
Docker lab reproducing CVE-2026-123007, an nginx HTTP/2 flow-control integer underflow leading to RCE, plus a root cron privilege-escalation path for local practice.
A local, Docker-based reproduction of CVE-2026-123007, an HTTP/2 flow-control integer underflow in nginx that leads to remote code execution with the worker process's privileges. Published nginx versions 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 are affected when HTTP/2 is enabled; this image builds nginx 1.31.8 from source, on Alpine Linux, with TLS and HTTP/2 turned on, so the behavior can be studied against a real, pinned, vulnerable build rather than a simulation.
The container also carries a second, classic misconfiguration: a root cron job that runs a world-writable script every minute. That gives the lab a full path from an unauthenticated network foothold (the nginx worker user) to root, entirely on your own machine.
CVE-2026-123007 is public and already patched upstream (fixed in nginx 1.31.9 / 1.30.7). This lab exists to practice against a disclosed, documented vulnerability, not to target anything running in production.
References: JFrog Security Research, Wiz, Qualys
docker build / docker run also works)Using Compose:
docker compose up --build
Or plain Docker:
docker build -t nginx2root .
docker run --rm -p 9991:9991 nginx2root
The site is then reachable at https://localhost:9991. The certificate is
self-signed, so your browser or client will warn about it; that is expected.
Two flags are hidden in the container:
/home/user_flag.txt — reachable once you have code execution as the
nginx worker user./root/root_flag.txt — reachable only as root.The first step is the real CVE-2026-123007 foothold against the HTTPS service on port 9991. The second step is a local privilege-escalation misconfiguration inside the container; enumerate what is running with elevated privileges once you have a shell.
This image reproduces a real, disclosed, and already-patched vulnerability for local, isolated practice only. Do not expose port 9991 to a public network or the internet, and do not point any exploit at a target you do not own or have explicit permission to test.
docker compose down
or, without Compose:
docker stop nginx2root