arduino_Core_STM32
  • Vendor / Project: stm32duino / STMicroelectronics ecosystem
  • Affected versions: v0.1.0 through v1.6.1
  • Fixed version: v1.7.0

Vulnerability Type

  • CWE-562: Use After Return
  • Stack-based dangling pointer / use-after-return

Technical Details

In the legacy implementation of pwm_start(), a TIM_HandleTypeDef structure is created as a local stack variable:

void pwm_start(...) {
    TIM_HandleTypeDef timHandle = {};
    HAL_TIM_PWM_Init(&timHandle);
    ...
}

The address of this local object is passed into HAL support logic and may be stored in global timer-management state, such as a global timer handle registry.

After pwm_start() returns, the stack object is no longer valid. However, subsequent asynchronous timer interrupt handlers may still dereference the stale pointer, causing memory corruption and undefined behavior.

Impact

Possible security impact includes:

  • Denial of Service (for example, crash or HardFault)
  • Potential code execution under favorable memory-layout and control conditions

Because this is a library-level issue, real exploitability depends on how the vulnerable library is integrated into firmware and how attacker-controlled input can influence stack reuse and interrupt timing.

Affected Components

  • cores/arduino/stm32/analog.c
  • pwm_start()
  • TIM_HandleTypeDef
  • global timer handle tracking logic (for example, timer_handles)

Fix

The issue appears to have been resolved indirectly in version 1.7.0 during a refactoring that replaced the previous stack-based handling path with a different timer-management design. No dedicated security advisory appears to have been issued for the legacy vulnerability.

Discovery

This issue was identified during firmware security research involving fuzzing and root-cause analysis of legacy STM32-based firmware built on Arduino_Core_STM32.

Vendor Contact

The vendor PSIRT was contacted. The response indicated that current versions are not affected because the issue had already been fixed in version 1.7.0, but no dedicated CVE appears to have been requested by the vendor at that time.

Credit

Discovered by Jin Chang.

References

  • Project repository: https://github.com/stm32duino/Arduino_Core_STM32
  • CVE ID: CVE-2026-26399
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